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The American criminal justice system’s ills are by now so familiar as scarcely 
to bear repeating: unprecedented levels of incarceration, doled out disproportion-
ately across racial groups, and police that seem to antagonize and hurt the now-
distrustful communities they are tasked to serve and protect. Systemic social ail-
ments like these seldom permit straightforward diagnoses, let alone simple cures. In 
this case, however, a large, diverse, and influential group of experts—the legal acad-
emy’s “democratizers”—all identify the same disease: the retreat of local democratic 
control in favor of a bureaucratic “machinery” disconnected from public values and 
the people themselves. Neighborhood juries, for example, internalize the costs of pun-
ishing their own; neighborhood police, “of” and answerable to the community, think 
twice before drawing their weapons or stopping a local boy on a hunch. The experts 
and detached professionals who populate our dominant bureaucratic institutions, 
in contrast, are motivated by different, less salubrious, incentives. Across the gamut 
of criminal justice decision-making, the democratizers maintain, the influence of the 
local laity is a moderating, equalizing, and ultimately legitimating one. A generous 
dose of participatory democracy won’t solve all our problems, but it’s our best shot 
to get the criminal justice system back on its feet. 
This Article’s warning is plain: don’t take the medicine. “Democratization” 
wields undeniable rhetorical appeal but will not really fix what ails us—and may 
just make it worse. The democratization movement, this Article argues, rests on con-
ceptually problematic and empirically dubious premises about the makeup, prefer-
ences, and independence of local “communities.” It relies on the proudly counterin-
tuitive claim that laypeople are largely lenient and egalitarian, contrary to a wealth 
of social scientific evidence. And ultimately, democratization’s dual commitments 
are on a collision course. The democratizers simultaneously devote themselves to 
particular ends—amelioration of the biased and outsized carceral state—and to par-
ticular means—participatory democracy. What happens if, as this Article predicts, 
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the means do not produce the ends? Which commitment prevails? Worse yet, vener-
ating lay opinion distracts from alternative visions of “democratic” criminal justice 
that more credibly tackle the critical question of how best to blend public accounta-
bility with evidence and expertise. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For the uninitiated, a brief rehearsal of the facts of the mat-
ter: The United States presently incarcerates over two million in-
dividuals, with another four million under other forms of correc-
tional supervision.1 The nation’s imprisonment rate is the highest 
in the world,2 while its crime rates are about average.3 One-third 
of American inmates are black.4 One in three black males in the 
United States will be incarcerated before he dies.5 Figures like 
these are far out of line with national population demographics 
and do not simply reflect differential rates of offending across ra-
cial groups.6 These “twin problems”—“overall severity” and “dis-
parate treatment of African-Americans”7—plague American po-
licing as well. American law enforcement officers killed over 1,100 
individuals in 2017, more than 300 of them black.8 From 2004 to 
2012 in New York City alone, police conducted 4.4 million pedes-
trian stops, targeting black individuals more than half the time.9 
 
 1 Danielle Kaeble and Mary Cowhig, Correctional Populations in the United States, 
2016 *2 (US Department of Justice, Apr 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/GT2Z-LJKA. 
 2 Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population List *2 (Institute for Criminal Policy Re-
search 12th ed 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/Q4XU-3DZW. 
 3 See Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social, Psycho-
logical and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal 
Law, 1 Buff Crim L Rev 23, 37–38 (1997). The US homicide rate, for example, is below the 
world average. See Global Study on Homicide 2019 *11, 27 (UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime, Apr 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/BR3S-F5JQ. 
 4 See E. Ann Carson, Prisoners in 2016 *5 tbl 3 (US Department of Justice, Jan 
2018), archived at https://perma.cc/3DYA-DQYR. 
 5 Thomas P. Bonczar, Prevalence of Imprisonment in the US Population, 1974–2001 
*1 (US Department of Justice, Aug 2003), archived at https://perma.cc/3X7D-TSAG. The 
one-in-three statistic has been criticized as stale, though a conservative updated estimate 
still puts it at one in four. See Glenn Kessler, The Stale Statistic That One in Three Black 
Males ‘Born Today’ Will End Up in Jail (Wash Post, June 16, 2015), online at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/06/16/the-stale-statistic 
-that-one-in-three-black-males-has-a-chance-of-ending-up-in-jail/ (visited Feb 19, 2020) 
(Perma archive unavailable). 
 6 See Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Race and Punishment: Racial Perceptions of Crime and 
Support for Punitive Policies *20–22 (The Sentencing Project, Sept 2014), archived at 
https://perma.cc/UB68-WHCB. 
 7 John Paul Stevens, Book Review, Our ‘Broken System’ of Criminal Justice (NY 
Rev Books, Nov 10, 2011), archived at https://perma.cc/WD92-XLYX. 
 8 See 2017 Police Violence Report (Mapping Police Violence), archived at 
https://perma.cc/38L8-3RQ3. 
 9 Floyd v City of New York, 959 F Supp 2d 540, 558–59 (SDNY 2013). 
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Unsurprisingly, public attitudes toward, and trust in, law en-
forcement diverge sharply along racial lines.10 Talk of a crisis of 
legitimacy in American policing is commonplace.11 
Given broad academic consensus on these points, the press-
ing questions are how we got here and, especially, how we can get 
out. Theories proliferate. Notably, though, a diverse and accom-
plished group of scholars, following different intellectual paths, 
have recently converged upon the same basic conclusion. The re-
treat of local democratic control over criminal justice, these writ-
ers argue, precipitated the system’s collapse; to reverse course, 
reformers must curb the influence of bureaucrats and redirect 
power to local communities to stimulate “bottom-up populism.”12 
Aspects of this account have a decidedly counterintuitive cast: 
they require us to accept that politically liberal reforms to profes-
sionalize police and prosecutors, protect minority rights, and en-
sure equality of punishment across defendants had unintended 
and ultimately perverse effects. Yet however counterintuitive the 
theory may have been at its inception, the notion that we ought 
to “trad[e] a good deal of expertise for a little democracy,” wrote 
Professor David Sklansky in 2008, “probably reflects the general 
view among scholars today.”13 
The thesis is perhaps most strongly associated with the late 
Professor Bill Stuntz, the preeminent criminal procedure scholar 
of his generation. 14  “For much of American history,” Stuntz 
 
 10 Only 30 percent of African Americans report a high degree of trust in the police as 
compared to 45 percent of Hispanics and 61 percent of whites. Jim Norman, Confidence in 
Police Back at Historical Average (Gallup, July 10, 2017), archived at 
https://perma.cc/LV2B-QYGJ. 
 11 See, for example, President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of 
the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing *9–11 (US Department of Justice Of-
fice of Community Oriented Policing Services, May 2015), archived at 
https://perma.cc/9LN5-28UA; Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal 
Estrangement, 126 Yale L J 2054, 2058–59 (2017) (explaining that “[m]any scholars and 
policymakers have settled on a ‘legitimacy deficit’ as the core diagnosis of the frayed rela-
tionship between police forces and the communities they serve”). 
 12 Stephanos Bibas, The Machinery of Criminal Justice xxvi (Oxford 2012). 
 13 David Alan Sklansky, Democracy and the Police 230 n 81 (Stanford 2008) (quota-
tion marks omitted), quoting William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 
100 Mich L Rev 505, 586 (2001). 
 14 See Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 Nw U L Rev 
1367, 1403 (2017) (referring to Stuntz as “a founding father of the democratization point 
of view” who “would have been among us [democratizers] had he lived”). Reading Stuntz’s 
work as a whole, the actual extent of its overlap with the democratization agenda is un-
clear. Stuntz, “hardly an unqualified foe of judicial activism,” was “deeply committed to 
the project of rationalist reform” and rejected a criminal law designed to express or reflect 
moral values rather than, fundamentally, to govern. See David Alan Sklansky, Stealing 
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writes, “outside the South[,] criminal justice institutions pun-
ished sparingly, mostly avoided the worst forms of discrimination, 
controlled crime effectively, and, for the most part, treated those 
whom the system targets fairly.”15 Then, around the end of the 
Gilded Age, coincident with the Great Migration of African  
Americans to Northern cities, crime began to concentrate in poor 
urban neighborhoods while suburban populations exploded.16 
Given that prosecutors and judges are typically elected at the 
county level, while police are a city institution, this means subur-
ban and wealthy urban voters now had relatively more power 
over urban criminal justice.17 These voters, however, enjoying his-
torically low crime rates following World War II, had little reason 
to care about local criminal justice, and everyday policing and 
prosecution became the job of often-distant technocrats.18 “These 
professionals and experts,” Stuntz laments, “changed the justice 
system almost entirely for the worse.”19 The upshot: the mostly 
black residents of today’s poor city neighborhoods, where crime 
rates are highest, “have less ability than in the past to govern the 
police officers and prosecutors who govern them.”20 And “[a]s local 
democracy has faded . . . discrimination has grown more common, 
and criminal punishment has become prone to extremes.”21 
The solution, urges Stuntz, is to reverse course. “If criminal 
justice is to grow more just,” Stuntz reasons, “those who bear the 
costs of crime and punishment alike must exercise more power 
over those who enforce the law and dole out punishment.”22 “Make 
criminal justice more locally democratic,” the argument goes, 
“and justice will be more moderate, more egalitarian, and more 
effective at controlling crime.”23 What we need is “a large dose of 
the local democracy that once ruled American criminal justice.”24 
 
Bill Stuntz, in Michael J. Klarman, David A. Skeel, and Carol S. Steiker, eds, The Political 
Heart of Criminal Procedure: Essays on Themes of William J. Stuntz 87, 88, 93, 98–101 
(Cambridge 2012). Sklansky called Stuntz the “Charles Dickens of criminal procedure 
scholars”—“everyone wanted [him] as an ally and everyone saw in him a sympathetic 
soul.” Id at 87. 
 15 William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice 2 (Belknap 2011). 
 16 Id at 7, 16–22, 35. 
 17 Id at 35. 
 18 Id at 7, 193. 
 19 Stuntz, Collapse of American Criminal Justice at 194 (cited in note 15). 
 20 Id at 7. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Stuntz, Collapse of American Criminal Justice at 39 (cited in note 15). 
 24 Id at 8. 
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Community policing, for Stuntz, is a promising start; better yet 
would be “more jury trials in order to give local citizens . . . the 
power to decide who merits punishment and who doesn’t.”25 
An expanding literature supplies numerous consonant ac-
counts. What unites them is a conviction that the “root of the pre-
sent crisis,” in Professor Josh Kleinfeld’s phrasing, “is a set of bu-
reaucratic attitudes, structures, and incentives divorced from the 
American public’s concerns and sense of justice.”26 The prescrip-
tion, in turn, is complementary: “[M]ake criminal justice more 
community focused and responsive to lay influences.”27 The cast 
of “democratizers” reads like a who’s who of contemporary crimi-
nal justice scholars representing a range of methodological and 
ideological perspectives—momentum has only grown in the dec-
ade since Sklansky called the preference for democracy over ex-
pertise “the general view among scholars today.”28 Stuntz and 
Kleinfeld’s fellow travelers include, to varying degrees, now-
Judge Stephanos Bibas, as well as Professors Laura Appleman, 
Rick Bierschbach, Josh Bowers, Robert Burns, Adriaan Lanni, 
Tracey Meares, Janice Nadler, Paul Robinson, Dorothy Roberts, 
Jonathan Simon, Jocelyn Simonson, and Tom Tyler, among oth-
ers. There is now a democratization “manifesto” and a group- 
authored white paper of detailed policy proposals.29 
This Article’s claim is that we follow this path of “democrati-
zation” at considerable peril. As a rhetorical weapon, “democratic 
criminal justice” has undeniable power, if sometimes troubling 
imprecision. Were scholarship but a battle of rhetoric, I would 
contemplate surrender. Who, after all, could be against democ-
racy?30  In fact, my sympathy for the democratization position 
runs deeper still—I wish we lived in a world in which the democ-
ratizers’ plans would work. Yet, as political scientist Robert Dahl 
cautioned, “There is a great variety of empirical facts that one 
needs to know . . . before one can rationally decide on the kinds of 
 
 25 Id. 
 26 Kleinfeld, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1376 (cited in note 14). 
 27 Id. 
 28 See Sklansky, Democracy and the Police at 230 n 81 (cited in note 13). 
 29 Kleinfeld, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1376–77 (cited in note 14). See also generally Joshua 
Kleinfeld, et al, White Paper of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 Nw U L Rev 1693 (2017). 
 30 On the rhetorical power of the democratic ideal, see Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? 
Democracy and Power in an American City 317 (Yale 1961) (“To reject the democratic creed 
is in effect to refuse to be an American.”); James A. Stimson, Tides of Consent: How Public 
Opinion Shapes American Politics 170 (Cambridge 2004) (“The word ‘democracy’ is bound 
up with symbolism, belief, patriotism, and a quasi-religious commitment.”). 
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political rules one wants to follow in the real world.”31 My concern 
is that the pertinent empirical facts do not favor the democratiz-
ers’ designs. This skepticism is grounded in social scientific re-
search—drawn from political science, psychology, sociology, eco-
nomics, criminology, and empirical legal studies—about public 
attitudes toward punishment, racial bias, judicial behavior, group 
decision-making, and more. The democratizers overlook or mini-
mize much of this work, emphasizing theoretical arguments and, 
on central issues, a surprisingly small number of empirical stud-
ies they claim favor their position. When all the evidence is fairly 
weighed, the argument for more participatory democracy becomes 
significantly harder to sustain, at least if the goal is a better crim-
inal justice system rather than participation for its own sake. 
I begin, in Part I, by describing and organizing the democra-
tization literature. This requires interweaving myriad scholarly 
works by creative and independent-minded authors, some of 
whom might resist being lumped together or disagree with por-
tions of the democratization agenda.32 Yet any slight overgenerali-
zation is justified by the important shared assumptions it reveals. 
I am indebted here to Kleinfeld, whose sweeping pro-democratiza-
tion “manifesto” helped me organize my own thinking. Kleinfeld 
rightly acknowledges “a range of opinion within the democratiza-
tion movement on the degree to which criminal justice should be 
open to . . . popular-majoritarian control.”33 Yet democratization 
is also a “big tent movement”—to be a member, “it is enough to 
think the arrow of reform points toward more democracy,” as the 
 
 31 Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 52 (Chicago 1956). See also Brian 
Leiter, The Roles of Judges in Democracies: A Realistic View *6–16 (University of Chicago 
Public Law & Legal Theory Paper Series No 622, Mar 17, 2017), archived at 
https://perma.cc/QQ3V-TTDT (describing a “realistic view of democracy”). See generally 
Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels, Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not 
Produce Responsive Government (Princeton 2016) (arguing that folk theories of democracy 
collapse in the face of social scientific evidence about the behavior of democratic citizens). 
 32 See, for example, Josh Bowers, Upside-Down Juries, 111 Nw U L Rev 1655, 1665–
66 (2017) (“I do not prize popular participation qua participation.”); Tracey Meares, Polic-
ing and Procedural Justice: Shaping Citizens’ Identities to Increase Democratic Participa-
tion, 111 Nw U L Rev 1525, 1526 (2017) (“I think I am more of a fan of bureaucracy than 
the organizers of this [democratization] Symposium may be.”); Dorothy E. Roberts, De-
mocratizing Criminal Law as an Abolitionist Project, 111 Nw U L Rev 1597, 1604 (2017) 
(critiquing the procedural justice aspect of democratization); Jocelyn Simonson, Democra-
tizing Criminal Justice Through Contestation and Resistance, 111 Nw U L Rev 1609, 1611 
(2017) (“Relying on deliberation and consensus ignores the ways in which our current 
criminal justice system relegates African-Americans and other marginalized populations 
to non-democratic subjects.”). 
 33 Kleinfeld, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1399–1400 (cited in note 14). 
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democratizers define it, “not less.”34 Indeed, the nineteen authors 
of the democratization white paper insist that their views, while 
not identical, “do not vary so much as to undermine the distinc-
tiveness of [their] identity as a school of thought in criminal law 
and procedure and a movement in criminal justice reform.”35 
In unpacking the democratization literature, it helps to dis-
tinguish among democratization’s principles, purposes, and con-
crete proposals. Democratization’s principles feature a commit-
ment to widespread lay participation in criminal justice and an 
aversion to bureaucratic and expert control. “The idea that crime 
should be kept out of public life,” the democratizers think, “safely 
handled by a coterie of experts, was and remains profoundly anti-
democratic.”36 
Democratization’s purposes begin with attacking the criminal 
justice system’s “twin problems”: severity and inequality. Ampli-
fying the laity’s voice, meanwhile, and aligning the criminal law 
with community values, will boost the law’s legitimacy, or moral 
credibility, promoting respect and compliance—in turn, one 
hopes, permitting even greater leniency. Finally, the democratiz-
ers pursue a constellation of benefits intrinsic to participation it-
self. Some of these sound in nonconsequentialist terms, such as 
the simple satisfaction of a community’s desire to participate. 
Others are rooted in consequentialist grounds ancillary to crimi-
nal justice: participation promotes engagement in civic life and 
builds social capital. 
Next are the democratizers’ discrete policy proposals, which 
can be loosely sorted into four groups. The first contains diverse 
recommendations for substantive law reform, like downgrading 
offense levels and thinning the criminal code. Proposals in the 
second group involve altering structural incentives to temper po-
licing and prosecution and promote procedural justice, such as by 
forcing localities to internalize the fiscal costs of punishment and 
evaluating the police on measures that reflect community trust. 
The third group envisions citizen advisory and oversight commit-
tees working alongside legislatures, police, prosecutors, and cor-
rections officials. The final cluster concerns jury reform: more—
and more representative—juries, not just for guilt determination 
but also charging, bail, plea bargaining, and sentencing. 
 
 34 Id at 1400. 
 35 Kleinfeld, et al, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1697 (cited in note 29). 
 36 Ian Loader, Fall of the ‘Platonic Guardians’: Liberalism, Criminology, and Politi-
cal Responses to Crime in England and Wales, 46 Brit J Crimin 561, 582 (2006). 
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I will not be quite ready, after laying all of this out, to pivot 
from description to critique. For my objection is not to the democ-
ratizers’ principles and proposals in the abstract, or to their pur-
poses, which I generally support. My objection instead concerns 
what I take to be their fundamental premises: the empirical facts 
that must be true for their principles—and the proposals designed 
to implement them—to achieve their intended purposes. My ob-
jection, in other words, is not to participatory democracy writ 
large, but rather to whether the mechanisms of participatory de-
mocracy the democratizers propose will yield the criminal justice 
outcomes they claim to desire. 
The last task of Part I, then, is to elaborate these premises. 
The democratization project, I argue, requires that: (1) people re-
side in cohesive communities that are able—in fact, yearn—to ex-
press collective values about criminal justice; (2) people are rela-
tively lenient, at least toward their own community members; 
(3) the bureaucracy is comparatively more severe; (4) people are 
egalitarian, at least, again, toward their neighbors and friends; and 
(5) giving people voice, and aligning the law with community val-
ues, will bolster the legitimacy and moral credibility of the system, 
leading to better law compliance and cooperation with authorities. 
These premises are simple enough to state but—perhaps be-
cause we (all of us) want them to be true—rebutting them re-
quires extensive argument. That is the task of Part II, the Arti-
cle’s heart. The democratization position, I argue, rests on 
conceptually problematic and empirically dubious premises about 
the existence, makeup, preferences, and independence of local 
“communities” and ignores the ways in which deliberative mech-
anisms tend to amplify predictably dominant voices. It does not 
fairly weigh the evidence on public attitudes toward punishment, 
the political economy of sentencing, or the benefits insulated bu-
reaucratic institutions can provide. It naively assumes that people 
will go easy on “their own” despite considerable contrary evidence. 
And it exaggerates the empirical case for inducing compliance 
through procedural justice and empirical desert techniques. 
The very possibility that democratization might not deliver 
what it aims to accomplish exposes the fragility of the democra-
tizers’ big-tent coalition. The democratizers purport to commit 
simultaneously to principles (means) and purposes (ends) they be-
lieve those principles will promote. What happens if, as my evi-
dence suggests, the means do not produce the ends? The move-
ment will surely splinter. On one side will be those committed to 
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the principles of lay participation, wherever they may lead. Such 
a philosophy is their prerogative, of course, but they are disingen-
uous to wrap themselves in the rhetoric of the resistance. On the 
other side will be those committed to decarceration, however ac-
complished. Their belief in democratization is shallow and contin-
gent; they do not wish to effectuate community values that con-
flict with their own reform prescriptions. The people matter only 
insofar as they provide strategic cover for, and legitimation of, 
what is ultimately an expert-driven agenda. 
Part III, the conclusion, gestures toward alternative visions 
of “democratic” criminal justice, some of which unabashedly seek 
to emphasize expert perspectives. Actually, many of the democra-
tizers’ own proposals are not only consistent with top-down,  
expert-driven reforms, but also are more plausibly viewed as 
such. This is not a criticism, to my mind. Indeed, one of democra-
tization’s shortcomings may be that it obscures the potential of 
additional such improvements to the system. That being said, 
practical constraints prevent the elaboration of a well-specified 
alternative model of reform, and Part III endeavors only to illu-
minate a few plausible directions. 
Many readers will already have observed that these are, in a 
sense, old battles being refought. The conflict between lay and ex-
pert governance is as old as democracy itself,37 and domestically 
predates the Founding. (Just ask Alexander Hamilton.38) Even 
within criminal justice circles, the pendulum has been swinging 
for decades. Early reformers professionalized criminal justice in-
stitutions to address one set of problems and, when crime rates 
climbed in the 1970s and 1980s, were blamed for another. Politics 
then pried control from expert hands.39 Academics, in turn, force-
fully criticized this populist shift, which generated a raft of deeply 
punitive policies like “three-strikes” laws.40 And now the democ-
ratizers present an academic defense of populist criminal justice 
 
 37 See Ilya Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government Is 
Smarter 7–9 (Stanford Law 2d ed 2016) (summarizing debates over lay political ignorance 
beginning with Plato and Aristotle). 
 38 Max Farrand, ed, 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 299 (Yale 1911) 
(remarks of Alexander Hamilton) (“The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of 
God; and however generally this maxim has been quoted and believed, it is not true in fact.”). 
 39 See David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contempo-
rary Society 13 (Chicago 2001). 
 40 See generally, for example, Michael Tonry, Thinking About Crime: Sense and Sen-
sibility in American Penal Culture (Oxford 2004); Julian V. Roberts, et al, Penal Populism 
and Popular Opinion: Lessons from Five Countries (Oxford 2003); Franklin E. Zimring, 
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alongside a platform for refined, and even more far-reaching, 
changes. 
My intervention does not simply repeat the last generation’s 
critique of populist criminal justice policies, though certainly I 
benefit from their labor. My target is not the political realm but 
specifically the intellectual framework the democratizers have 
erected to justify the investment of power in the laity. In addition, 
the body of social science evidence that bears on these questions 
has ballooned in the past two decades or so. I respond, in other 
words, to arguments that were largely unarticulated, with evi-
dence that was mostly unavailable, when the previous generation 
wrote.41 
If it is true, as many say, that we are in the midst of a crimi-
nal justice “moment,” when extraordinary reform may be possi-
ble, it is essential to scrutinize the evidence that bears on what 
kind of democracy we ought to demand in the criminal justice do-
main. Participatory and deliberative democracy are gathering 
momentum as potential answers to this crucial question. This Ar-
ticle seeks to pump the brakes and initiate a more nuanced con-
versation about where that will really lead. 
I.  THE CASE FOR DEMOCRATIZATION 
This Part synthesizes and structures the democratization 
project. Part I.A identifies the democratizers’ core principles and 
situates them within broader debates about the nature of democ-
racy writ large. It also explains how democratization relates to 
localism. Part I.B explains the democratizers’ purposes. Part I.C 
walks through their concrete policy proposals. Finally, Part I.D 
extracts the central premises that support the democratization 
agenda. The democratizers are less explicit about some of these 
 
Gordon Hawkins, and Sam Kamin, Punishment and Democracy: Three Strikes and You’re 
Out in California (Oxford 2001). 
 41 The closest account may be Sklansky’s treatment of the relationship between dem-
ocratic theory and policing. Sklansky draws upon insights from the “democratic pluralists” 
to identify blind spots in contemporary thinking about democratic policing. These insights, 
which echo throughout this Article, include the “dangers of assuming a unified public; the 
grounds for skepticism about the feasibility, necessity, and desirability of universal polit-
ical engagement . . . and the democratic attractions of modernity.” Sklansky, Democracy 
and the Police 108 (cited in note 13). Similar themes appear in Professor Rachel Barkow’s 
recent book. See generally Rachel Elise Barkow, Prisoners of Politics: Breaking the Cycle 
of Mass Incarceration (Belknap 2019). 
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premises than others. Nevertheless, here, as throughout the Ar-
ticle, I prioritize fidelity to the democratizers’ own expressed 
views, while necessarily eliding distinctions to some extent. 
A. Principles 
The democratization project aims to increase opportunities 
for ordinary citizens to participate in, deliberate about, and ulti-
mately influence criminal justice policymaking and adjudication. 
In this sense, the “democratization” label is unfortunately 
vague—democracy is, as the democratizers acknowledge, “a pro-
foundly contested concept.”42 Yet the democratizers have some-
thing quite specific in mind: to infuse criminal justice not just 
with “democracy” in some general sense, but with deliberative and 
participatory democracy. These traditions “insist, as their names 
imply, on the importance of the broader political community’s de-
liberation on matters of public concern and participation in the 
activity of government.”43 
Voting is one form of lay participation. Professor Kleinfeld, 
for example, emphasizes the “absolutely central place of voting in 
all democracy as such.”44 Nevertheless, representative democracy 
is clearly too weak to quench the democratizers’ democratic thirst. 
They criticize “skeptical, minimalist” conceptions of democracy 
that consist “essentially in choosing which set of elites rules at a 
given time.”45 Yet they are even more distrustful of arrangements 
that would keep important issues from the voters and bureau-
crats who are insulated from public accountability.46 
The democratizers also believe in downsizing the role of crim-
inal justice bureaucrats and experts.47 While there are, of course, 
 
 42 Kleinfeld, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1378 (cited in note 14). This is a major theme of 
Sklansky’s work on democratic policing and prosecution. See Sklansky, Democracy and 
the Police at 108 (cited in note 13); David Alan Sklansky, Unpacking the Relationship 
Between Prosecutors and Democracy in the United States, in Máximo Langer and David 
Alan Sklansky, eds, Prosecutors and Democracy: A Cross-National Study 276, 283–86 
(Cambridge 2017). 
 43 Kleinfeld, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1378 (cited in note 14).  
 44 Id at 1394. 
 45 Id at 1383–84, discussing Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and De-
mocracy 252–53 (Routledge 5th ed 2003). 
 46 See, for example, Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at xxi (cited in note 12) 
(arguing that the ability of legal insiders to operate independently from the public’s inter-
est and without its full understanding “subverts democracy”). 
 47 See, for example, id at 105 (criticizing “expert-worship”); id at 129 (lamenting the 
criminal justice system’s “legalese and mathematical gobbledygook”). There are some ex-
ceptions. Professor Meares, in particular, has advocated greater use of empiricism and 
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ways for the laity and bureaucracy to collaborate, decisional in-
fluence is at bottom a zero-sum game. The democratizers see 
themselves as reversing a trend in which lawyers and experts 
have “stolen” the criminal law—and the community morality it 
embodies—from the people, and replaced it with a “scientific lan-
guage of efficiency and deterrence.”48 The democratizers do not 
generally maintain that experts are evil or ill-intentioned. Ex-
perts are more often portrayed as indifferent (homo economicus 
in pursuit of a promotion and leisure time) or well-meaning but 
misguided (Warren Court justices, in Stuntz’s famous account, 
who set out to protect the downtrodden but ended up making 
things worse). 49  Either way, the democratizers offer a deeply 
skeptical take on a privileged cadre who think they know best but, 
in reality, lack the passion, personal investment, and local wis-
dom of the people themselves.50 
Finally, democratization is entangled, in application, with lo-
calism, a distinct but overlapping theory about how to organize 
state power in a federal system.51 In the abstract, one can envision 
a local, expert-driven bureaucracy or participatory democracy on 
a large scale, such as a statewide referendum. That said, for a 
host of reasons, the democratizers focus on the local level, where 
populist reform is most likely to gain traction.52 Accordingly, I will 
frequently refer to “local democracy” or participatory “community 
justice” not because the concepts are analytically linked but be-
cause they run together in practice. 
As should now be evident, I will not address all arguments 
about the relationship between democracy (of whatever sort) and 
 
social science research in criminal procedure. See, for example, Tracey Meares and Tom 
Tyler, Policing: A Model for the Twenty-First Century, in Angela J. Davis, ed, Policing the 
Black Man: Arrest, Prosecution, and Imprisonment 161, 173 (Pantheon 2017).  
 48 Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at xxiv, 86 (cited in note 12). See also Nils 
Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 Brit J Crimin 1, 3–5 (1977). 
 49 See Stuntz, Collapse of American Criminal Justice at 216–43 (cited in note 15). 
 50 The democratizers insist they are not radicals, and resist only the system’s com-
plete bureaucratization. See, for example, Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at xxv 
(cited in note 12); Kleinfeld, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1381 (cited in note 14). However, their 
rhetoric consistently suggests a more ambitious program. After all, no one is arguing for 
total bureaucratization, so far as I am aware. 
 51 For a helpful explication of the relationship between democratization and localism, 
with focus on the latter, see generally Elizabeth Jánszky, Note, Defining the “Local” in a 
Localized Criminal Justice System, 94 NYU L Rev 1318 (2019). 
 52 Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at xxvi (cited in note 12). See also Stuntz, 
Collapse of American Criminal Justice at 283 (cited in note 15) (asserting that “[t]he keys 
to useful reform” include “decentralization [and] local democracy”). 
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criminal justice. I am not focused here, for example, on the trou-
bling effects of criminal justice on democracy—the ways in which 
the system undermines self-governance by excluding millions of 
Americans from the democratic process and civic life more gener-
ally.53 My topic is the arrow that runs in the other direction: the 
effects of democracy—deliberative and participatory democracy, 
in particular—on criminal justice. The two may be related, of 
course: a more inclusive polity might, through democratic partic-
ipation, produce a better system than the polity that governs to-
day. This does require certain assumptions, not clearly supported 
by the available evidence,54 about the ways in which these cur-
rently excluded individuals would contribute. In any event, my 
approach will be to take the polity as I find it and examine how it 
would, if empowered in the ways the democratizers envision, 
shape criminal justice, and not the other way around. 
B. Purposes 
What, exactly, the democratizers aim to accomplish varies 
across scholarly accounts. Yet four principal purposes cover most 
of the terrain. The first two are simply stated: the democratizers 
hope to reduce mass incarceration and mitigate racial disparity 
in the administration of criminal justice. 55  Again, particulars 
vary—concern about mass incarceration, for example, can encom-
pass sentencing, overcriminalization, prosecutorial power, polic-
ing, and even prison conditions. But a clear through-line emerges 
in these accounts: the democratizers aim to make the system less 
harsh and less discriminatory. 
 
 53 See generally Amy E. Lerman and Vesla M. Weaver, Arresting Citizenship: The 
Democratic Consequences of American Crime Control (Chicago 2014); Bell, 126 Yale L J 
2054 (cited in note 11). 
 54 See, for example, James M. Binnall, A Field Study of the Presumptively Biased: Is 
There Empirical Support for Excluding Convicted Felons from Jury Service?, 36 L & Pol 
1, 15–16 (2014) (finding that convicted felons, on average, exhibit a prodefense bias, but 
not greater than that of law students); Thomas J. Miles, Felon Disenfranchisement and 
Voter Turnout, 33 J Legal Stud 85, 85 (2004) (finding that felon disenfranchisement has 
“no discernible effect on state-level rates of voter turnout”). 
 55 See, for example, Albert W. Dzur, Participatory Democracy and Criminal Justice, 
6 Crim L & Phil 115, 115 (2012) (asking whether there is a “role for an active public in 
ratcheting down the tough-minded politics of crime control in the United States”); Adriaan 
Lanni, Implementing the Neighborhood Grand Jury, in Roger Anthony Fairfax Jr, ed, 
Grand Jury 2.0: Modern Perspectives on the Grand Jury 171, 172 (Carolina Academic 
2011) (“[P]ermitting local community members to play an active role in prosecutorial 
charging decisions and policies would help alleviate some of the political pathologies that 
have led to mass incarceration and the crisis of legitimacy.”). 
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The third purpose concerns the law’s moral authority. 
Largely because the criminal justice system is too harsh and too 
discriminatory, Stuntz observes, it “strikes many of its targets as 
wildly unjust.”56 Judge Bibas blames bureaucratization directly 
for the system’s legitimacy deficit. He points to plea bargaining 
and other “trends that have professionalized and mechanized the 
criminal justice system so much that it is out of touch with ordi-
nary people’s expectations and desires.”57 The democratizers offer 
their program partly to remedy this problem. The underlying mo-
tivation, for many democratizers, is instrumental: legitimacy pro-
motes compliance with the law—crime control—and cooperation 
and engagement with authorities.58 
The fourth and final purpose is largely ancillary to the other 
three. It involves a constellation of benefits thought to inhere in 
participation itself. At times, these aims take on a nonconsequen-
tialist cast. In describing deliberative democracy, Kleinfeld as-
serts that the “end is to ensure that the individuals who comprise 
society can participate in ‘democratic opinion- and will- 
formation,’ and that government has to listen once the democratic 
opinion and will are formed.”59  This requires no “exaggerated 
faith,” Kleinfeld adds, in “the likelihood that deliberative pro-
cesses will reach true or best substantive conclusions.”60  It is 
simply that “law and other exercises of governmental power 
should reflect and respond to the ethical life of the people living 
under that law and government.”61 
There are consequentialist, if not criminal-justice-related, 
reasons to value lay participation as well. Participation educates 
and promotes engagement in civic life.62 It may strengthen com-
munity and dampen public conflict. 63  The jury, in particular, 
 
 56 Stuntz, Collapse of American Criminal Justice at 2 (cited in note 15). 
 57 Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at xvii (cited in note 12). 
 58 See Kleinfeld, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1406 (cited in note 14) (“What the empirics 
essentially show is that controlling the crime rate is impossible without normative buy-in 
from the community.”). 
 59 Id at 1385, quoting Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms 300 (MIT 1996) 
(citation omitted) (emphasis added) (William Rehg, trans). 
 60 Kleinfeld, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1386–87 (cited in note 14). 
 61 Joshua Kleinfeld, Three Principles of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 Nw U L 
Rev 1455, 1466 (2017). 
 62 See Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age 
235–36 (California 1984); John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems 148–49 (Henry Holt 
1927); Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory 45 (Cambridge 1970). 
 63 See Barber, Strong Democracy at 152–53 (cited in note 62); David Mathews, Poli-
tics for People: Finding a Responsible Public Voice 40–41 (Illinois 1994). 
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Alexis de Tocqueville famously wrote, is “one of the most effica-
cious means for the education of the people which society can 
employ.” 64  Contemporary social science research suggests de 
Tocqueville may have been onto something: people who deliber-
ate on juries subsequently may be more likely to vote, follow pol-
itics, and get involved in political groups.65 
C. Proposals 
Over the years, the democratizers have generated scores of 
specific reform proposals. Conveniently for my purposes, a group 
of nineteen scholars recently issued a White Paper of Democratic 
Criminal Justice enumerating thirty concrete ideas.66 I quote gen-
erously from this white paper here, though I impose my own or-
ganization and cite additional sources consonant with the democ-
ratizers’ ideas. 
The proposals can be usefully sorted into four groups. The 
first contains suggestions for substantive law reform, including 
the law of punishment. Some examples: laws and practices “that 
violate community views of justice . . . should be eliminated”;67 
“[n]oncriminal approaches to social problems should be favored”;68 
“[t]he use of the legal category of ‘felony’ should be greatly re-
duced”;69 “[p]enal codes should be recodified to eliminate overlap 
among offenses”;70 “the minimum and maximum limits of pun-
ishment should be based on . . . community standards”;71 “reli-
ance on probation and surveillance should be reduced”; 72 
“[c]onditions in prisons and other correctional facilities should 
 
 64 Alexis de Tocqueville, 1 Democracy in America 306 (D. Appleton & Co 1904) (Henry 
Reeve, trans) (originally published 1835). See also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: 
Creation and Reconstruction 113 (Yale 1998); Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 
118 Harv L Rev 1099, 1144–45 (2005); John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative 
Government, in John M. Robson, ed, 19 The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill 371, 411–
12 (Toronto 1977). 
 65 See generally John Gastil, et al, The Jury and Democracy: How Jury Deliberation 
Promotes Civic Engagement and Political Participation (Oxford 2010). 
 66 See generally Kleinfeld, et al, 111 Nw U L Rev 1693 (cited in note 29). 
 67 Id at 1697. See also generally Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley, Justice, Lia-
bility, and Blame: Community Views and the Criminal Law (Westview 1995); Joshua 
Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life, 129 Harv L Rev 
1485 (2016). 
 68 Kleinfeld, et al, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1698 (cited in note 29). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id at 1699. 
 71 Id at 1703. See also Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at 132 (cited in note 12). 
 72 Kleinfeld, et al, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1703 (cited in note 29). 
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be . . . non-criminogenic”;73 “all collateral consequences that im-
pair . . . people from rejoining society . . . should be abolished”;74 
and “[j]udges should broadly . . . uphold and enforce the principle 
of equal citizenship throughout criminal justice.”75 
Proposals in the second group would modify criminal justice 
institutions to create incentives for better policing and prosecu-
tion. “Police practices and a police culture consistent with norms 
of procedural justice . . . should be fostered,” such as by “recruit-
ing officers with . . . links to the communities they police” and 
“evaluating officers and departments based on metrics that re-
flect community trust.” 76  “Public defenders and prosecutors 
should enjoy commensurate resources”;77 “[p]rosecutors [should] 
shadow public defenders” and vice versa;78 “jurisdictional bound-
aries of prosecutorial offices should be redrawn to make prosecu-
tors . . . responsive to smaller and more cohesive communities”;79 
and “[t]he county or other political unit with the authority to de-
cide . . . to prosecute or sentence an individual should also bear 
the financial costs of prosecuting or carrying out the sentence.”80 
The third set of proposals entails the creation of citizen advi-
sory and oversight committees: “[a]dvisory committees to aid leg-
islatures in the process of crafting substantive and procedural 
criminal law should be established” and “should include a diverse 
mixture of lay citizens, community leaders, judges, prosecutors, 
public defenders, private criminal justice attorneys, police offic-
ers, criminal justice scholars, and other stakeholders and experts 
in criminal justice”;81 “[c]ivilian review boards . . . should be es-
tablished,” permitting a diverse group of locals to advise police 
departments on “priorities, policies, and informal practices, as 
 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id at 1704. 
 75 Id at 1698. See also Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice at 291 
(cited in note 15). 
 76 Kleinfeld, et al, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1699 (cited in note 29). 
 77 Id at 1700. 
 78 Id. See also Jed S. Rakoff, Why Prosecutors Rule the Criminal Justice System—
and What Can Be Done About It, 111 Nw U L Rev 1429, 1435–36 (2017) (proposing that 
prosecutors occasionally serve as defense counsel). 
 79 Kleinfeld, et al, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1702 (cited in note 29). See also Ronald F. 
Wright, Elected Prosecutors and Police Accountability, in Davis, ed, Policing the Black 
Man 234, 234–41 (cited in note 47). 
 80 Kleinfeld, et al, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1705 (cited in note 29). See also Stuntz, Col-
lapse of American Criminal Justice at 289 (cited in note 15). 
 81 Kleinfeld, et al, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1699 (cited in note 29). 
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well as disciplinary decisions involving individual officers”;82 col-
laboration between prosecutors and communities should be en-
couraged; 83  “[r]estorative justice institutions and proceedings 
should be established”;84 and “the local community should be in-
volved in . . . citizen oversight boards for matters of policy and 
conditions in jails, prisons, and other correctional facilities.”85 
Finally, the democratizers want juries—more juries, with 
more information and authority, in more spaces, and more repre-
sentative of the local communities from which they are drawn.86 
Specifically, “[g]rand juries should . . . engage in genuine and sub-
stantial supervision of prosecutors’ charging decisions”;87 “bail ju-
ries” should be established; 88  “[p]ractices of plea bargaining 
should be modified to give juries meaningful supervisory author-
ity”;89 “[t]he trial jury . . . should be informed of its right to make 
judgments of both fact and law and to acquit based on an overall 
 
 82 Id at 1700. This essentially describes community policing, which has spawned a 
literature too vast even to sample and much of which is growing dated. For one recent 
intervention, see generally John M. Ray, Rethinking Community Policing (LFB Scholarly 
2014). On disciplinary civilian review boards, in particular, see generally Debra  
Livingston, The Unfulfilled Promise of Citizen Review, 1 Ohio St J Crim L 653 (2004). 
 83 On community prosecution, see generally Anthony V. Alfieri, Community Prosecu-
tors, 90 Cal L Rev 1465 (2002); Bruce A. Green and Alafair S. Burke, The Community 
Prosecutor: Questions of Professional Discretion, 47 Wake Forest L Rev 285 (2012). 
 84 Kleinfeld, et al, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1703 (cited in note 29). See also generally John 
Braithwaite, Criminal Justice That Revives Republican Democracy, 111 Nw U L Rev 
1507 (2017). 
 85 Kleinfeld, et al, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1705 (cited in note 29). 
 86 See, for example, Stuntz, Collapse of American Criminal Justice at 302–04 (cited 
in note 15). See generally Laura I. Appleman, Defending the Jury: Crime, Community, and 
the Constitution (Cambridge 2015); Suja A. Thomas, The Missing American Jury: Restor-
ing the Fundamental Constitutional Role of the Criminal, Civil, and Grand Juries  
(Cambridge 2016). But see Meares, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1526 n 2 (cited in note 32) (“I do 
not favor incorporating citizen decisionmaking into all aspects of criminal adjudication, 
such as bail hearings, guilty pleas, and sentencing decisions.”). 
 87 Kleinfeld, et al, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1700 (cited in note 29). See also generally Josh 
Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand Juries, 47 Wake Forest L Rev 319 
(2012). See also Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 Harv CR–CL L Rev 
359, 396–99 (2005). 
 88 Kleinfeld, et al, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1705 (cited in note 29). See also Laura I.  
Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, and the Sixth 
Amendment, 69 Wash & Lee L Rev 1297, 1363–69 (2012). 
 89 Kleinfeld, et al, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1697 (cited in note 29). See also generally 
Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 Ind L J 731 (2010). See also Stephanos Bibas and 
Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 
Yale L J 85, 141, 144 (2004); Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 Nw U L Rev 801, 
872–78 (2003). 
2020] Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice 729 
 
equitable judgment”90 and “of the sentencing implications and re-
lated consequences of a finding of guilt”;91 and “[s]entencing juries 
should be generally established and empowered to decide ultimate 
sentences or other dispositions of a case.”92 For all juries, “[p]rac-
tices of excluding citizens . . . based on their attitudes toward or 
histories with the criminal justice system . . . should be reduced in 
favor of a presumption of random selection and inclusion.”93 
D. Premises 
For the democratization project to hold together, its adher-
ents must believe the reforms they propose will serve the pur-
poses that motivate their scholarly efforts. This Section probes 
the democratizers’ beliefs by extracting five supporting premises 
from the democratization literature and summarizing the evi-
dence for each. These five premises, rather than the democratiz-
ers’ abstract principles or proposals, are the focus of Part II’s crit-
ical attention. 
1. Community. 
 The concept of “community” is central to the democratization 
agenda. Indeed, the whole point of democratization, on one tell-
ing, is to “make criminal justice more community focused.”94 In 
service of this aim, laws and practices inconsistent with “commu-
nity views of justice” are to be jettisoned.95 Legislative advisory 
committees should feature “community leaders.”96 Peace officers 
 
 90 Kleinfeld, et al, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1701 (cited in note 29). See also, for example, 
Stuntz, Collapse of American Criminal Justice at 303–04 (cited in note 15). See also gen-
erally, for example, Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the 
Criminal Justice System, 105 Yale L J 677 (1995). 
 91 Kleinfeld, et al, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1704 (cited in note 29). 
 92 Id at 1705. See also, for example, Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The 
Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U Pa L Rev 
33, 102–16 (2003); Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at 156–64 (cited in note 12) (ad-
vocating for “restorative sentencing juries”). On jury sentencing, see generally Morris B. 
Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 Duke L J 951 (2003); Jenia Iontcheva, Jury 
Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 Va L Rev 311 (2003); Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury 
Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time Has Come (Again)?, 108 Yale L J 
1775 (1999). But see Paul H. Robinson, Democratizing Criminal Law: Feasibility, Utility, 
and the Challenge of Social Change, 111 Nw U L Rev 1565, 1594 (2017) (“[T]he proper 
place of community views is in the creation of legal rules, not in the adjudication of indi-
vidual cases.”). 
 93 Kleinfeld, et al, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1697 (cited in note 29). 
 94 Kleinfeld, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1376 (cited in note 14). 
 95 Kleinfeld, et al, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1697 (cited in note 29). 
 96 Id at 1699. 
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should be recruited from the “communities they police.”97 Commu-
nity policing and prosecution should be encouraged. “[P]unish-
ment that . . . undermine[s] the community’s values” should be 
rejected.98 And imprisonment should be used “only to the extent 
the crime in view was a serious one according to community views 
of justice.”99 
Fashioning community “views” and “values” as policy bench-
marks presumes the existence of these collective sentiments.100 
The democratizers recognize that today’s communities are more 
heterogeneous and loosely stitched than those of the past.101 Still, 
empirical research by Professor Paul Robinson and others finds 
that, despite “pockets of disagreement,” today’s “[o]rdinary citi-
zens share a robust consensus about the substantive wrongful-
ness of various crimes”—that is, “which acts are wrongful and 
how wrongful they are relative to other crimes.”102 “Much of the 
apparent disagreement on crime and punishment,” this research 
suggests, “is an artifact of our abstract, politicized process,” which 
allows listeners to fill in vastly varying specifics.103 “People show 
remarkable agreement on most crimes,” in contrast, “when given 
detailed, concrete factual scenarios.”104 People also widely agree 
on procedural matters—specifically, on what makes procedures 
fair.105 
The democratizers tend to reject, moreover—as “too pessimis-
tic”—the view that “many places in America no longer have any 
meaningful sense of community on which criminal justice can 
 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id at 1702. 
 99 Kleinfeld, et al, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1703 (cited in note 29). 
 100 As Sklansky observes in the context of community policing, the notion here is that 
there is, “in any particular polity, an identifiable ‘public’ or ‘community’ position on con-
troversial policy questions, embraced by ordinary citizens as well as political leaders, and 
rising above the narrow interests of particular groups.” Sklansky, Democracy and the Po-
lice at 87 (cited in note 13). These assumptions resemble those regularly made in commu-
nitarian theories of democracy. See, for example, Alan F. Kay, Locating Consensus for 
Democracy: A Ten-Year U.S. Experiment 9 (Americans Talk Issues 1998). 
 101 See, for example, Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at 117 (cited in note 12). 
 102 Id at 119, discussing Paul H. Robinson and Robert Kurzban, Concordance and 
Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 Minn L Rev 1829, 1867–73, 1883–87 (2007). See also 
Peter H. Rossi and Richard A. Berk, A National Sample Survey: Public Opinion on Sen-
tencing Federal Crimes *11–12 (US Sentencing Commission, 1995), archived at 
https://perma.cc/7PHH-MAN4. 
 103 Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at 120 (cited in note 12). 
 104 Id. 
 105 See Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 125–30, 135–40, 163–65 (Yale 1990). 
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draw.” 106  “[W]hile only a fraction of Americans live in small 
towns,” Judge Bibas points out, “suburbs and cities comprise their 
own neighborhood communities” where residents repeatedly in-
teract, creating “shared culture and experiences.”107 Any dissen-
sus thus can be minimized by devolving decisions from the county 
or city down to the neighborhood level, which the democratizers 
urge for both prosecutors and the police.108 
It is undeniable, after all, that cognizable minority communi-
ties dot the American landscape. Having created these en-
claves,109 the least we can do is try to empower them. Indeed, one 
downside of our society’s court-centered attachment to individual 
rights is “its disempowering effect on inner-city communities.”110 
Inner-city residents are reasonable people who, if left alone, will 
figure things out through collective deliberation.111 Even where 
neighborhood residents disagree, that is, the deliberative process 
will generate wise decisions.112 
Local communities, moreover, want a greater role. Reflective 
of American governance more generally,113 the people believe that 
insiders—lawyers, experts, and officials—“stole” the criminal law 
from them. “The public is hungry to see and understand criminal 
justice.”114 Crime victims are a prime example but they are not 
the only ones. “Wrongdoers, victims, and the public” all want “to 
 
 106 Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at 162 (cited in note 12). 
 107 Id. 
 108 See id at 146; Kleinfeld, et al, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1702 (cited in note 29). 
 109 See generally Richard Rothstein, The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How 
Our Government Segregated America (Liveright 2017). 
 110 Tracey L. Meares and Dan M. Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong: Chicago’s Paradox 
of Unwanted Rights, Boston Rev 7 (Apr–May 1999) (emphasis omitted). 
 111 Tracey L. Meares and Dan M. Kahan, Meares and Kahan Respond, Boston Rev 22 
(Apr–May 1999). See Kahan and Meares, When Rights Are Wrong at 7 (cited in note 110). 
 112 For arguments that deliberation improves decisions rather than merely aggregat-
ing individual preferences, see Jeffrey Abramson, We, the Jury: The Jury System and the 
Ideal of Democracy 205 (Basic Books 1994); James S. Fishkin, The Voice of the People: 
Public Opinion and Democracy 28 (Yale 1995); Archon Fung, Empowered Participation: 
Reinventing Urban Democracy 17 (Princeton 2004). 
 113 See, for example, Mathews, Politics for People at 11 (cited in note 63) (contending 
that the people have been “forced out of politics by a hostile takeover”). 
 114 Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at 35 (cited in note 12). Again, public desire 
to participate is understood to exist more broadly. See, for example, Thomas E. Cronin, 
Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall 5 (Harvard 1989) 
(claiming that people “would participate if they had a better way to make themselves 
heard”); Lawrence K. Grossman, The Electronic Republic: Reshaping Democracy in the 
Information Age 148 (Viking 1995) (referring to the “continu[ed] yearning of the American 
people to govern themselves”); Quentin Kidd, American Government: Readings from 
Across Society 5 (Longman 2000) (asserting that “[t]oday . . . the cry from people to be let 
in—to be able to share in the ruling of themselves—continues to be heard”). 
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hear the defendant express remorse and apologize and the victim 
forgive.”115 They “hunger for a morality play” and “crave” their 
“day in court.”116 And even those who participate reluctantly—as 
many jurors concededly do—“report that participating increases 
their respect for the system and empowers them.”117 
2. Lay leniency. 
The democratizers maintain that laypeople hold relatively le-
nient attitudes toward criminal punishment. Enhancing lay con-
trol over sanctions, therefore, will temper the system’s severity.118 
The democratizers know this claim strikes many readers as coun-
terintuitive. Some of our most draconian laws began as popular 
referenda. The label “soft on crime” is an albatross for politicians 
and judicial candidates of any stripe.119 If polled directly, the pub-
lic will say that judges sentence too leniently.120 The democratiz-
ers concede all of this. 
Yet context matters. “[O]rdinary citizens,” cautions Judge  
Bibas, “have very poor information about how the criminal justice 
system actually works.” 121  “Because voters are badly misin-
formed,” he explains, “they clamor for tougher sentences, three-
strikes laws, and mandatory minima across the board;” yet in re-
ality, “voters are not as reflexively punitive as one might think.”122 
“One cannot assume,” in other words, “that current laws are 
harsh because that is what the public really wants; these laws 
 
 115 Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at 72 (cited in note 12). 
 116 Id at 58, 72. 
 117 Id at 38. 
 118 See, for example, Bowers, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1664 (cited in note 32) (arguing that 
“[a] healthy dose of localism and populism may serve to moderate otherwise draconian 
enforcement decisions”); Kleinfeld, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1407 (cited in note 14) (“Americans 
favor much less draconian levels of punishment than American law currently prescribes.”); 
Robinson, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1595 (cited in note 92) (“[S]hared judgments of justice are not 
brutish and draconian, but rather stand in stark contrast to the brutish and draconian 
measures created by . . . general deterrence and incapacitation of the dangerous, which dis-
connect criminal law from the constraints of justice.”); Simonson, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1623 
(cited in note 32) (“There is reason to think that if those most likely to be arrested and incar-
cerated were given truly equal influence over policy, and if policymaking happened more 
locally, then the criminal justice system would be less rather than more punitive.”). 
 119 See, for example, Lord Windlesham, Politics, Punishment, and Populism 25  
(Oxford 1998); Beale, 1 Buff Crim L Rev at 29 (cited in note 3). 
 120 Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at 36 (cited in note 12). See also Lanni, Note, 
108 Yale L J at 1780–81 (cited in note 92). 
 121 Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at 36 (cited in note 12). 
 122 Id at 38. 
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often result from a warped, dysfunctional political process.”123 
“The average voter, if fully informed,” Judge Bibas concludes, 
“would likely think the sentences on the books are tough enough 
in particular cases.”124 
Worse yet, “[t]hough politicians frequently claim that their 
enactments are driven by public demand, it is often the case that 
they are in fact the motivation behind the public opinion itself.”125 
The democratizers point here to sociologist Katherine Beckett’s 
well-known work.126 The public’s support for punitive legal re-
forms, Beckett finds, is generated largely by “political elites” who 
“shape[ ] . . . public perceptions and sentiment” on criminal jus-
tice issues.127 Politicians provoke public concern by emphasizing 
crime in public speeches, statements, and policy proposals. 128 
Beckett presents regression analyses showing that (1) political 
and media attention to crime, rather than increasing crime rates, 
drives public concern about crime, and (2) public concern about 
crime responds to political attention to crime, rather than the 
other way around.129 The critical implication is that public sup-
port for punitive policies does not reflect a “universal and preex-
isting public desire” for harsh punishment.130 
Apparently punitive attitudes also stem from ex ante consid-
eration of crime and punishment—“wholesale” punishment 
choices rather than “retail” ones.131 Asked in the abstract about 
the appropriate punishment for an offense, for example, people 
“mentally fill in the blanks and base their sentencing recommen-
dations on stereotypes or on memorable or recent examples” of 
that offense drawn from media accounts.132 “When people con-
sider the actual details as jurors ex post,” in contrast, “their per-
spectives change dramatically.”133 “When they are given concrete 
 
 123 Id at xx. 
 124 Id at 38. 
 125 Paul H. Robinson, Geoffrey P. Goodwin, and Michael D. Reisig, The Disutility of 
Injustice, 85 NYU L Rev 1940, 1979 n 133 (2010). 
 126 See id at 1984–86, discussing Katherine Beckett, Making Crime Pay: Law and 
Order in Contemporary American Politics (Oxford 1997). 
 127 Beckett, Making Crime Pay at 107 (cited in note 126). 
 128 See id at 23. 
 129 See id at 21–25. 
 130 Id at 107. 
 131 See Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at 38 (cited in note 12). 
 132 Id at 36. 
 133 Id. Judge Bibas gives an example: “[E]ven though 88% of survey respondents fa-
vored a mandatory three-strikes statute in the abstract, most favored one or more excep-
tions when presented with specific cases.” Id, citing Brandon K. Applegate, et al, Assessing 
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cases,” in fact, “average citizens favor sentences as low as or even 
markedly lower than those required by a variety of criminal 
laws.” 134  The democratizers cite empirical work by Professors 
Paul Robinson, Shari Diamond, and others. These studies find 
that, when presented with case vignettes, laypeople choose sen-
tences below statutory minimums and in line with sentencing 
guidelines.135 
3. Bureaucratic severity.  
Hand in glove with the premise of lay leniency is a deep dis-
trust of the governmental bureaucracy and the officials and ex-
perts who populate and participate in it. This “machinery of crim-
inal justice,” to borrow Judge Bibas’s titular term, dispenses 
unfeeling, assembly-line justice without regard to person or cir-
cumstance. Efficiency reigns as “mass-produced [plea] bargains 
short-circuit elaborate constitutional procedures such as discov-
ery, cross-examination, and jury instructions and deliberation.”136 
The role of lawyers is reduced to moving “the plea-bargaining ma-
chinery as quickly and cheaply as possible, which maximizes the 
number of people the system can deter and incapacitate.”137 And 
all this happens largely hidden from public view.138 In fact, rea-
sons one recent account, “it may be [this] dedemocratization, the 
retrenchment of American democracy, that partially accounts for 
high rates of imprisonment in the United States.”139 
 
Public Support for Three-Strikes-and-You’re-Out Laws: Global Versus Specific Attitudes, 
42 Crime & Delinq 517, 522 tbl 2, 528–30 & tbl 4 (1996). 
 134 Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at xx–xxi. 
 135 Id at 36–37 (cited in note 12), citing Peter H. Rossi and Richard A. Berk, Just 
Punishments: Federal Guidelines and Public Views Compared 149 (Aldine de Gruyter 
1997); Robinson, Goodwin, and Reisig, 85 NYU L Rev at 1949–78 (cited in note 125); 
Loretta J. Stalans and Shari Seidman Diamond, Formation and Change in Lay Evalua-
tions of Criminal Sentencing: Misperception and Discontent, 14 L & Hum Behav 199, 202 
& n 1, 205–07 & tbls 2, 3 (1990). 
 136 Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at xvi (cited in note 12). 
 137 Id. 
 138 See generally Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial 
World, 127 Harv L Rev 2173 (2014). 
 139 Vanessa Barker, The Politics of Imprisonment: How the Democratic Process 
Shapes the Way America Punishes Offenders 184 (Oxford 2009). See also Lisa L. Miller, 
The Perils of Federalism: Race, Poverty, and the Politics of Crime Control 181 (Oxford 
2008) (arguing that “the problem is not that in the United States bureaucratic agencies of 
the criminal justice system are not sufficiently insulated from public pressure,” but rather 
“that they are too insulated from the people who are most exposed to crime and violence 
on a regular basis”). 
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Judges and other officials who work in this system grow 
numb. Judge Bibas, for instance, contrasts “jaded” professionals, 
including judges, with “less cynical” laypeople who serve on juries 
and advisory boards.140 He worries that judges may “los[e] a sense 
of perspective and grow[ ] to accept harsh drug sentences as the 
norm,” for example.141 Consistent with this narrative, the democ-
ratizers cite studies in which laypeople presented with crime vi-
gnettes recommend lower sentences than judges or other officials 
do. In one frequently cited study, for example, lay jurors in Cook 
County selected sentences equal to or less severe than those se-
lected by Illinois judges in a series of four vignettes.142 
The “rationalism” and “centralization” that “have come to 
dominate criminal justice” through the bureaucracy also hamper 
mercy.143 To “Enlightenment minds and scientists,” Judge Bibas 
claims, “mercy was arbitrary. Rational criminal justice, they 
thought, demanded equal, predictable deterrence, and mercy un-
dercut deterrence.” 144  Put another way, “[t]he administrative 
ideal of equality across cases seemed to conflict with individual-
ized justice and with compassionate mercy”; as a result, “both ex-
ecutive clemency and jury nullification dwindled.”145 Parole, too, 
was standardized to increase sentencing predictability—neces-
sary for effective plea bargaining—before it was later restricted 
or abolished.146 And sentencing guidelines sought to reduce dis-
parity in part by cabining mercy, limiting the extent of and ac-
ceptable justifications for sentencing reductions.147 
 
 140 Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at 32, 183 n 4 (cited in note 12), citing Harry 
Kalven Jr and Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 66–75, 115–16, 164–89 (Little, Brown 1966). 
 141 Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at 32 (cited in note 12). Professor Jenia 
 Iontcheva expresses a similar concern: “As judges themselves have admitted,” she reports, 
“their daily exposure to sentencing and their political ambitions might sometimes harden 
their outlooks on punishment.” Iontcheva, 89 Va L Rev at 361 (cited in note 92). 
 142 See Shari Seidman Diamond and Loretta J. Stalans, The Myth of Judicial Leni-
ency in Sentencing, 7 Behav Sci & L 73, 74–75, 80 (1989), cited in Bibas, Machinery of 
Criminal Justice at 187 n 15 (cited in note 12); Lanni, Note, 108 Yale L J at 1796 n 97 
(cited in note 92). 
 143 Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at xxx (cited in note 12). 
 144 Id at 23. 
 145 Id at 24. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State 
and the Demise of Mercy, 121 Harv L Rev 1332 (2008). 
 146 Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at 25 (cited in note 12). See also George 
Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph: A History of Plea Bargaining in America 186–94 
(Stanford 2003). 
 147 Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at 25 (cited in note 12). 
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4. Equality. 
The democratizers’ ideas of lay leniency and egalitarianism 
are tightly intertwined. “[M]oderation and equality,” as Stuntz 
puts it, “travel together, reinforce one another.”148 This is partly a 
mechanical relationship: young black men have disproportionate 
contact with the justice system and thus bear the brunt of the 
system’s severity. Any temperance, therefore, will disproportion-
ately benefit this same population. There is, however, another as-
pect to the democratizers’ antidiscrimination agenda, which reg-
isters not in disparate impact but discriminatory treatment. The 
democratizers argue that laypeople are basically egalitarian, at 
least toward members of their own racial or ethnic cohorts, and so 
shifting power to the local laity will reduce the effect of any dis-
criminatory “outgroup” bias that elites and bureaucrats harbor.149 
Stuntz gives the most compelling account.150 “In the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries,” Stuntz recounts, “when lo-
cal politics governed the amount and distribution of criminal pun-
ishment, the justice system was stable, reasonably lenient, and 
surprisingly egalitarian.”151 But “[i]n the twentieth century’s sec-
ond half,” he continues, “[s]uburban populations mushroomed, di-
luting poor city neighborhoods’ electoral power.”152  During the 
1950s and 1960s, as violent crime rates rose in the increasingly 
black urban North, white suburban voters were indifferent, and 
imprisonment rates actually fell.153 “After the early 1970s,” how-
ever, with crime still rising, “indifference gave way to anger.”154 
Suburban voters—“for whom crime was at once frightening and 
distant”—demanded action, and county-elected prosecutors re-
sponded, prompting “the generation-long punitive turn that drove 
 
 148 William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 Harv L Rev 1969, 2031 (2008). 
 149 See, for example, Stuntz, Collapse of American Criminal Justice at 312 (cited in 
note 15):  
One reason black criminals from poor city neighborhoods have been treated with 
so much more severity than criminals from white immigrant communities in 
America’s past is that the former are more easily categorized as The Other, as a 
people whose lives are separate from the lives of those who judge them. 
 150 For a consonant narrative, see Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at 164 (cited 
in note 12). 
 151 Stuntz, 121 Harv L Rev at 1973 (cited in note 148). 
 152 Id. 
 153 See id. 
 154 Id at 2014. 
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American prison populations into the stratosphere.” 155  Young 
black men shouldered most of the load.156 
Stuntz’s key insight was to see the problem as one of agency 
costs. For suburban voters—and for appellate judges “whose de-
cisions shape policing and punishment on city streets”—“criminal 
justice policies are mostly political symbols or legal abstractions, 
not questions the answers to which define neighborhood life”; and 
“[d]ecisionmakers who neither reap the benefit of good decisions 
nor bear the cost of bad ones tend to make bad ones.”157 The way 
forward, then, is to “[p]lace more power in the hands of residents 
of those neighborhoods where the most criminals and crime vic-
tims live.”158 “Because residents of those neighborhoods suffer so 
much from crime, they are unlikely to support abandonment of 
the sort that Northern cities experienced in the 1950s, 1960s, and 
early 1970s,” Stuntz assures; and “[b]ecause those same residents 
suffer so much from mass incarceration,” he adds, “they are also 
unlikely to support the mindless severity” of the subsequent pu-
nitive turn.159 Unlike suburban voters and distant bureaucrats, 
black urban voters “are loath to incarcerate their sons and broth-
ers, neighbors and friends.”160 
5. Compliance. 
Finally, the democratizers worry about flagging public es-
teem for criminal justice institutions, which, in turn, may weaken 
voluntary compliance with the law and cooperation and engage-
ment with legal authorities. Their program aims to rehabilitate 
the justice system’s image. The underlying premise is that repair-
ing trust in the system will improve compliance with the law, 
which may then enable greater leniency. Two large literatures 
support this idea, both of which find that public willingness to de-
fer to the law stems from a belief that the law is worthy of respect. 
 
 155 Stuntz, 121 Harv L Rev at 2010 (cited in note 148). 
 156 Id at 1971 (noting that black men are incarcerated at seven times the rate of their 
white counterparts). 
 157 Id at 1974. 
 158 Id at 2031–32. 
 159 Stuntz, 121 Harv L Rev at 2032 (cited in note 148). 
 160 Id at 1981. See also Miller, The Perils of Federalism at 156–57 (cited in note 139) 
(observing that “[o]ne major perspective that is conspicuous in its absence from citizen 
group advocacy at the local level is the punitiveness exhibited in state and national crime 
politics,” where focus is not on “the people who have to live with both the realities of day-
to-day threats of victimization as well as the contentious and often unproductive encoun-
ters with the justice system”). 
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The first, associated most closely with Professor Tom Tyler, 
elaborates a theory of “procedural justice.”161 Procedural justice 
emphasizes the importance of fair procedures in shaping public 
perceptions that legal authorities are legitimate. Fairness, in this 
context, entails, among other things, impartiality, transparency, 
and—most relevant to the democratization agenda—voice: essen-
tially, the chance to have one’s views considered.162 This moti-
vates the many civilian boards the democratizers propose to es-
tablish, as well as their specific recommendation that “[p]olice 
practices and a police culture consistent with norms of procedural 
justice, fairness, and legitimacy should be fostered.”163 Juries, too, 
are thought to legitimate judicial verdicts, both for litigants and 
for broader society.164 
It is not obvious, I should note, that procedural justice in its 
paradigmatic form—the police-civilian encounter—fits comforta-
bly in the democratization agenda. The laity’s involvement is nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient to implement a procedural justice 
approach to policing. That is to say, even an autocracy can in-
struct its agents to treat civilians in a procedurally just manner; 
meanwhile, procedural justice requires bureaucratic expertise for 
its execution. Still, a broader view of procedural justice encom-
passes not only this “retail” varietal—in the street meeting be-
tween officer and civilian—but also a “wholesale” one—in policy-
level interactions between state institutions and the communities 
they serve.165 The latter is a more obvious exemplar of the democ-
ratization philosophy. Yet, to the extent that procedural fairness 
in retail interactions motivates cooperation with the authorities, 
it works to support the overall democratization agenda by foster-
ing lay engagement.166 
 
 161 The canonical work, at least in criminal justice circles, is Tyler, Why People Obey 
the Law (cited in note 105). 
 162 See, for example, id at 163; Tom R. Tyler, Kenneth A. Rasinski, and Kathleen M. 
McGraw, The Influence of Perceived Injustice on the Endorsement of Political Leaders, 15 
J Applied Soc Psych 700, 715–21 (1985). 
 163 Kleinfeld, et al, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1699 (cited in note 29). See also Final Report 
of the President’s Task Force at *1–2 (cited in note 11). 
 164 See Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 Georgetown L J 641, 
681 (1996) (“[P]ublic participation in the criminal justice system was designed to enhance 
public legitimacy of the criminal justice system.”). 
 165 See Meares, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1531 (cited in note 32). 
 166 See id at 1532–35; Tom R. Tyler, From Harm Reduction to Community Engage-
ment: Redefining the Goals of American Policing in the Twenty-First Century, 111 Nw U L 
Rev 1537, 1552–54 (2017). 
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The second compliance-related literature, associated with 
Paul Robinson and others, concerns “empirical desert.”167 Essen-
tially, the criminal law’s “moral credibility” increases the more 
the law comports—in what and how harshly it punishes—with 
lay views of desert. This notion is reflected in the democratizers’ 
proposals for abolition of laws and practices “that violate commu-
nity views of justice”; decriminalization “where the prohibited 
conduct is not wrong in itself given community views of justice”; 
grading of offenses that “reflect[s] community views of justice”; 
punishment based on blameworthiness as “determined by commu-
nity standards of justice and actual social practice within the com-
munity in which the crime took place”; and sentencing juries.168 
II.  CHALLENGING THE PREMISES 
This Part scrutinizes the democratizers’ five central prem-
ises. A careful review of the evidence, I argue, shows that the de-
mocratizers have not made the case for the sweeping reforms they 
propose, some of which, in fact, may work against the movement’s 
own stated purposes. Parts II.A–E take on the premises identified 
in Part I. Part II.F contends that, when the democratizers’ pro-
posals falter, the movement will splinter. 
A. Community 
The democratizers’ first premise is that Americans reside in 
reasonably cohesive communities that are capable of forming 
and expressing—indeed, long to express—“community values” 
and “community views” of justice. This Section argues that 
(1) American neighborhoods have always been, and certainly are 
today, far more heterogeneous than the democratizers allow; 
(2) most laypeople do not wish to be more involved in governing 
the criminal justice system; and (3) a “community-based” system 
of criminal justice overlooks the extent to which neighborhoods 
are interconnected. 
1. Heterogeneity. 
Most accounts of democratization are nostalgic, even roman-
tic. They gaze backwards, to eras before today’s carceral state, to 
understand why criminal justice used to work and where it went 
 
 167 See Robinson, Goodwin, and Reisig, 85 NYU L Rev at 1943 (cited in note 125). 
 168 Kleinfeld, et al, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1697–1703 (cited in note 29). 
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astray. Judge Bibas, for example, praises the “village ideal” of co-
lonial America and its criminal justice “morality plays.”169 For 
Stuntz, the Gilded Age was golden.170 Community policing advo-
cates envision folksy, small-town Mayberry.171  In these earlier 
days, all agree, Americans clustered in tight-knit, self-governing 
communities.172 Criminal justice was naturally lenient and egali-
tarian because the same people who doled out punishment bore 
its costs. Its substance, moreover, reflected the shared values of 
those homogeneous groups.173 
If this sounds too sanguine, it is. “We the people” have always 
been an exclusive bunch.174 We can imagine idyllic, homogeneous 
colonial villages only by blinking the women, blacks, and other 
marginalized groups who did not share in old-world self- 
governance. For these groups, the criminal justice system was not 
a site of democratic participation but rather an instrument for 
maintaining an oppressive social hierarchy and expelling noncon-
formists.175 Neighbors were not only friends but also spies—the 
prying eyes of the church on “brotherly watch.”176 Punishment in 
 
 169 Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at 116–17 (cited in note 12). 
 170 Stuntz, Collapse of American Criminal Justice at 129–57 (cited in note 15). At one 
point, Stuntz describes the Gilded Age as “the half-century between Reconstruction’s end 
and the Great Depression’s beginning.” Id at 8. Stuntz’s Gilded Age therefore includes 
what others might call the Progressive Era and Roaring Twenties. It’s also possible to read 
Stuntz’s period of interest as running all the way through the 1950s. See Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Book Review, Criminal Justice, Local Democracy, and Constitutional Rights, 
111 Mich L Rev 1045, 1047 (2013). 
 171 Mayberry was the fictional setting for The Andy Griffith Show, which gave 1960s 
Americans “a glimpse (albeit mythical) of the ways in which policing was thought to be 
accomplished in much of rural and small-town America.” John Liederbach and James 
Frank, Policing Mayberry: The Work Routines of Small-Town and Rural Officers, 28 Am 
J Crim Just 53, 53 (2003). 
 172 See Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at 2 (cited in note 12) (describing “close-
knit” and “fairly homogeneous” early American communities in which “people knew and 
agreed on what acts were right and wrong,” especially in religious colonies); Samuel 
Walker, Popular Justice: A History of American Criminal Justice 15 (Oxford 2d ed 1998) 
(“New England villages were almost entirely white, English, and Protestant. . . . Southern 
colonies were different only in terms of the presence of the slave population.”). 
 173 See Walker, Popular Justice at 15 (cited in note 172) (“In [the colonial village] 
context, there was a high degree of consensus over proper behavior.”). 
 174 See, for example, Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American 
History 12 (Basic Books 1993) (“Nobody could honestly call the colonial systems ‘demo-
cratic.’ They were little theocracies.”). See generally Aziz Rana, The Two Faces of Ameri-
can Freedom (Harvard 2010) (describing the entanglement of American principles of in-
ternal self-governance and the subordination of marginalized groups such as slaves, 
Native Americans, and women). 
 175 See Walker, Popular Justice at 20, 23 (cited in note 172). 
 176 Id at 18–19. Real colonial justice, explains Professor Nicola Lacey, tolerated “a 
pervasive executive and judicial discretion that led in general to wildly unequal justice 
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these tight-knit communities could be brutal and deeply stigma-
tizing: the stocks, flogging, and widely attended hangings were 
common.177 These were the days when “[m]en feared witches and 
burnt women.”178 Shared fates did not temper justice. 
Stuntz’s Gilded Age was hardly more inclusive. Women still 
couldn’t vote in most states. Race riots racked the nation in 
1919.179 Peonage and Jim Crow ruled the South; lynch mobs had 
little fear of sanction.180 Blacks fared only slightly better in the 
North. Indeed, it was white social scientists, journalists, and pub-
lic figures in the urban North who, around the nineteenth cen-
tury’s end, formulated modern ideas about black criminality.181 In 
response, black researchers exposed the pervasive role of white 
racism in turn-of-the-century northern criminal justice.182 Even 
in largely white locales, ethnic conflicts corrupted police  
administration.183 
The democratizers do see these concerns. None of them wants 
to revisit the colonies’ brutal punishments or resurrect Jim Crow. 
“There is much in our history to deplore,” Judge Bibas concedes.184 
 
and in particular to the disproportionate, and sometimes bloodthirsty, criminalization of 
those regarded as being of bad character or as being otherwise marginal or dangerous.” 
Nicola Lacey, Book Review, Humanizing the Criminal Justice Machine: Re-Animated Jus-
tice or Frankenstein’s Monster?, 126 Harv L Rev 1299, 1312 (2013). 
 177 Walker, Popular Justice at 14 (cited in note 172). See id at 16 (describing the au-
thorization of death sentences for a child’s cursing or striking a parent); id at 32–35 (de-
scribing public whipping, branding, and mutilation of offenders). 
 178 Whitney v California, 274 US 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis concurring). See also 
Michael Stephen Hindus, Prison and Plantation: Crime, Justice, and Authority in  
Massachusetts and South Carolina, 1767–1878 49 (UNC 1980) (describing the prosecu-
tion of pregnant brides for fornication in Massachusetts). 
 179 See Walker, Popular Justice at 148–49 (cited in note 172). See also Friedman, 
Crime and Punishment in American History at 13 (cited in note 174). 
 180 See Walker, Popular Justice at 76 (cited in note 172); David Garland, Penal Excess 
and Surplus Meaning: Public Torture Lynchings in Twentieth-Century America, 39 L & 
Socy Rev 793, 795 (2005) (arguing that “lynchings were, first and foremost, collective crim-
inal punishments”). 
 181 See Khalil Gibran Muhammad, The Condemnation of Blackness: Race, Crime, and 
the Making of Modern Urban America 3–9 (Harvard 2010). 
 182 See id at 10–12. 
 183 Walker, Popular Justice at 56 (cited in note 172). “[T]his was not a period when 
ethnic communities were policed by ‘their own’”; “people often mistrusted cops on the beat 
because the officers were unfamiliar with the language and customs of recent immigrant 
communities.” Schulhofer, Book Review, 111 Mich L Rev at 1055 (cited in note 170). 
 184 Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at 13 (cited in note 12). 
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They urge us instead to focus on how old-fashioned criminal jus-
tice worked “within the circle of moral equality.”185 Borrow the 
good parts, the theory goes, and leave behind the bad. And the “cir-
cle of moral equality” is larger now, so we can import older models 
of criminal justice without adopting their pathologies as well.186 
But can we? Suppose I am overly cynical about old-world 
“community.” Suppose, that is, that genuine “community” did ex-
ist in the colonies or the Gilded Age, at least within the “circle of 
moral equality.” Times have changed. Criminologist Samuel 
Walker puts it well: “The informality and [ ] apparent effective-
ness of the colonial approach to crime and justice were rooted in 
a world that is long gone and cannot be recreated.”187 Contempo-
rary America is incredibly diverse. As early as 1922, a prominent 
study recognized that Cleveland had become “a city of 
strangers”188 and that informality and local control were “out of 
place in the city of today.”189 Policing’s “old basis in personal rela-
tionships and local rapport had disappeared forever,” writes Pro-
fessor Stephen Schulhofer, and “the beguiling vision of cohesive 
communities had passed out of reach.”190 
To be sure, the democratizers concede this as well.191 Yet they 
don’t seem to acknowledge its implications. In rejecting the de-
mocratizers’ appeals to nostalgia, the point is not simply to insist, 
dogmatically, that they must take the bad with the good. The 
point is that their historical examples fail to show “community 
justice” actually succeeding in a complex, heterogeneous society 
 
 185 Kleinfeld, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1369 (cited in note 14). See also Stuntz, Collapse of 
American Criminal Justice at 68 (cited in note 15) (“For most of the nation’s history, those 
. . . institutions functioned reasonably well (outside the South—an important qualification).”). 
 186 See also Tracey L. Meares and Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Proce-
dural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U Chi Legal F 197, 207–08 (argu-
ing that, now that blacks are “no longer excluded from the nation’s democratic political 
life,” courts should defer to local democratic choices about policing policies). 
 187 Walker, Popular Justice at 3 (cited in note 172). 
 188 Raymond B. Fosdick, Police Administration, in Roscoe Pound and Felix Frankfurter, 
eds, Criminal Justice in Cleveland: Reports of the Cleveland Foundation Survey of the Ad-
ministration of Criminal Justice in Cleveland, Ohio 6–7 (Cleveland Foundation 1922) 
(Cleveland Report). 
 189 Roscoe Pound, Criminal Justice and the American City—A Summary, in Pound 
and Frankfurter, eds, Cleveland Report 557, 615 (cited in note 188). 
 190 Schulhofer, Book Review, 111 Mich L Rev at 1052 (cited in note 170). See also 
Nicole P. Marwell, Bargaining for Brooklyn: Community Organizations in the Entrepre-
neurial City 14 (Chicago 2007); Paul E. Peterson, City Limits 116 (Chicago 1981); Albert 
J. Reiss Jr, The Police and the Public 209 (Yale 1971). 
 191 See Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at 14 (cited in note 12). 
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like today’s.192 Whatever success old-world justice can claim, that 
success occurred under circumstances we long ago left behind. To 
put the point differently, even on the democratizers’ sunnier his-
torical account, the criminal justice system of colonial America, to 
pick an example, simply did something different from what we 
need our law to do today. Colonial justice enforced the dominant 
norms of white Christian men and excluded those who would not 
conform. It did not attempt to reconcile conflicting views of a het-
erogeneous populace.193 
True, the democratizers might respond, America today is 
more diverse than ever before. Yet heterogeneous peoples do not 
necessarily hold heterogeneous views on criminal justice. Quite to 
the contrary, work by Professor Paul Robinson and others work 
has found surprising concordance in lay judgments of desert. Re-
searchers in these studies ask participants to order a set of crime 
descriptions by severity. They find “a high degree of agreement 
about judgments of justice across all demographics, at least for 
what one might call the core of wrongdoing.”194 Community views 
of justice, in other words, may cohere even as communities them-
selves grow increasingly diverse. 
This research is undoubtedly important. I am skeptical, how-
ever, that it can carry the weight of the democratizers’ case on 
this point. Two basic problems stand out. First, there is a credible 
argument that Robinson—and those who rely on his findings—
overstate the extent of lay consensus. Robinson’s concordance 
studies exclude “victimless” (or “vice”) crimes, which are “crimes 
over which there is tremendous public disagreement” and which 
 
 192 See Schulhofer, Book Review, 111 Mich L Rev at 1073 (cited in note 170) (“[A] city’s 
ability, before 1960, to control crime through informal institutions without harsh punish-
ment tells us very little about the capacity of such institutions to succeed under the con-
ditions that took hold so quickly thereafter.”). For evidence that growing diversity has 
contributed to the decline of town hall deliberative democracy, see Jane J. Mansbridge, 
Beyond Adversary Democracy 68 (Chicago 2d ed 1983). 
 193 See Walker, Popular Justice at 15 (cited in note 172) (describing colonial justice as 
“aggressively conformist”); id at 19 (“When there were serious disagreements, especially 
over . . . theology, the consensus broke down, and the dissenting minority often packed up 
and moved away to establish a separate community.”). 
 194 Robinson, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1567 (cited in note 92). See, for example, Paul H. 
Robinson, Intuitions of Justice and the Utility of Desert 18–34 (Oxford 2013). See also Rossi 
and Berk, A National Sample Survey at *9–12 (cited in note 102). For cross-national or 
cross-cultural applications, see generally Sandra S. Evans and Joseph E. Scott, The Seri-
ousness of Crime Cross-Culturally: The Impact of Religiosity, 22 Crimin 39 (1984); Sergio 
Herzog, Public Perceptions of Crime Seriousness: A Comparison of Social Divisions in  
Israel, 39 Isr L Rev 57 (2006). 
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form the majority of all offenses committed.195 In addition, the 
core-periphery distinction on which Robinson relies is unstable 
across cultural groups. Kuwaitis, to give one example, view adul-
tery as being far more serious than Americans do.196 Moreover, 
even within the core, people often disagree about when offenses 
have occurred. Everyone opposes murder, rape, and misappropri-
ation, that is—Robinson’s core—but they disagree about “what 
counts as murder, rape, and misappropriation.”197 
Second, the consensus Robinson does find concerns only rela-
tive, not absolute, blameworthiness. People largely agree, that is, 
on how to rank offenses in order of severity. But Robinson does 
not find that people agree on how severely to punish any particu-
lar offense, and many others have found that they do not.198 For a 
project that envisions aligning criminal punishment with “com-
munity views of justice,” or expressing “community views” 
through sentencing juries, this distinction matters. Robinson ar-
gues that, once an “endpoint” for maximal punishment is chosen, 
everything will fall into place according to the consensus ordinal 
ranking.199 Yet the choice of endpoint is crucial and itself conten-
tious. If people disagree about the endpoint, therefore—and they 
do—they are apt to disagree about the entire sentencing hierar-
chy that descends from that extreme.200 
 
 195 Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan, and David A. Hoffman, Some Realism About Pun-
ishment Naturalism, 77 U Chi L Rev 1531, 1552 (2010). See id at 1552–56. Elsewhere, Rob-
inson himself refers to “core” offenses as “a select few.” Paul H. Robinson, Owen D. Jones, 
and Robert Kurzban, Realism, Punishment, and Reform, 77 U Chi L Rev 1611, 1612 (2010).  
 196 See Braman, Kahan, and Hoffman, 77 U Chi L Rev at 1557–58 (cited in note 195). 
 197 Id at 1604 (emphasis omitted).  
 198 See, for example, Rossi and Berk, A National Sample Survey at *12 (cited in note 
102); Peter H. Rossi, Jon E. Simpson, and JoAnn L. Miller, Beyond Crime Seriousness: 
Fitting the Punishment to the Crime, 1 J Quant Crimin 59, 72–81 (1985); Christopher  
Slobogin and Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein, Putting Desert in Its Place, 65 Stan L Rev 77, 
94–96 (2013). But see William Samuel and Elizabeth Moulds, The Effect of Crime Severity 
on Perceptions of Fair Punishment: A California Case Study, 77 J Crim L & Crimin 931, 
945–48 (1986) (finding widespread agreement among California residents on sentencing 
preferences). 
 199 See Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for 
Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S Cal L Rev 1, 33–35 (2007). 
 200 See Rossi and Berk, A National Sample Survey at *9 (cited in note 102) (“[I]t is 
important to note that severity studies are not about sentencing. To derive desired sen-
tences from rated severity it is necessary to know how the two are related, a critical issue 
on which the severity studies are largely silent.”); Joseph E. Jacoby and Francis T. Cullen, 
The Structure of Punishment Norms: Applying the Rossi-Berk Model, 89 J Crim L & 
Crimin 245, 305–07 (1998) (arguing that, because of this disagreement, public opinion 
cannot be used as a basis for sentencing guidelines); Joseph E. Kennedy, Empirical Desert 
and the Endpoints of Punishment, in Paul H. Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey, and Kimberly 
Kessler Ferzan, eds, Criminal Law Conversations 54, 54 (Oxford 2009) (asserting that 
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Perhaps because of concern on this very point—that is, the 
problems of heterogeneity and disagreement—the democratizers 
tend to focus on the microlocal.201 Theirs is a theory of neighbor-
hoods, not cities. And while contemporary society is more hetero-
geneous than ever before—and may not share uniform views on 
punishment—residential segregation ensures that neighbor-
hoods retain a more singular flavor.202 Indeed, the democratiza-
tion literature brims with rhetoric about empowering “black” and 
“minority communities.”203 Residents of these neighborhoods, the 
democratizers presume, share values that broader society may not. 
Two problems plague this argument as well. First, while res-
idential segregation surely remains high compared to what many 
of us would consider ideal, it’s lower than people think, and it’s 
falling quickly.204 Most black Americans, for example, do not live 
in “black communities,” nor do they live in big cities.205 On top of 
 
Robinson’s finding of universality in judgments of empirical desert has “limited utility” 
because “[m]aximum punishments differ greatly between societies”); Peter H. Rossi and J. 
Patrick Henry, Seriousness: A Measure for All Purposes?, in Malcolm W. Klein and  
Katherine S. Teilmann, eds, Handbook of Criminal Justice Evaluation 489, 491 (Sage 
1980) (“[A]greement on the relative ordering of criminal acts is compatible with consider-
able differences in the absolute level of seriousness attributed to any given act.”). 
 201 See, for example, Kleinfeld, 129 Harv L Rev at 1562 (cited in note 67) (“[F]ederal-
ism and other forms of localism . . . can be used to reduce the incidences of value disagree-
ment and the need to work out universal values.”). But see Josh Bowers and Paul H.  
Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts 
of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 Wake Forest L Rev 211, 233 (2012) (“In the . . . 
context of empirical desert, we think it makes sense to define the relevant community as 
the populace covered by a contemplated liability or punishment rule, because the reach of 
substantive criminal law typically extends all the way to the state’s borders.”). 
 202 See, for example, Appleman, Defending the Jury at 78 (cited in note 86) (“Individual 
communities in the United States have tended to remain . . . segregated according to race, 
ethnicity, and class—therefore rendering localized communities more homogeneous.”). 
 203 See, for example, Simonson, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1615 n 25 (cited in note 32) (“A 
democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law . . . prioritiz[es] the empowerment of low- 
income and minority individuals and communities to participate more fully in the for-
mation and implementation of criminal justice policies.”), quoting Janet Moore, Democracy 
Enhancement in Criminal Law and Procedure, 2014 Utah L Rev 543, 566; Kleinfeld, 111 
Nw U L Rev at 1409 (cited in note 14) (arguing that the “poor, black neighborhoods most 
affected by crime are also the neighborhoods most affected by excessive punishment and 
policing,” and therefore ought to take the lead in calibrating criminal justice policy). 
 204 For a good review of the evidence, see Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Civil Rights in 
a Desegregating America, 83 U Chi L Rev 1329, 1343–48 (2016). 
 205 Paul Jargowsky, Are Minority Neighborhoods a Disaster? (The Century Founda-
tion, Oct 14, 2016), online at https://tcf.org/content/commentary/minority-neighborhoods 
-disaster (visited Feb 19, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable) (reporting that 42 percent of 
black Americans live in neighborhoods that are majority black); Alana Semuels, No, Most 
Black People Don’t Live in Poverty—or Inner Cities (The Atlantic, Oct 12, 2016), archived 
at https://perma.cc/X3FY-RWKV (reporting that 52 percent of black Americans in the top 
one hundred metropolitan areas live in suburbs). 
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that, residential mobility is high, especially in urban areas.206 If 
shared values come from shared experiences, then mobility weak-
ens those values.207 For these reasons and more, a large literature 
critiques the assumption of unitary, easily defined “communities” 
the democratizers imagine will self-govern in their members’ in-
terests.208 The democratizers are not oblivious to this critique but 
they provide no satisfactory response. 
Second, even “black neighborhoods,” where they do persist, 
are far from monolithic.209 “Property owners, tenants, shopkeep-
ers, senior citizens, teenagers, and the homeless,” Schulhofer 
points out, “have divergent interests. Who speaks for this ‘com-
munity’?”210 Many older blacks, for example, are concerned about 
 
 206 See generally Claudia Coulton, Brett Theodos, and Margery A. Turner, Residen-
tial Mobility and Neighborhood Change: Real Neighborhoods Under the Microscope, 14 
Cityscape: J Pol Dev & Rsrch 55 (2012). 
 207 See Mark E. Correia, Citizen Involvement: How Community Factors Affect Progres-
sive Policing 7 (Police Executive Research Forum 2000) (discussing arguments that “at-
tempts to instill (or build) a sense of community have become exceedingly difficult in a 
society that is highly mobile and individualistic”); Reiss, The Police and the Public at 209 
(cited in note 190). Residential mobility creates “temporal spillover effects” as well: “What 
does local autonomy mean,” Professor Rich Schragger asks, “in a mobile society where 
changes in the make-up of local populations occur over the span of years as opposed to 
decades or longer?” Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 Mich L Rev 371, 
424 (2001). 
 208 See, for example, Steve Herbert, Citizens, Cops, and Power: Recognizing the Limits 
of Community 12 (Chicago 2006) (“[M]any people do not understand community as spa-
tially bounded; urban residents often seek community outside their neighborhood.”);  
Michael E. Buerger, A Tale of Two Targets: Limitations of Community Anticrime Actions, 
in David R. Karp, ed, Community Justice: An Emerging Field 137, 148–50 (Rowman & 
Littlefield 1998) (arguing that community policing often uses “community” rhetoric to re-
fer to “the people living in a given bounded district,” who may not actually share common 
concerns); Carl B. Klockars, The Rhetoric of Community Policing, in Jack R. Greene and 
Stephen D. Mastrofski, eds, Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality 239, 247–50 (Praeger 
1988) (“Nothing, in fact, is more different from community than those relationships that 
characterize most of modern urban life.”). 
 209 See, for example, Michael C. Dawson, Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary 
African-American Political Ideologies 2 (Chicago 2001); Mary Pattillo, Black on the Block: 
The Politics of Race and Class in the City 2 (Chicago 2007); Regina Austin, “The Black 
Community,” Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S Cal L Rev 1769 (1992); 
Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105 Nw U L Rev 149, 166–71 
(2011); Robert Weisberg, Restorative Justice and the Danger of “Community”, 2003 Utah 
L Rev 343, 348. For the more general point, see Schulhofer, Book Review, 111 Mich L Rev 
at 1082 (cited in note 170) (arguing that, even if we could isolate ethnically and socioeco-
nomically homogeneous enclaves, “we cannot plausibly assume that the people within 
those boundaries constitute a single ‘community’ with coherent, unified preferences”). 
 210 Schulhofer, Book Review, 111 Mich L Rev at 1082 (cited in note 170). See also 
Correia, Citizen Involvement at 7 (cited in note 207) (“A vexing concern for [community-
oriented policing] programs has been the inability to establish a sense of community in 
disadvantaged neighborhoods.”). 
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the younger generation.211  Class cleavages divide black neigh-
bors.212 In fact, in a 2007 Pew poll, nearly four in ten black re-
spondents said that, given intrablack diversity, blacks can no 
longer be thought of as a single race.213 Yet “[b]ecause whites by 
and large don’t see black Americans as a complex population of 
differentiated individuals,” writes political scientist Adolph Reed 
in an acerbic critique, “the organic community imagery seems 
reasonable and natural to them.”214 
Consider the intense debate over whether the “black commu-
nity” supported the loitering ordinance invalidated in City of  
Chicago v Morales.215 Professors Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares 
argued that Chicago’s law deserved special deference because it 
“was to be enforced only after consultation with ‘local leaders’ and 
‘community organizations’—the representatives of the average 
citizen.” 216  Others saw it quite differently. Professors Albert 
Alschuler and Stephen Schulhofer observed that white aldermen 
had drafted the ordinance, which was backed by Mayor Daley’s 
administration; that the Chicago chapter of the NAACP and the 
editorial page of the city’s leading black newspaper denounced the 
proposal; and that more black alderman voted against the ordi-
nance than for it.217 Reviewing the legislative history, Professor 
Dorothy Roberts similarly finds diverse black opinions on the 
matter.218 
The democratizers acknowledge this too, in their more care-
ful moments. They might even say I caricature their position in 
suggesting it assumes total consensus at the local neighborhood 
level. But if the democratizers allow for dissent and disagreement 
within communities, then they need some mechanism for resolv-
 
 211 See Cathy J. Cohen, Democracy Remixed: Black Youth and the Future of American 
Politics 24 (Oxford 2010). 
 212 See, for example, Michael C. Dawson, Not in Our Lifetimes: The Future of Black 
Politics 94–97 (Chicago 2011) (describing an election to fill Barack Obama’s former state 
assembly seat as “about the intersection of race and class in a Chicago neighborhood”). 
 213 Blacks See Growing Values Gap Between Poor and Middle Class (Pew Research 
Center, Nov 13, 2007), archived at https://perma.cc/YQL6-TRNY. 
 214 Adolph Reed Jr, Class Notes: Posing as Politics and Other Thoughts on the Amer-
ican Scene 11 (New Press 2000). 
 215 527 US 41 (1999). 
 216 Dan M. Kahan and Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal 
Procedure, 86 Georgetown L J 1153, 1183 (1998) (citation omitted). 
 217 See Albert W. Alschuler and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or Bed-
rock Rights? A Response to Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998 U Chi Legal F 215, 217–20. 
 218 Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-
Maintenance Policing, 89 J Crim L & Crimin 775, 822–26 (1999). 
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ing that disagreement in the course of generating unified “com-
munity views” on policing, punishment, and so on. They seldom 
specify how this is going to work. Take Kahan and Meares, for ex-
ample, who urged judicial deference to the judgments of inner-city 
communities on policing strategies. As Sklansky observes, Kahan 
and Meares’s analysis “give[s] little attention to the structures 
through which these communities actually make decisions.”219 
The most obvious possibility is voting. When community 
members disagree on police or prosecutorial priorities, they 
should take a vote. But once we get to this point, what is left of 
participatory democracy? It begins to feel more like a parlor trick: 
take a group of people who disagree, have them vote, and then 
call the result the “will of the community” when it’s really just 
majoritarianism. “Community” becomes the product of, rather 
than a justificatory premise of, the democratization agenda. 
Kleinfeld emphasizes that voting in these settings should occur 
only after group deliberation.220 But this distinction may be more 
sentimental than real—research from the jury-deliberation set-
ting suggests that deliberation only rarely changes minds.221 
I suspect many democratizers would not resort to voting so 
soon. Consensus, they would say, is how communities resolve dis-
agreement. Community meetings, town halls, beat meetings—
these (not the ballot) are the stuff of which democratization is 
made. Here, however, the democratizers confront another diffi-
culty. The theory on which they ground their vision—deliberation 
theory—is entirely idealized. It envisions what philosopher  
Jürgen Habermas calls an “ideal speech situation,”222 with ex-
change among “free and equal citizens . . . motivated by justice or 
the common good.” 223  Deliberation theory predicts consensus, 
 
 219 Sklansky, Democracy and the Police at 100 (cited in note 13). See also Reed, Class 
Notes at 10 (cited in note 214) (critiquing the view that “we don’t need to ask how the 
community makes its decisions, how it forms its will, because it reflects an immediate, 
almost mystical identity of interest and common feeling”). 
 220 See Kleinfeld, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1470 n 44 (cited in note 61). 
 221 See, for example, Valerie P. Hans and Neil Vidmar, Judging the Jury 112, 119 
(Plenum 1986); Kalven and Zeisel, The American Jury at 488 (cited in note 140). See also 
Dennis J. Devine, Jury Decision Making: The State of the Science 158–61 (NYU 2012) (col-
lecting additional studies). But see Shari Seidman Diamond and Mary R. Rose, The Con-
temporary American Jury, 14 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 239, 250–53 (2018) (arguing that de-
liberations matter to outcomes and citing studies). 
 222 Jürgen Habermas, 1 The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Ration-
alization of Society 25 (Beacon 1984) (Thomas McCarthy, trans). 
 223 Samuel Freeman, Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment, 29 Phil & 
Pub Affairs 371, 380 (2000). See also Habermas, 1 The Theory of Communicative Action at 
25 (cited in note 222). 
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moreover, only if these free and equal citizens deliberate ration-
ally, eschewing irrelevant information, bad logic, and unverifia-
ble assertions.224 
As deliberation theorists recognize, real deliberation is defec-
tive on these measures.225 From here, they typically go in one of 
two directions. First, some theorists endeavor to identify the hy-
pothetical consensus that would have emerged if the precondi-
tions for deliberation had been met.226 Kleinfeld rejects this as a 
viable path for the democratization project, which is understand-
able given the democratizers’ commitment to popular rule.227 Sec-
ond, other theorists—and the democratizers, it seems—simply 
forge ahead despite the imperfections of real-world delibera-
tion.228 This choice is also understandable but “diverts attention,” 
as Sklansky points out, “from the ongoing power dynamics” of de-
liberating groups.229 “[O]ne person’s consensus,” after all, “is often 
another’s hegemony.”230 
Indeed, a mountain of research—much of it from the commu-
nity policing literature—finds that, in practice, deliberative 
mechanisms tend to amplify predictably dominant voices while 
muffling others. In other words, the “community values” that ap-
pear to emerge from community meetings and the like dispropor-
tionately reflect relatively powerful factions of the community.231 
 
 224 See, for example, Simone Chambers, Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas 
and the Politics of Discourse 98–99 (Cornell 1996); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, 
Democracy and Disagreement 52–94 (Belknap 1996); Jürgen Habermas, 2 The Theory of 
Communicative Action: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason 49  
(Beacon 1987) (Thomas McCarthy, trans). 
 225 See, for example, Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement at 3 
(cited in note 224). 
 226 See Habermas, Between Facts and Norms at 107–08 (cited in note 59). 
 227 See Kleinfeld, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1470 (cited in note 61). 
 228 See id at 1470–71. See also Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagree-
ment at 16, 358–59 (cited in note 224); Christopher H. Schroeder, Deliberative Democracy’s 
Attempt to Turn Politics into Law, 65 L & Contemp Probs 95, 111–13, 116–17 (2002). For 
commentary on this choice, see Jon Elster, The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of 
Political Theory, in James Bohman and William Rehg, eds, Deliberative Democracy: Es-
says on Reason and Politics 3, 18 (MIT 1997); Frederick Schauer, Talking as a Decision 
Procedure, in Stephen Macedo, ed, Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disa-
greement 17, 20–26 (Oxford 1999). 
 229 Sklansky, Democracy and the Police at 104 (cited in note 13). 
 230 Ian Shapiro, Three Ways to Be a Democrat, 22 Pol Theory 124, 134 (1994). 
 231 See, for example, Herman Goldstein, Policing a Free Society 146 (Ballinger 1977); 
Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy at 276 (cited in note 192); Wesley G. Skogan, 
Representing the Community in Community Policing, in Wesley G. Skogan, ed, Commu-
nity Policing: Can It Work? 57, 71–73 (Wadsworth 2004). Some of the democratizers 
acknowledge this concern. See, for example, Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of ‘the People’ in 
Criminal Procedure, 119 Colum L Rev 249, 286 (2019). 
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Preeminent policing scholar Herman Goldstein observed 
firsthand that, “absent vigorous representation of the people af-
fected, persons attracted to membership on such a body are in-
clined to encourage and support some of the very police practices 
to which the advocates of decentralized decision-making are most 
strongly opposed.”232  In short, participatory democracy will al-
ways favor those who have the time and wherewithal to partici-
pate, and the human capital to dominate.233 
The broader point is that it is too facile to assume that 
“whereas less-than-ideal speech situations will generate fewer 
benefits than ideal speech situations, any verbal interaction, how-
ever imperfect, is better than nothing.”234 In fact, “deliberation in 
the real world can be and often is dangerous”: it can “fan emotions 
unproductively, can exacerbate rather than diminish power dif-
ferentials among those deliberating, . . . is ill-suited to many is-
sues, and can lead to worse decisions than would have occurred if 
no deliberation had taken place.”235 
2. Apathy and alienation. 
Suppose we assume away all of these problems. We imagine 
that Americans reside in local communities of interest that share, 
to a large extent, a set of values relevant to criminal justice policy. 
And where individuals disagree, an acceptable method exists for 
 
 232 Goldstein, Policing a Free Society at 146 (cited in note 231). As Goldstein’s obser-
vation reveals, disempowered voices can be silenced not only because they speak more 
quietly but also through exclusion from the conversation altogether. See, for example, 
Wesley G. Skogan, et al, Community Policing in Chicago, Year Ten: An Evaluation of  
Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy iii (Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority 
2004); James Forman Jr, Community Policing and Youth as Assets, 95 J Crim L & Crimin 
1, 16–20 (2004). For discussion of how self-selection into voluntary community groups cre-
ates a “communitarian fallacy of homogeneity,” see Mark Peel, Trusting Disadvantaged 
Citizens, in Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi, eds, Trust and Governance 315, 339 
(Russell Sage Foundation 1998). 
 233 It is unnecessary to infer any nefarious motives here. Political theorist Arnold 
Kaufman observes that a small number of individuals may “choose, at great personal sac-
rifice and out of a genuine sense of civic responsibility, to attend all the meetings. They 
give up so much that they quite understandably come to think that they are the vanguard 
of good citizenry of the future.” Arnold S. Kaufman, Participatory Democracy: Ten Years 
Later, in William E. Connolly, ed, The Bias of Pluralism 201, 209 (Atherton 1969). 
 234 John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy: Americans’  
Beliefs About How Government Should Work 190 (Cambridge 2002). 
 235 Id at 190–91. See also id at 246–54; Achen and Bartels, Democracy for Realists at 
299–303 (cited in note 31); Jason Brennan, Against Democracy 58–73 (Princeton 2016). 
2020] Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice 751 
 
extracting “the community’s view.” Still, a major question re-
mains: What evidence is there that these communities actually 
want to participate in the administration of criminal justice? 
a) “Stealth democracy.”  The democratizers describe an ea-
ger public clamoring at the gates of power, blocked from entry by 
insiders who have stolen their disputes to feed the machinery of 
bureaucratic justice. These are de Tocqueville’s Americans, who 
“feel an immense void” when excluded from consideration of “the 
interests of the community.”236 Evocative as it is, this account is 
largely fictional—a story told by the elite. For most ordinary peo-
ple, the truth is that “participatory democracy simply takes too 
many evenings.”237 
Political scientists John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse 
set out to examine the conventional wisdom that people want to 
govern themselves by surveying ordinary people and convening 
focus groups around the country.238 They found, perhaps surpris-
ingly, that “[t]he last thing people want is to be more involved in 
political decision making: They do not want to make political de-
cisions themselves[ ] [and] they do not want to provide much in-
put to those who are assigned to make these decisions.”239 They 
“would much prefer to spend their time in nonpolitical pur-
suits.”240 Nor are they particularly keen on the idea of their fellow 
Americans ruling. “People overwhelmingly admit that they and 
the American people generally are largely uninformed about po-
litical matters,” Hibbing and Theiss-Morse report.241 “They also 
 
 236 de Tocqueville, 1 Democracy in America at 267 (cited in note 64). 
 237 Kaufman, Participatory Democracy at 209 (cited in note 233). Kaufman cites  
Michael Walzer, A Day in the Life of a Socialist Citizen, Dissent (May–June 1968), who, 
in turn, references Oscar Wilde. 
 238 See Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy at 246–54 (cited in note 234) 
(describing their methodology, including a survey of 1,266 nationally representative re-
spondents and 8 focus-group sessions). 
 239 Id at 1. These are generalizations, of course. To be sure, “some ordinary Americans 
love the give and take of politics,” but “because politicized citizens make more noise, and 
because political writers themselves are smitten with politics and care about issues, the 
number of ‘politicos’ in the general population has been grossly overestimated.” Id at 11. See 
also Herbert, Citizens, Cops and Power at 13 (cited in note 208) (finding that “[u]rban resi-
dents do not typically wish for their neighborhoods to act in a politically robust manner”). 
 240 Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy at 2 (cited in note 234). See also 
Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City 305 (Yale 1961) 
(“In liberal societies, politics is a sideshow in the great circus of life.”); Jerome H. Skolnick, 
The Berkeley Scheme: Neighborhood Police, 212 The Nation 372, 373 (1971) (criticizing 
neighborhood policing advocates for assuming “that people, especially poor people, have 
all kinds of free time and public interest”). 
 241 Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy at 126 (cited in note 234). 
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have reservations about the trustworthiness of the American peo-
ple” and are “not at all certain that the ‘country would be better 
off if the American people rather than politicians decided im-
portant political matters.’”242 
The governance Americans want, instead, is what Hibbing 
and Theiss-Morse call “stealth democracy”: people want democ-
racy “to exist but not to be visible on a routine basis.”243 That said, 
the only thing Americans dislike more than “a political system 
built on sustained public involvement” is “a political system in 
which decision makers—for no reason other than the fact that 
they are in a position to make decisions—accrue benefits at the 
expense of non-decision makers.”244 “They are therefore left with 
a dilemma”: they “want to turn political matters over to somebody 
else because they do not want to be involved themselves, but they 
do not want to turn decision making over to someone who is likely 
to act in a selfish, rather than other-regarding, manner.”245 The 
upshot is that “people are surprisingly smitten with the notion of 
elite experts making choices—provided those experts have noth-
ing to gain from selecting one option over another.”246 
b) Criminal justice exceptionalism?  Of course, even if  
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse are right in general, it is possible that 
criminal justice is the exception to the rule. Judge Bibas tells us 
that, unlike in other areas of government where “rational apathy 
and faith in expertise leads voters to defer to experts . . . many 
ordinary citizens do not defer to criminal justice experts but show 
 
 242 Id. More sharply: “People themselves believe that people aren’t very bright, they 
don’t care, they are lazy, they are selfish, they want to be left alone, and they don’t want 
to be informed.” Id at 127. 
 243 Id at 2. See also Bernard E. Harcourt, The Invisibility of the Prison in Democratic 
Theory: A Problem of “Virtual Democracy”, 23 Good Socy 6, 11–14 (2014) (elaborating a 
descriptive theory of “virtual democracy,” in which the state operates without the full par-
ticipation of its citizens and responsibility is projected onto politicians and experts). 
 244 Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy at 2 (cited in note 234). This,  
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse argue, explains Americans’ apparent support for direct democ-
racy: “People indicate greater enthusiasm for more political involvement when popular 
democracy is presented as the only alternative to dominance by self-serving elites.” Id at 
130 (emphasis added). 
 245 Id at 85–86. 
 246 Id at 86. See id at 141 (“Contrary to conventional wisdom, people like the concept 
of objective bureaucrats making their technical decisions.”). For evidence that “stealth de-
mocracy” retains explanatory power today, roughly fifteen years after Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse first wrote, see John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, A Surprising Number 
of Americans Dislike How Messy Democracy Is. They Like Trump. (Wash Post, May 2, 2016), 
online at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/02/a-surprising 
-number-of-americans-dislike-how-messy-democracy-is-they-like-trump (visited Feb 19, 
2020) (Perma archive unavailable). 
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passionate interest in how insiders handle criminal cases.” 247 
“The public is hungry to see and understand criminal justice,” he 
insists, “as shown by its insatiable appetite for crime dramas, 
news stories, and even reality-television courtroom coverage.”248 
It is certainly true that, especially in recent years, public interest 
in criminal justice is high. Internet searches and media coverage 
of police misconduct spiked after the deaths of Michael Brown and 
Eric Garner, for example.249 Black Lives Matter is now a house-
hold name. 
Yet what Hibbing and Theiss-Morse find as a general matter 
does appear to hold in the criminal justice setting. Attendance at 
community-policing and community-prosecution meetings, for ex-
ample, has consistently disappointed over the long run. 250  An 
evaluation of community policing programs in eight cities found 
that all eight encountered great difficulty in cultivating and 
maintaining community involvement.251 This “low level of citizen 
participation,” in turn, “is detrimental to police departments’ pro-
grammatic efforts.”252 
 
 247 Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at xvii (cited in note 12). 
 248 Id at 35. 
 249 Aurélie Ouss and John Rappaport, Is Police Behavior Getting Worse? Data Selec-
tion and the Measurement of Policing Harms, J Legal Stud *1 (forthcoming), archived at 
https://perma.cc/G3E7-TREN. 
 250 See Correia, Citizen Involvement at 54–58 (cited in note 207); Goldstein, Policing 
a Free Society at 146 (cited in note 231); Skogan, et al, Community Policing in Chicago at 
ii–iii (cited in note 232); William Lyons, Partnerships, Information and Public Safety: 
Community Policing in a Time of Terror, 25 Policing: Intl J Police Strategies & Mgmt 530, 
534 (2002); Wesley G. Skogan, Why Reforms Fail, 18 Policing & Socy 23, 31 (2008). 
 251 See Randolph M. Grinc, “Angels in Marble”: Problems in Stimulating Community 
Involvement in Community Policing, 40 Crime & Delinq 437, 465 (1994). 
 252 Correia, Citizen Involvement at 10 (cited in note 207). Take Chicago’s community 
policing program, for example. Around the end of the twentieth century, community polic-
ing in Chicago, with its well-attended beat meetings, was thought to exemplify “empow-
ered participation” in local governance. See Fung, Empowering Participation at 2–5 (cited 
in note 112); Robert E. Worden and Sarah J. McLean, Mirage of Police Reform: Procedural 
Justice and Police Legitimacy 26 (California 2017) (asserting that community policing was 
“implemented as a strategic reform . . . in Chicago as much as (and probably more than) 
it was in any other city”). On a longer view, however, this early success was a flash in the 
pan. Critically, Chicago had been spending millions to run its meetings and promote at-
tendance. See Wesley G. Skogan, et al, Taking Stock: Community Policing in Chicago *8 
(National Institute of Justice, 2002), archived at https://perma.cc/49NJ-RHSV. Experts 
wondered even then whether that level of funding was sustainable. It wasn’t. In the early 
2000s, “[m]oney was pulled away . . . and never returned.” Nissa Rhee, Manny Ramos, and 
Andrea Salcedo, The Rise and Fall of Community Policing in Chicago, Chi Reader (Sept 
22, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/4YWU-VKCG. Attendance waned. See Skogan, et 
al, Community Policing in Chicago at ii–iii (cited in note 232) (reporting that, by 2002, 
beat meetings had gotten shorter, fewer officers were attending, and satisfaction among 
attendees was declining); Rhee, Ramos, and Salcedo, The Rise and Fall of Community 
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To be sure, public preferences to participate are endogenous 
to the system—perhaps people don’t want to participate because, 
under current conditions, participation is unfulfilling. Improve 
the system, the argument might go, and preferences will change. 
Maybe.253 But we’ve been trying community policing—including 
the sorts of civilian review and advisory boards the democratizers 
suggest—for over thirty years. Why should we not think this is as 
good as it gets? Of course, it is possible that what people want is 
not more meetings but rather a practice of ongoing engagement 
between the police and civilians on the terms of the latter, not the 
former. If so, the democratizers should prioritize constructing this 
new model. Still, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (and others) give rea-
son for continued skepticism: “people want to distance themselves 
from government,” they report, “not because of a system defect but 
because many people are simply averse to political conflict and 
many others believe political conflict is unnecessary and an indica-
tion that something is wrong with governmental procedures.”254 
c) Mandatory participation.  Perhaps people need a nudge 
to awaken the participatory spirit. Jury service, of course, is man-
datory. Adding additional juries—for bail, pleas, sentencing, and 
so on—would require only expanding the current system. We 
could likewise require participation on civilian advisory commit-
tees or review boards or attendance at neighborhood beat meet-
ings. In reality, however, it’s not so simple: the national yield on 
jury summonses is less than 50 percent255 and far less in some 
 
Policing in Chicago (cited in note 252) (noting sharply declining attendance after 2000). 
Community policing was said to have failed the city’s Latinos, in particular, due to their 
insufficient “commitment” to participating in the program. See Wesley G. Skogan and 
Lynn Steiner, Crime, Disorder and Decay in Chicago’s Latino Community, 2 J Ethnicity 
Crim Just 7, 25 (2004). 
 253 See generally Michael A. Neblo, Kevin M. Esterling, and David M.J. Lazer, Politics 
with the People: Building a Directly Representative Democracy (Cambridge 2018). 
 254 Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy at 7 (cited in note 234). See also 
generally Nina Eliasoph, Avoiding Politics: How Americans Produce Apathy in Everyday 
Life (Cambridge 1998); Samara Klar, Yanna Krupnikov, and John Barry Ryan, Affective 
Polarization or Partisan Disdain? Untangling a Dislike for the Opposing Party from a Dis-
like of Partisanship, 82 Pub Op Q 379 (2018). See also Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary 
Democracy at 273 (cited in note 192); Diana C. Mutz, Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative 
Versus Participatory Democracy 3 (Cambridge 2006); Stacy G. Ulbig and Carolyn L. Funk, 
Conflict Avoidance and Political Participation, 21 Pol Behav 265, 276 (1999). 
 255 Gregory E. Mize, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, and Nicole L. Waters, The State-of-
the-States Survey of Jury Improvement Efforts: Executive Summary *5 (Center for Jury 
Studies 2007), archived at https://perma.cc/UWS7-LL8L. 
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large cities.256 Younger adults who have childcare responsibilities 
or are starting careers are especially reluctant to serve; so are 
individuals of lower socioeconomic status and some communities 
of color.257 But setting that aside, there could be benefits to ex-
panding mandatory service—intrinsic benefits irrespective of 
criminal justice outcomes. Some research has found that jury ser-
vice promotes voting and other forms of political engagement.258 
Over time, in fact, grudging, mandatory service might naturally 
morph into widespread volunteerism. 
It is worth asking: If the point of democratization is to effec-
tuate the people’s will, do we accomplish this by forcing people to 
participate against their will?259 Put differently, the democratiz-
ers focus on effectuating the laity’s substantive views on criminal 
justice policy, but people have preferences for process as well—
indeed, much clearer preferences, according to Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse260—and the two may be at odds. True, a little bit of 
forced participation now might change public preferences for pro-
cess in the future. But this smacks of a certain paternalism incon-
gruous with the democratizers’ own conception of democratic rule. 
Given that most people do not want more responsibility for polit-
ical decision-making, nor to give that responsibility to the rest of 
public, which approach actually implements what the people 
 
 256 See, for example, Susan Carol Losh and Robert G. Boatright, Life-Cycle Factors, 
Status, and Civic Engagement: Issues of Age and Attitudes Toward Jury Service, 23 Just 
Sys J 221, 222 (2002) (reporting that, in New York City and Los Angeles, only around 
10 percent of summoned jurors reported); Richard Seltzer, The Vanishing Juror: Why Are 
There Not Enough Available Jurors?, 20 Just Sys J 203, 216 (1999) (finding that 20 per-
cent of DC jurors ignored summonses and 35 percent did not receive them). 
 257 See, for example, Andrew J. Bloeser, Carl McCurley, and Jeffery J. Mondak, Jury 
Service as Civic Engagement: Determinants of Jury Summons Compliance, 40 Am Polit 
Rsrch 179, 189 (2012) (finding that 46 percent of Washington State jurors complied with 
summonses but only half as many Latinos and Asians did so). 
 258 See generally John Gastil, et al, Jury Service and Electoral Participation: A Test 
of the Participation Hypothesis, 70 J Polit 351 (2008); John Gastil and Phillip J. Weiser, 
Jury Service as an Invitation to Citizenship: Assessing the Civic Value of Institutionalized 
Deliberation, 34 Pol Stud J 605 (2006). 
 259 See Russell Hardin, Deliberation: Method, Not Theory, in Macedo, ed, Deliberative 
Politics 103, 112 (cited in note 228) (“It is hard to avoid the suspicion that deliberative 
democracy is the ‘democracy’ of elite intellectuals” that “will work, if at all, only in parlor 
room discourse or in the small salons of academic conferences.”); Daniel A. Bell, Demo-
cratic Deliberation: The Problem of Implementation, in Macedo, ed, Deliberative Politics 
70, 75 (cited in note 228) (asserting that “ordinary citizens would not recommend solving 
political problems by means of deliberation”), citing Lynn M. Sanders, Against Delibera-
tion, 25 Pol Theory 347, 348 (1997). 
 260 See Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy at 13 (cited in note 234). 
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want—one that forces them to participate nonetheless or one that 
respects their preference to put the experts in charge? 
To say that there are social benefits to jury service and pos-
sibly other forms of criminal justice engagement, moreover, is not 
to say there aren’t countervailing costs. Again, group deliberation 
can reinforce hierarchy and cause discomfort. Some jurors walk 
away feeling frustrated or disenchanted. Jury service is stressful 
and some jurors, particularly those who hear violent or disturbing 
matters, actually experience adverse health effects.261 The costs 
to individuals who are called but not seated are substantial as 
well.262 Overall, the annual total social cost of the jury system is 
probably in the billions.263 The point is not that there are no ben-
efits to the jury system; only that, before expanding it, we should 
consider the costs as well. 
Finally, even assuming the intrinsic benefits of “mandatory” 
public participation do outweigh the costs, one might still ask 
whether this—the criminal justice process—is the optimal site for 
engagement. At least some of the democratizers see value in 
members of the community expressing their collective condemna-
tion of criminal wrongdoers.264 I am more skeptical. Participating 
 
 261 For a review of the relevant literature, see generally Michelle Lonergan, et al, 
Prevalence and Severity of Trauma- and Stressor-Related Symptoms Among Jurors: A Re-
view, 47 J Crim Just 51 (2016). See also generally Daniel W. Shuman, et al, The Health 
Effects of Jury Service, 18 L & Psych Rev 267 (1994). 
 262 See, for example, Gastil, et al, The Jury and Democracy at 66 (cited in note 65) 
(reporting that many non-seated prospective jurors “perceived their time to have been 
wasted”); Joanna Sobol, Note, Hardship Excuses and Occupational Exemptions: The Im-
pairment of the “Fair Cross-Section of the Community”, 69 S Cal L Rev 155, 158–59 (1995). 
This describes a huge number of potential jurors. See Susan Saulny, Jury Duty? Prepare 
for Rejection; Though Many Are Called, Few Ever Deliberate (NY Times, Sept 8, 2003), 
archived at https://perma.cc/ATT3-TVD3 (“In New York State, 82 percent of the people 
called for jury service never make it past voir dire.”). 
 263 See Donald L. Martin, The Economics of Jury Conscription, 80 J Pol Econ 680, 684 
tbl 1, 700–01 appx (1972) (estimating the annual social cost of the jury system at $232.9 
million in 1962 dollars, which is over $2 billion in 2019 dollars, though trial rates and the 
nature of jury trials have changed). 
 264 See, for example, Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at 49–50 (cited in note 12) 
(arguing, among other things, that punishment “reaffirms society’s norms”). 
2020] Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice 757 
 
in punishment has real downsides,265 and its upsides may be over-
stated.266 Why not mandatory community service instead? The 
bottom line is that, even if there are net intrinsic benefits to lay 
participation in criminal justice, criminal justice is not the only 
game in town, and the net benefits of lay participation in other 
societal activities may be even greater. 
3. Externalities. 
To this point, I have focused on the ways in which individuals 
in our society are less interconnected, and less interested in con-
nection, than the democratizers seem to think. In an important 
respect, however, the opposite is simultaneously true. The democ-
ratizers’ vision of an America in which neighborhoods make and 
implement criminal justice policy reflective of shared values and 
local conditions ignores the critical ways in which neighborhoods 
themselves are interconnected. What one neighborhood does 
about crime affects the neighborhoods around it in ways that are 
not incidental but structural.267  “The particular behaviors and 
persons targeted by quality of life or exclusionary zoning ordi-
nances,” for example, “will not disappear; they will just go some-
where else, to increasingly marginalized, coerced, and isolated 
spaces.”268 “Displacement,” one commentator poignantly writes, 
“is thus the central birth act of community.”269 
This is not to say that displacement is an inevitable byprod-
uct of all policing strategies, no matter how carefully executed. 
Indeed, the empirical evidence suggests that “focused deterrence” 
strategies—which aim “to change offender behavior by under-
standing underlying crime-producing dynamics and conditions 
 
 265 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice 
5–6 (Oxford 2016) (outlining reasons that “anger is always normatively problematic, 
whether in the personal or in the public realm”); Tonry, Thinking About Crime at 201 
(cited in note 40) (arguing that the desire to punish is an expression of anger). See also 
Eric Klinenberg, Bowling Alone, Policing Together, 28 Soc Just 75, 80 (2001) (“[T]he ele-
vation of policing into a mode of social integration marks a disturbing trend toward a so-
ciety where distrust, suspicion, and fear are organizing principles of politics and culture.”). 
 266 See generally, for example, Marilyn Peterson Armour and Mark S. Umbreit, As-
sessing the Impact of the Ultimate Penal Sanction on Homicide Survivors: A Two State 
Comparison, 96 Marq L Rev 1 (2012) (finding that capital punishment does not improve 
survivors’ well-being). 
 267 Schragger, 100 Mich L Rev at 422 (cited in note 207). 
 268 Id at 427. 
 269 Id. See also Dennis P. Rosenbaum, The Limits of Hot Spots Policing, in David 
Weisburd and Anthony A. Braga, eds, Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives 245, 
252–53 (Cambridge 2006). 
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that sustain recurring crime problems and by implementing an 
appropriately focused blended strategy of law enforcement, com-
munity mobilization, and social service actions”—can reduce 
crime without significant displacement.270 The policing programs 
evaluated in the focused deterrence literature, however, warrant 
study precisely because they are exceptional. More typical forms 
of American policing, in contrast, may well displace crime—one 
review, for example, found “considerable evidence of spatial dis-
placement of calls or crime incidents as a result of police crack-
downs, especially during drug enforcement.”271 
Displacement of crime, moreover, coupled with jurisdictional 
competition, may actually create an “arms race between local 
communities attempting to drive crime to their neighbors,” re-
sulting in an upward spiral of enforcement and sanctions.272 Af-
fluent communities are most likely to come out on top.273 These 
negative externalities are easy to miss if we think about only our 
own “community” when formulating policy, as the adversely af-
fected individuals are, by definition, “outsiders” to that commu-
nity.274 Yet they create real tension within the participatory dem-
ocratic agenda, as these same “outsiders,” precisely because of 
their outsider status, have no voice in the decisions to adopt the 
policies that affect them.275 
The democratizers’ plan to devolve power to increasingly 
small neighborhood jurisdictions will only exacerbate this prob-
lem. The smaller the geographic unit that controls criminal pun-
ishment, the shorter the distances between the interiors of differ-
ent units, which makes it easier for potential offenders to travel 
among relevant jurisdictions and therefore to select among juris-
dictions in which to commit crime. The smaller the jurisdiction, 
in other words, the greater the payoff from raising punishment to 
displace crime. 
 
 270 Anthony A. Braga, David Weisburd, and Brandon Turchan, Focused Deterrence 
Strategies and Crime Control: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of the 
Empirical Evidence, 17 Crimin & Pub Pol 205, 206, 237–38 (2018). 
 271 Rosenbaum, The Limits of Hot Spots Policing at 253 (cited in note 269). 
 272 See Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, 
and Jurisdictional Competition, 103 Mich L Rev 1831, 1834 (2005). 
 273 See Herbert, Citizens, Cops, and Power at 59, 146 (cited in note 208). 
 274 See Schragger, 100 Mich L Rev at 422 (cited in note 207). 
 275 See id at 444–45. 
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B. Lay Leniency 
The democratizers insist that, properly understood, people 
are basically lenient, or at least no less so than criminal justice 
professionals. This premise motivates their prescription of democ-
ratization as a palliative for mass incarceration. To be sure, the 
democratizers readily concede that, when surveyed on “whole-
sale” policy issues in general public opinion polls, laypeople have 
long expressed punitive sentiments, including that sentences are 
too lenient. They urge us, however, not to infer too much from 
these results. Moreover, sentiments tend to soften at the “retail” 
level, in particular cases. This Section responds to these points in 
detail. 
1. Wholesale leniency. 
General opinion polls, the democratizers insist, capture only 
“top of the head” opinions rather than informed, reflective judg-
ments. These opinions, too, are cultivated by political elites; they 
do not preexist in the polity. The same thing explains punitive 
public referenda. What is more, the image of a punitive public is 
increasingly outdated. In fact, public attitudes have been soften-
ing since the mid-1990s. 
a) Reflexive opinions.  All agree that, from the 1970s 
through at least the mid-1990s, Americans expressed generally 
punitive penal policy opinions.276 The public firmly supported the 
death penalty,277 three-strikes laws,278 and mandatory minimum 
 
 276 See, for example, Peter K. Enns, Incarceration Nation: How the United States Be-
came the Most Punitive Democracy in the World 38 (Cambridge 2016); Julian V. Roberts 
and Loretta J. Stalans, Public Opinion, Crime, and Criminal Justice 207 (Westview 1997). 
See also Francis T. Cullen, Bonnie S. Fisher, and Brandon K. Applegate, Public Opinion 
About Punishment and Corrections, 27 Crime & Just 1, 26–27, 38 (2000); Douglas R. 
Thomson and Anthony J. Ragona, Popular Moderation Versus Governmental Authoritari-
anism: An Interactionist View of Public Sentiments Toward Criminal Sanctions, 33 Crime 
& Delinq 337, 338 (1987); Michael G. Turner, et al, Public Tolerance for Community-Based 
Sanctions, 77 Prison J 6, 7 (1997); Vesla M. Weaver, Frontlash: Race and the Development 
of Punitive Crime Policy, 21 Stud Am Pol Dev 230, 264 fig 9 (2007). 
 277 See, for example, Beckett, Making Crime Pay at 80 & n 5 (cited in note 126); Enns, 
Incarceration Nation at 25–26, 35 (cited in note 276). 
 278 Voters in Washington State’s 1993 referendum on a “three-strikes” statute ap-
proved the measure by a three-to-one margin. Cullen, Fisher, and Applegate, 27 Crime & 
Just at 38 (cited in note 276). In a 1994 referendum, 72 percent of voters supported  
California’s “three-strikes” law. Id. 
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sentences.279 They consistently regarded judicial sentences as un-
duly lenient.280 All agree as well that the public is deeply unin-
formed about the criminal justice system.281 One particularly tell-
ing misapprehension is that people believe crime is rising even 
when it’s been declining for years.282 Confronted with widespread 
lay ignorance, some scholars conclude that public opinions on 
wholesale criminal justice policies are simply meaningless.283 
Others, however, call for public education.284 Studies using fo-
cus groups and surveys have found that participants become less 
punitive when they are educated about alternatives to,285 or the 
costs of,286 incarceration. Some scholars contend, based on these 
findings, that the public’s “true” judgments can be revealed only 
by sampling informed participants.287 In this vein, democratizers 
committed to reducing incarceration might figure that educating 
 
 279 See, for example, id at 38; Stalans and Diamond, 14 L & Hum Behav at 200 (cited 
in note 135). 
 280 From the first administration of the nationwide General Social Survey in 1972 
through 1994, the percentage of respondents reporting that local courts are too lenient 
rose from 65 percent to 85 percent, fluctuating between 80 percent and 87 percent from 
1976 through 1994. GSS Data Explorer, online at https://gssdataexplorer.norc.org/trends/ 
Civil%20Liberties?measure=courts (visited Feb 19, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). An 
almost identical question asked on the Gallup poll yielded similarly punitive results be-
ginning in the 1970s, see Enns, Incarceration Nation at 35 (cited in note 276), and lasting 
through 1992, see Justin McCarthy, Americans’ Views Shift on Toughness of Justice Sys-
tem (Gallup, Oct 20, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/BW7X-BAKH. 
 281 For a catalog of the public’s misperceptions, see Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, 
Crime, and Criminal Justice, 16 Crime & Just 99, 109–16 (1992). 
 282 See, for example, Michael T. Costelloe, Ted Chiricos, and Marc Gertz, Punitive 
Attitudes Toward Criminals: Exploring the Relevance of Crime Salience and Economic In-
security, 11 Punishment & Soc 25, 27 (2009); Justin McCarthy, Most Americans Still See 
Crime Up over Last Year (Gallup, Nov 21, 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/8WZM-99M3.  
 283 See Stalans and Diamond, 14 L & Hum Behav at 200 (cited in note 135). See also 
Judith Greene and John Doble, Attitudes Towards Crime and Punishment in Vermont: 
Public Opinion About an Experiment with Restorative Justice 4–5, 9–10 (National Insti-
tute of Justice, 2000), archived at https://perma.cc/2HLR-33J5. 
 284 See Julian V. Roberts, American Attitudes About Punishment: Myth and Reality, 
in Michael Tonry and Kathleen Hatlestad, eds, Sentencing Reform in Overcrowded Times: 
A Comparative Perspective 250, 254–55 (Oxford 1997). 
 285 See John Doble and Josh Klein, Punishing Criminals, The Public’s View: An  
Alabama Survey 38 (Edna McConnell Clark Foundation 1989); Michael Hough and Julian 
Roberts, Attitudes to Punishment: Findings from the British Crime Survey 29 (Home Office 
Research & Statistics Directorate, 1998), archived at https://perma.cc/4V67-XX3G. 
 286 See Thomson and Ragona, 33 Crime & Delinq at 350 (cited in note 276). 
 287 See, for example, Jan W. de Keijser, Penal Theory and Popular Opinion: The De-
ficiencies of Direct Engagement, in Jesper Ryberg and Julian V. Roberts, eds, Popular Pun-
ishment: On the Normative Significance of Public Opinion 101, 107 (Oxford 2014); David 
A. Green, Public Opinion Versus Public Judgment About Crime: Correcting the “Comedy 
of Errors”, 46 Brit J Crimin 131, 150 (2006). 
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the public will minimize the risk that lay participation will effec-
tuate punitive views. 
There is more than an ounce of hypocrisy in this position. 
Consider how the democratizers know that the public view is un-
informed: because the democratizers themselves are elites whose 
study of the criminal justice system gives them specialized 
knowledge. The democratizers favor the preferences of the public, 
that is, only so long as the public is, in their own expert assess-
ment, “informed.” And who decides what information to give the 
public before eliciting their views? Some “elite” with expertise on 
the topic. Which elite, then, may go far toward determining the 
content of public judgment—learning does not inevitably cut to-
ward leniency. If people are informed that many death row in-
mates committed murders while on probation, for instance, they 
may become more punitive, not less.288 
There are additional reasons to be pessimistic about basing 
criminal justice policy on “informed” public views. First, other re-
search indicates that public opinion on criminal justice affairs 
may be “much more fixed and inflexible” than just portrayed, as 
it is “largely rooted in certain fairly stable underlying social psy-
chological predispositions,” such as “sociopolitical ideology and 
racial prejudice.”289 “Given the sources of these attitudes, and the 
fact that political and social values are developed early in life and 
are rather stable,” this research suggests, “it is likely that views 
on the criminal justice system are rather rigid and resistant to 
change.”290 The truth may be somewhere in the middle: public 
opinion may be fixed with respect to some issues but not others, 
and different factions of the public may differ in this regard.291 
Second, the sort of mass public education campaign that 
would be necessary to alter widely held public attitudes simply 
isn’t feasible. Written materials and presentations are likely in-
adequate; proponents advocate admittedly “utopian” mechanisms 
like deliberative polls, consensus conferences, study circles, and 
planning cells.292 There is also some evidence that, even when suc-
cessfully altered, lay attitudes revert back to their “pre-informed” 
 
 288 See Cullen, Fisher, and Applegate, 27 Crime & Just at 44–45 (cited in note 276); 
Turner, et al, 77 Prison J at 8 (cited in note 276). 
 289 Lawrence D. Bobo and Devon Johnson, A Taste for Punishment: Black and White 
Americans’ Views on the Death Penalty and the War on Drugs, 1 Du Bois Rev 151, 155 (2004). 
 290 Id. 
 291 See id at 170–71. 
 292 See Green, 46 Brit J Crimin at 147, 150 (cited in note 287). 
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state.293 Penal policies based on the preferences of a curated and 
ephemeral “informed” public therefore will not reflect the prefer-
ences of the public at large.294 In short, it is likely unwise to “dis-
miss global attitudes as somehow ‘wrong’ or based on mispercep-
tions,” as even “general polling questions are measuring 
something,”295 if nothing more than a “general propensity that un-
derlies many people’s thinking.”296 
b) Elite influence.  Nor should the notion that political 
elites manipulate public opinion provide much comfort about the 
content of “true” public attitudes toward punishment. Professor 
Katherine Beckett, the principal authority cited for this proposi-
tion, finds that when politicians focus more attention on crime, 
public concern about crime increases.297  Beckett’s research de-
sign, however, has serious limitations. First, as Beckett herself 
notes, concern about crime does not necessarily generate punitive 
attitudes.298 Second, Beckett’s measure of public concern is coarse, 
using the percentage of respondents who rank crime as the “most 
important problem facing the nation.”299 Her principal finding, 
therefore, may mean only that political attention promotes crime 
from, say, the public’s second-most-important issue to its first-
most-important concern. And a lot depends on the status of other 
issues, such as the economy. During a recession, for example, wor-
ries about the economy may eclipse fears about crime; when the 
recession ends, economic concerns may recede, creating the ap-
pearance of rising (relative) concern about crime even if underly-
ing attitudes toward crime are unchanged.300 
More recent scholarship rejects the theory that politicians 
create rather than follow the public’s punitive views. Political sci-
entist Peter Enns reviews archival and public opinion data from 
the 1960s and concludes that “the evidence overwhelmingly  
suggests that political elites” in that signal era “responded to the 
 
 293 See de Keijser, Penal Theory and Popular Opinion at 106–07 (cited in note 287). 
 294 See id at 107–09. 
 295 Applegate, et al, 42 Crime & Delinq at 530 (cited in note 133) (emphasis added). 
 296 Cullen, Fisher, and Applegate, 27 Crime & Just at 58 (cited in note 276). 
 297 See, for example, Beckett, Making Crime Pay at 15 (cited in note 126) (“[L]evels of 
public concern are largely unrelated to the reported incidence of crime and drug use but 
are strongly associated with the extent to which elites highlight these issues in political 
discourse.”). For consonant accounts, see Mark D. Ramirez, Punitive Sentiment, 51 Crimin 
329, 333–34 (2013); Weaver, 21 Stud Am Pol Dev at 232 (cited in note 276). 
 298 See Beckett, Making Crime Pay at 25–26 (cited in note 126). 
 299 Id at 16 & n 11. 
 300 See Enns, Incarceration Nation at 21 (cited in note 276). 
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public’s shifting support for being tough on crime.”301 In a series 
of regressions, Enns then explores the relationship among public 
opinion data, crime reports in the media, political attention to 
crime, and changes in the incarceration rate. Refining Beckett’s 
“most important problem” proxy for public attitudes about pun-
ishment, Enns constructs a composite measure of public punitive-
ness from twenty-six survey questions assessing “attitudes to-
ward the treatment of criminals, the death penalty, spending to 
prevent crime, and lack of confidence in the police and the crimi-
nal justice system.”302 He finds that “[c]rime rates appear to influ-
ence news coverage, which influences the public’s punitiveness, 
which influences government action”—and that public punitive-
ness predicts the incarceration rate.303 Other recent work simi-
larly concludes that public views are more influential than polit-
ical ones in retaining the death penalty 304  and that federal 
criminal justice policy responds to public punitiveness but not to 
“elite attention to crime.”305 All of this evidence tends to validate 
those who have attributed harsh penal policies like three-strikes 
laws to the forces of penal populism.306 
 
 301 Id at 68. 
 302 Id at 33–37. 
 303 Id at 95, 114–18. See also John F. Pfaff, Locked In: The True Causes of Mass In-
carceration and How to Achieve Real Reform 176 (Basic Books 2017) (concluding that, due 
to methodological improvements, Enns’s findings are more persuasive than Beckett’s); 
John Clegg and Adaner Usmani, The Racial Politics of the Punitive Turn *7 n 3 (un-
published manuscript, Aug 2018) (on file with author) (similar). Not everyone agrees that 
crime rates drive public concern with crime or public punitiveness. This skeptical view 
usually traces back to Beckett, though there is some more recent research to this effect as 
well. See, for example, Gary Kleck and Dylan Baker Jackson, Does Crime Cause Punitive-
ness?, 63 Crime & Delinq 1572, 1584 (2017). 
 304 See David Jacobs and Jason T. Carmichael, The Political Sociology of the Death 
Penalty: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 67 Am Sociological Rev 109, 126–27 (2002). 
 305 Sean Nicholson-Crotty, David A.M. Peterson, and Mark D. Ramirez, Dynamic Rep-
resentation(s): Federal Criminal Justice Policy and an Alternative Dimension of Public 
Mood, 31 Pol Behav 629, 650 (2009). Professor Mark Ramirez finds that presidential fram-
ing of crime influences punitive public sentiment, though the effect is smaller than, say, 
that of “public perceptions that racial integration is increasing.” Ramirez, 51 Crimin at 
348–49 (cited in note 297). Using Ramirez’s data, Enns finds some evidence consistent 
with Ramirez but also finds that the opposite relation—that public sentiment influences 
presidential framing—is more likely. See Enns, Incarceration Nation at 95–96 (cited in 
note 276). Enns also argues that, even if political elites sometimes influence public atti-
tudes, they “face strong incentives to follow the public and are unlikely to be able to lead 
the public for extended periods of time.” Id at 51. 
 306 See note 40. See also Barkow, Prisoners of Politics at 105 (cited in note 41) (“[T]he 
shift to mass incarceration is directly linked to the shift from leaving judgments to profes-
sionals to allowing the masses to set policies directly.”). 
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c) Outdated perspectives.  It is sometimes said that we are 
in the midst of a criminal justice “moment,” when public attitudes 
have softened and the possibilities for reform have opened up.307 
Indeed, the data suggest we’ve been on this path for some time. 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the public’s punitiveness, as meas-
ured by general policy questions, began—along with crime rates, 
notably—to decline.308 National polls, surveys, and referenda doc-
ument the public’s declining support for the death penalty,309 in-
creasing belief that courts are too harsh,310 and rising rejection of 
mandatory minimums.311 In addition, some progressive criminal 
justice policies—such as reducing penalties for nonviolent crimes 
and drug offenses, 312  providing rehabilitative services for con-
victed offenders,313 and favoring “root cause” over “get tough” ap-
proaches to crime314—currently enjoy high levels of public sup-
port. Perhaps because they seek to discount the importance of 
public attitudes when those attitudes are punitive, the democra-
tizers don’t give this point a lot of ink. Still, it’s hard to shake the 
sense that optimism flowing from recent attitudinal shifts perme-
ates the democratization agenda. 
Yet several points of caution are in order. First, while public 
opinion is certainly less punitive today than it was three decades 
 
 307 See, for example, Ghandnoosh, Race and Punishment at *5 (cited in note 6); Beth 
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 308 See Enns, Incarceration Nation at 38, 162 (cited in note 276). 
 309 See Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Death Penalty Support Lowest Since 1972 (Gallup, Oct 
26, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/CVG4-6FW3. See also Jill Mizell, An Overview of 
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2014), archived at https://perma.cc/K5W8-7JP6. 
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every year since 1994. See GSS Data Explorer (cited in note 280). 
 311 See Mizell, An Overview of Public Opinion at 35 (cited in note 309); Peter D. Hart 
Research Associates, Inc, Changing Public Attitudes Toward the Criminal Justice System 
*5 (Open Society Institute, Feb 2002), archived at https://perma.cc/K4Z4-8S7E; Cheryl A. 
Roberts, et al, Rethinking Justice in Massachusetts: Public Attitudes Toward Crime and 
Punishment *14 (Crime & Justice Institute and Doble Research Associates, Nov 3, 2005), 
archived at https://perma.cc/F2R5-ETHE. 
 312 See Mizell, An Overview of Public Opinion at *33–34 (cited in note 309); Peter D. 
Hart Research Associates, Changing Public Attitudes at *10–12 (cited in note 311). 
 313 See Francis T. Cullen, et al, Public Support for Correctional Rehabilitation in 
America: Change or Consistency?, in Julian V. Roberts and Mike Hough, eds, Changing 
Attitudes to Punishment: Public Opinion, Crime and Justice 128, 137 (Routledge 2002). 
See also Mizell, An Overview of Public Opinion at 21 (cited in note 309); Peter D. Hart 
Research Associates, Changing Public Attitudes at *4, 13–14 (cited in note 311). 
 314 See Mizell, An Overview of Public Opinion at *24 (cited in note 309); Peter D. Hart 
Research Associates, Changing Public Attitudes at *3 (cited in note 311); Roberts, et al, 
Penal Populism and Popular Opinion at 13 (cited in note 40). 
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ago, at the tail end of a massive crime wave, it remains quite 
harsh. A majority of the country continues to support the death 
penalty and still believes that courts are too lenient.315 Well under 
20 percent of Americans think that prison conditions are too 
harsh.316 And the emergence of seemingly lenient attitudes has 
not crowded out punitive beliefs. In fact, numerous studies show 
that the same individuals who support the death penalty and 
view the courts as too lenient also support rehabilitation and al-
ternative sentences to incarceration.317 
Second, public support for more lenient policies, such as al-
ternatives to incarceration, is strictly limited to nonviolent of-
fenders. Most would agree that the public still desires long terms 
of imprisonment for violent offenders. 318  As more than half of 
state prisoners are incarcerated for violent offenses, the public’s 
punitive views with respect to violent offenders may swamp their 
somewhat more lenient views regarding nonviolent offenders.319 
There is some suggestion, too, that the public may hold a broad view 
of which offenses are “violent”—respondents in one recent study 
counted the purchase of a controlled substance as violent “because 
of aggressive tendencies” they believe accompany the activity.320 
Last, and most important, even if the public endorses more 
lenient policies today, that in no way precludes public opinion 
from veering punitive in the future. Indeed, current trends may 
simply reflect reversion to the mean. This is a simple but critical 
point. If Enns is right, it is unsurprising that public punitiveness 
has declined since the mid-1990s because crime rates have been 
 
 315 On the death penalty, see Jones, U.S. Death Penalty Support Lowest Since 1972 
(cited in note 309). On judicial leniency, see GSS Data Explorer (cited in note 280). A 2014 
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 318 See, for example, James Forman Jr, Locking Up Our Own: Crime and Punishment 
in Black America 221, 228, 231 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2017); Greene and Doble, At-
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falling as well. Even those who view the public as generally harsh 
concede that public punitiveness sometimes recedes. But what 
happens when crime begins to climb or a sensational offense cap-
tures the nation’s attention, setting off a moral panic? Circum-
stances like these have birthed countless punitive laws and noth-
ing has been done to change the political defects that enabled 
them.321 The democratizers propose fundamental—and presuma-
bly enduring—changes in system design, not temporary adjust-
ments designed to exploit a possibly fleeting “moment” of public 
restraint. Their burden is to show that their reimagined system is 
best for the long run, including the bad times and not just the good. 
The public’s punitive wholesale attitudes pose problems for 
various aspects of the democratization agenda. The democratizers 
want laypeople to “aid legislatures in the process of crafting sub-
stantive and procedural criminal law,” to advise police depart-
ments on “priorities, policies, and informal practices,” to collabo-
rate with prosecutors, and to oversee “matters of policy and 
conditions in jails [and] prisons.”322 The evidence just reviewed 
should make us nervous about what policies, exactly, the laity will 
demand. 
2. Retail leniency. 
Perhaps because of these concerns about public views on 
wholesale criminal justice issues, a major part of the democrati-
zation agenda aims to channel lay participation toward “retail” 
outlets: adjudication, such as sentencing juries, rather than poli-
cymaking. The democratizers rely heavily on research by Profes-
sors Robinson, Diamond, and others finding that, when presented 
with individual case vignettes, laypeople choose sentences more 
lenient than their wholesale perspectives might suggest.323 Even 
granting some credence to the basic point, I continue to believe 
that lay severity remains a problem. In fact, on my reading, the 
 
 321 See Pfaff, Locked In at 162–63 (cited in note 303). See also Tonry, Thinking About 
Crime at 85–86 (cited in note 40) (describing the influence of “moral panics” on crime pol-
icy); Philip Pettit, Is Criminal Justice Politically Feasible?, 5 Buff Crim L Rev 427, 436–
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ation of the Mods and Rockers (Routledge 3d ed 2002). 
 322 Kleinfeld, et al, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1699 (cited in note 29). 
 323 Ironically, Robinson himself advocates consideration of lay views of justice for 
wholesale rather than retail purposes. See Robinson, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1594 (cited in 
note 92). 
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weight of the evidence suggests that the laity is at least as puni-
tive as the courts and bureaucratic professionals, and probably 
more so. 
a) National studies.  Since 1980, only three vignette stud-
ies, to my knowledge, draw on national samples of the US popu-
lation.324 This is not to suggest that state or local studies are use-
less, and national studies can mask spatial variation. Still, just 
as the democratizers propose systemic changes that must func-
tion well across time, their program must flourish across space as 
well. As it turns out, all three of the national studies suggest the 
public is at least slightly more punitive than the courts. 
First, and most recently, a widely cited 2010 article by  
Robinson and others finds that lay respondents are significantly 
more punitive than judges. The authors presented respondents 
with crime vignettes—so-called milestone scenarios—describing 
offenders committing common offenses that varied widely in se-
verity.325 Respondents’ sentences were “considerably more puni-
tive than the criminal courts typically are.”326 In fact, respond-
ents’ mean sentences were often double or triple the average time 
served by real offenders.327 The democratizers cite this Robinson 
study for a different point, discussed below, and ignore this criti-
cal finding. 
Second, a 1994 study by Professors Peter Rossi, Richard 
Berk, and Alec Campbell commissioned by the US Sentencing 
Commission, finds that lay respondents assigned sentences that 
were, on average, slightly longer than those prescribed by the 
1987 Sentencing Guidelines.328 Rossi, Berk, and Campbell also 
note that respondents favored harsher sentences than the Guide-
lines for less serious offenses and more lenient sentences for 
graver crimes.329  They characterize the public as “saying that 
prison is a proper punishment for the vast majority of federal 
 
 324 See Jacoby and Cullen, The Structure of Punishment Norms at 251–52 (cited in 
note 200) (noting that “virtually all” studies of public punishment preferences use “stu-
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 325 See Robinson, Goodwin, and Reisig, 85 NYU L Rev at 1962–63 (cited in note 125); 
Robinson and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1867 (cited in note 102). 
 326 Robinson, Goodwin, and Reisig, 85 NYU L Rev at 1974 (cited in note 125). 
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 328 See Peter H. Rossi, Richard A. Berk, and Alec Campbell, Just Punishments: Guide-
line Sentences and Normative Consensus, 13 J Quant Crimin 3, 267, 278 (1997). 
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crimes, but [that the] very longest sentences prescribed by the 
guidelines are excessive.”330 
Finally, a 1987 study by Joseph Jacoby and Christopher 
Dunn reports highly punitive sentences by lay respondents. The 
authors characterize respondents’ sentences as “tending to be 
much longer than sentences actually served currently” across a 
number of states.331 Various researchers have revisited Jacoby 
and Dunn’s data, reaching similar conclusions. One study, for ex-
ample, compares respondents’ preferred sentences to the average 
time served by offenders in New York.332 The authors find that 
respondents were almost three times more likely than the courts 
to “impose” prison sentences and “sentenced” offenders to an av-
erage of three-and-a-half more years of prison than New York of-
fenders actually served.333 
b) “Crime control” studies.  Where, then, do the democra-
tizers get the idea that laypeople are lenient? Three of the studies 
most commonly cited for this point actually show, upon closer in-
spection, only that the public is less punitive than notoriously 
harsh mandatory sentencing laws. These studies do not show that 
laypeople are less punitive than the courts would be in the ab-
sence of these laws, which many judges also regard as overly pu-
nitive.334 The first is the 2010 Robinson study discussed above. In 
addition to the “milestone” vignettes already mentioned, the au-
thors presented respondents with a series of “crime-control” sce-
narios, in which offenders committed offenses that trigger severe 
punishment policies such as three strikes, mandatory minimums, 
 
 330 Id at 287. Some scholars, moreover, have argued that Rossi, Berk, and Campbell’s 
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and felony murder rules.335 They find that respondents chose sen-
tences below those dictated by these “crime-control” laws.336 Sim-
ilarly, a 1995 study of Ohio residents found that, although re-
spondents overwhelmingly supported three-strikes legislation in 
the abstract (88 percent), only a small fraction (17 percent) as-
signed sentences that were consistent with a three-strikes 
scheme when given individual vignettes.337 Finally, a 1983 study 
found that only 7 percent of Illinois respondents chose sentences 
for a residential burglary vignette as long as or longer than the 
state’s statutory minimum sentence.338 
c) Methodological shortfalls.  The democratizers cite addi-
tional vignette studies, all of which suffer from serious methodo-
logical flaws. Several of the studies, for example, aggregate re-
sponses or respondents in ways that preclude any reliable 
inferences about lay and bureaucratic punitiveness. Judge Bibas 
describes one widely cited study from California in which, he says, 
representative respondents given six scenarios “preferred sen-
tences as low as or lower than the typical punishments prescribed 
by statute.”339 The study’s data, however, do not permit this con-
clusion. Respondents did not select precise sentences; they chose 
sentencing ranges, and it is impossible to tell what sentence 
within a particular range various respondents had in mind. When 
the statutory middle term fell within the range respondents pre-
ferred, it is possible the respondents wanted a sentence below the 
middle term, but—as the study’s authors admit in a cautious mo-
ment—it is “difficult to be sure.”340 Nor do we know a separate 
 
 335 See Robinson, Goodwin, and Reisig, 85 NYU L Rev at 1962–67 (cited in note 125). 
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crucial fact: how often judges sentence below the middle term. 
The only relevant conclusion the data actually warrant is that re-
spondents’ sentences roughly parallel those in the criminal 
code.341 
Multiple external validity concerns plague the vignette stud-
ies as well. In some cases, the problems are manifest. A surprising 
number of the studies cited, for example, involve foreign subjects, 
who are shown to be no more severe than judges in actual cases.342 
While Robinson contends that attitudes toward punishment of 
“core wrongdoings” are “deep, predictable, and widely shared” 
across cultures,343 others have cast serious doubt on that proposi-
tion, as already discussed.344 Indeed, Kleinfeld himself argues at 
great length that America’s “culture of punishment” is harsher 
than Europe’s.345 
Some of the most-cited domestic studies are hard to general-
ize due to sampling bias. In a famous 1987 study by Professors 
Loretta Stalans and Shari Diamond, for example, only 11 percent 
of lay respondents assigned a sentence above the statutory mini-
mum.346 Judges, too, might have preferred sentences below the 
minimum, of course. In any event, Stalans and Diamond’s sam-
pling technique precludes much, if any, more general conclusion: 
they found their subjects on a train to Chicago.347 In a subsequent 
study, Diamond and Stalans found that Cook County jurors se-
lected sentences equal to or less severe than Illinois judges in a 
series of four vignettes.348 Critically, all of the jurors resided in 
 
 341 See id at 938. 
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Cook County—the most politically liberal county in the state349—
while the judges hailed from all over Illinois. This mismatch  
biased the judicial sample toward relative punitiveness. Indeed, 
the authors report that Cook County judges were more lenient 
than judges from elsewhere in the state.350 
Note, too, the problem, for present purposes, of comparing lay 
sentencing preferences to the preferences of elected judges, as 
most of the pertinent studies do. As I will show, elected judges—
who are, or logically should be, preferred by the democratizers to 
appointed ones—respond to electoral incentives by sentencing 
more harshly.351 Even if elected judges were more punitive than 
the laity, therefore, the same is not necessarily true of their ap-
pointed, more insulated, counterparts. 
It may also be misleading to equate lay responses to vignettes 
with anticipated sentences in real criminal cases. Indeed, this 
points to an additional external validity concern that permeates 
all of the vignette studies. According to Robinson, the vignette 
studies capture what he calls “empirical desert.” Empirical de-
sert, reflecting the punishment that laypeople regard as justified, 
differs from “deontological desert,” which is built upon principles 
of moral philosophy.352 But Robinson’s empirical desert is “empir-
ical” only in a thin sense. A more accurate characterization, notes 
Professor Alice Ristroph, is “laboratory desert.”353 
The point, of course, is that laboratory vignettes differ mean-
ingfully from actual jury service. “Findings derived from unreal-
istic simulations should be appropriately qualified,” one treat-
ment cautions, “and should not be forwarded as the primary basis 
for policy changes.”354 Framing effects, time constraints, and even 
reading comprehension all affect how research subjects respond 
to laboratory vignettes; 355  the lack of real-world consequences 
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may matter as well.356 Actual jurors are swayed by what they read 
in the newspaper357 and see in the courtroom. Weapons358 and 
graphic evidence,359 for example, can elicit punitive responses. De-
fendants’ races become more salient.360  Victims garner sympa-
thy.361 Judges, of course, are vulnerable to the same courtroom in-
fluences, though studies that compare lay laboratory responses to 
actual judicial sentences already incorporate these effects. 
Judges, moreover, appear slightly better than jurors at ignoring 
certain kinds of legally irrelevant considerations.362 
d) From jurors to juries.  Everything I’ve said so far per-
tains to the behavior of individual jurors. Even if I’m right, it is 
possible that juries—groups of jurors who deliberate together—
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200 (2006); Kevin S. Douglas, David R. Lyon, and James R. P. Ogloff, The Impact of 
Graphic Photographic Evidence on Mock Jurors’ Decisions in a Murder Trial: Probative or 
Prejudicial?, 21 L & Hum Behav 485, 497 (1997). See also generally, for example, Saul M. 
Kassin and David A. Garfield, Blood and Guts: General and Trial-Specific Effects of Vide-
otaped Crime Scenes on Mock Jurors, 21 J Applied Soc Psych 1459 (1991); Jessica M.  
Salerno, Seeing Red: Disgust Reactions to Gruesome Photographs in Color (But Not in 
Black and White) Increase Convictions, 23 Psych Pub Pol & L 336 (2017). But see Carleen 
M. Thompson and Susan Dennison, Graphic Evidence of Violence: The Impact on Juror 
Decision-Making, the Influence of Judicial Instructions and the Effect of Juror Biases, 11 
Psychiatry Psych & L 323, 334–34 (2004). 
 360 See Laura T. Sweeney and Craig Haney, The Influence of Race on Sentencing: A 
Meta-Analytic Review of Experimental Studies, 10 Behav Sci & L 179, 191 (1992) (finding 
that jurors who could see rather than merely read about the defendant’s race were more 
likely to succumb to racial bias in judging guilt). 
 361 Judge Bibas says “participation by victims does not lead to harsher sentences.” 
Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at 91 (cited in note 12). A great deal of research says 
otherwise. See, for example, Bryan Myers and Edith Greene, The Prejudicial Nature of 
Victim Impact Statements: Implications for Capital Sentencing Policy, 10 Psych Pub Pol 
& L 492, 501–04 (2004); Bryan Myers, et al, Victim Impact Statements and Crime Hei-
nousness: A Test of the Saturation Hypothesis, 19 Psych Crime & L 129 (2013); Ray  
Paternoster and Jerome Deise, A Heavy Thumb on the Scale: The Effect of Victim Impact 
Evidence on Capital Decision Making, 49 Crimin 129 (2011). But see generally Theodore 
Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey, and Martin T. Wells, Victim Characteristics and Victim 
Impact Evidence in South Carolina Capital Cases, 88 Cornell L Rev 306 (2003). 
 362 See Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie, and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ig-
nore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U Pa L 
Rev 1251, 1317, 1321 (2005) (finding that judges could ignore inadmissible information 
obtained in violation of the right to counsel and the outcome of a search when determining 
whether probable cause existed). 
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are more temperate than the individuals who compose them. 
There is certainly some research to this effect, 363  and the  
acquittal-happy “Bronx jury” comes to mind.364 But the Bronx 
jury is famous because it is exceptional; there is much research 
that cuts the other way, including evidence of a “punitive shift” 
during deliberation.365 The directional effect of deliberation in any 
given case likely depends on jurors’ predeliberation inclinations, 
which, I have suggested, tend to lean punitive. So predicts the 
phenomenon of group polarization, “by which members of a delib-
erating group typically end up in a more extreme position in line 
with their tendencies before deliberation began.”366 Significantly 
for the criminal sentencing context, “[g]roup polarization has 
been found with respect to moral outrage: When individual jurors 
are outraged . . . , deliberation leads juries to become more out-
raged still.”367 
Even apart from these social psychological reasons to fear 
that juries may be more punitive than judges, there is a crucial 
political economy explanation raising serious doubt that jury sen-
tencing, in practice, will ever be the more merciful choice. The 
best study on actual jury sentencing outside the capital context is 
 
 363 See Iontcheva, 89 Va L Rev at 361 n 261 (cited in note 92) (citing studies). 
 364 See James M. Keneally, Jury Nullification, Race, and The Wire, 55 NY L Sch L 
Rev 941, 946 (2010–2011) (“This term originally described a jury consisting mostly of mi-
norities in the Bronx, New York, that refuses to convict minority defendants.”). 
 365 See, for example, Nadine M. Connell, Death by Jury: Group Dynamics and Capital 
Sentencing 58–67 (LFB Scholarly 2009) (finding that juries that reported a favorable de-
liberation environment were more likely to return a death sentence); Virginia Criminal 
Sentencing Commission, 2002 Annual Report *36–38 (2002), archived at 
https://perma.cc/W7SD-8ZEG (finding that noncapital sentencing juries “typically handed 
down sentences greater than the recommendations of the sentencing guidelines,” which 
judges frequently reduced); Mona Lynch and Craig Haney, Mapping the Racial Bias of the 
White Male Capital Juror: Jury Composition and the “Empathic Divide”, 45 L & Socy Rev 
69, 92 (2011) (finding that deliberation created a punitive shift in mock jurors’ death sen-
tencing behavior); Mona Lynch and Craig Haney, Capital Jury Deliberation: Effects on 
Death Sentencing, Comprehension, and Discrimination, 33 L & Hum Behav 481 (2009) 
(same).  
 366 Cass R. Sunstein, Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge 92 (Oxford 
2006) (emphasis omitted). 
 367 Id at 98. The study Sunstein cites involved jury assessments of punitive damages 
for corporate misconduct. See generally David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, and Daniel 
Kahneman, Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 Colum L Rev 1139 (2000). 
The authors of that study note prior research finding that jury deliberation has a “leniency 
shift” on criminal guilt determinations, see id at 1140 n 2, but also predict that delibera-
tion will increase severity in “settings in which those arguing for higher criminal punish-
ments would have a rhetorical advantage” over those arguing for leniency, see id at 1162. 
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a 2005 paper by Professor Nancy King and Rosevelt Noble.368 King 
and Noble use archival data from two states that authorize jury 
sentencing. Controlling for observable covariates of sentence se-
verity, they find that, “for most of the offenses examined in these 
two states, the sentences selected by juries after jury trial were 
both more varied and more severe than sentences selected by 
judges after bench trial.”369 
The explanation, King and Noble contend, may have nothing 
to do with the backgrounds and personalities of judges and jurors. 
Instead, what best explains the pattern may be a straightforward 
“jury-sentencing penalty.” In the ordinary plea bargaining con-
text, it is well known that, because trials are resource intensive, 
judges impose lower sentences on defendants who plead guilty 
and waive their trial rights, and higher sentences on those who 
are convicted after trial. This is known as the “trial penalty.” The 
same thing may happen, King and Noble conclude, for sentencing 
in jury sentencing states. That is, to induce defendants to waive 
their jury-sentencing right, judges deliberately sentence more le-
niently than juries do.370 Critically, the “pervasiveness of negoti-
ated guilty pleas in criminal adjudication suggests . . . that a sen-
tencing context lacking these forces can be created only 
experimentally.”371 The prospects that jury sentencing will tem-
per the system’s severity, in other words, exerting a downward 
pressure on incarceration rates, are dim. 
C. Bureaucratic Severity 
Alongside their faith in the basic leniency of the American 
laity, the democratizers espouse serious skepticism toward ex-
perts and bureaucrats. On their telling, the officials who run the 
criminal justice system, and the lawyers who participate in it, 
strive for efficiency above all else. They mass produce convictions 
and maximize total imprisonment years. Bureaucratic rational-
ity, moreover, prizes formal equality over equitable considera-
tions, inhibiting the exercise of mercy in individual cases. 
 
 368 Nancy J. King and Rosevelt L. Noble, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: Com-
paring Severity and Variance with Judicial Sentences in Two States, 2 J Empirical Legal 
Stud 331 (2005). 
 369 Id at 332. 
 370 See id at 358. For a similar conclusion, see Robert A. Weninger, Jury Sentencing 
in Noncapital Cases: A Case Study of El Paso County, Texas, 45 Wash U J Urban & Con-
temp L 3, 16–17 (1994) (“Courts may [ ] reduce the price set by the jury to induce defend-
ants to waive trial.”). 
 371 King and Noble, 2 J Empirical Legal Stud at 361 (cited in note 368). 
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This Section interrogates these arguments. I first examine 
two types of evidence showing how bureaucratic insulation—and 
its foil, electoral accountability—affect the severity of criminal 
justice. One compares the American system to its more bureau-
cratic European counterparts; the other compares elected judges 
and prosecutors to appointed ones. I then review suggestive evi-
dence on the effects of repeat play among sentencing judges. Fi-
nally, I argue that penal populism shares responsibility for the 
decline of mercy in American criminal justice. 
1. The comparative case. 
A growing comparative literature investigates the determi-
nants of penal policies. Nearly all of it suggests that populism 
makes criminal justice more, not less, severe. This may explain 
why the United States is widely regarded as having both the most 
punitive and the most popularly democratic criminal justice sys-
tem, at least in the developed world. 
Professor James Whitman frames the basic inquiry this way: 
“Why has American politics turned to the kind of retributivism 
that both French and German politics generally resists?” 372  
Whitman’s insight is that “retributivism . . . mobilize[s] social co-
hesion” in ways that are uniquely advantageous within the  
American political system.373 “It is surely the case,” Whitman rea-
sons, “that Americans punish more harshly because the manage-
ment of the punishment system in the United States is more 
given over to democratic politics.” 374  Professor David Garland 
agrees, observing that “explicit attempts to express public anger 
and resentment have become a recurring theme of the rhetoric 
that accompanies penal legislation and decision-making” in the 
United States.375 
“Conversely,” says Whitman, “it is manifest that part of the 
reason that the retributive temper has not established itself in 
France and Germany is that democratic politics has much less 
impact on criminal justice in Europe than it does in the United 
States.”376 In continental Western Europe, “state apparatuses re-
main highly autonomous, largely steered by bureaucracies that 
 
 372 James Q. Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide 
Between America and Europe 199 (Oxford 2003). 
 373 Id. 
 374 Id. 
 375 Garland, The Culture of Control at 9 (cited in note 39). See also id at 13–14. 
 376 Whitman, Harsh Justice at 199 (cited in note 372). 
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are far more insulated from democratic pressures.”377 “Tepid bu-
reaucratic routinization of criminal law,” the argument goes, “is 
an important barrier to the kind of overheated democratic retrib-
utivism that has come to America.”378 Garland, again, is in accord, 
crediting the rise of “professional bureaucracies” with the mar-
ginalization of “punitive sentiments,” which are “replaced by 
more utilitarian objectives and expectations.”379 The same distinc-
tion explains how European elites abolished the death penalty 
notwithstanding popular support for its retention.380 
Subsequent studies examining a larger number of countries, 
across a broader array of variables, have enriched Whitman and 
Garland’s observations. Surveying the literature a decade ago, 
Professor Michael Tonry identified “risk” and “protective” factors 
that make it more or less likely, respectively, that a society will 
adopt punitive policies. 381  “Prominent risk factors,” Tonry ex-
plains, “include ‘conflict’ political systems, elected judges and 
prosecutors, sensationalist journalism, . . . and a populist view 
that criminal justice policy should be strongly influenced by pub-
lic sentiment and partisan politics.”382 “Prominent protective fac-
tors,” in contrast, “include consensus political systems, nonparti-
san judges and prosecutors, . . . and a predominant view that 
 
 377 Id (emphasis omitted). 
 378 Id at 200. See also generally Michael Cavadino and James Dignan, Penal Systems: 
A Comparative Approach (Sage 2006); David Downes, Visions of Penal Control in the  
Netherlands, 36 Crime & Just 93 (2007); Joachim J. Savelsberg, Knowledge, Domination, 
and Criminal Punishment, 99 Am J Soc 911 (1994). 
 379 David Garland, Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory 183 
(Chicago 1990). See also Roger Lane, Urban Police and Crime in Nineteenth-Century 
America, 2 Crime & Just 1, 18 (1980) (noting “that the highly undemocratic London Met-
ropolitan Police, founded in 1829 by the last of the pre-reformed parliaments, was much 
less tolerant of abusive brutality—largely directed against the ‘lower orders’—than were 
their counterparts in democratic New York”). 
 380 This is the basic thrust of Andrew Hammel, Ending the Death Penalty: The Euro-
pean Experience in Global Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan 2010). See also David Garland, 
Peculiar Institution: America’s Death Penalty in an Age of Abolition 121–26, 162–66  
(Oxford 2010); Marie Gottschalk, The Prison and the Gallows: The Politics of Mass Incar-
ceration in America 98–101 (Cambridge 2006) (similar, for the victims’ rights movement). 
 381 See Michael Tonry, Determinants of Penal Policies, 36 Crime & Just 1, 13–16 
(2007). See also Franklin E. Zimring and David T. Johnson, Public Opinion and the Gov-
ernance of Punishment in Democratic Political Systems, 605 Annals Am Acad Pol & Soc 
Sci 266, 274 (2006) (identifying “leniency” and “severity vectors”). 
 382 Id at 6. “Conflict systems are typically characterized by two major political parties, 
first-past-the-post electoral systems, single-member electoral districts, and policy discon-
tinuities.” Tonry, 36 Crime & Just at 18 (cited in note 381). 
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criminal justice policy falls appropriately within the province of 
expert knowledge and professional experience.”383 
“Every country,” Tonry explains, “experiences long-term de-
velopments . . . and moral panics associated with sensational in-
cidents.”384 “Different mixes of risk and protective actors,” in turn, 
explain why countries exhibit “differing degrees of [ ] susceptibility 
to overreaction” during moral panics.385 “In times of recurring moral 
panics about crime and drugs,” Tonry emphasizes, “America’s sys-
tem of dispersed governmental powers, election of judges and pros-
ecutors, and frequent legislative elections made policy makers sus-
ceptible to powerful influence by transient but widely shared 
public emotions.”386 
Critically, not only do Tonry’s risk factors describe American 
criminal justice to a T, but several also reflect, in particular, the 
extent to which American criminal justice is already democratized. 
If the United States could also claim numerous protective factors, 
it might make sense to pursue further popular democratization if 
there were benefits unrelated to penal policy. But we do not have 
that luxury. Given all of our risk factors, and the absence of any 
protective counterweights, the literature Tonry marshals makes a 
clear prediction: further democratization will make punitive out-
comes more likely and further bureaucratization, less so. 
Professor Nicola Lacey arrives at similar conclusions. What 
makes criminal justice more moderate in continental Europe, 
Lacey contends, is precisely the set of political institutions that 
block the public’s often-punitive preferences from direct imple-
mentation into public policy.387  Foremost among these may be 
 
 383 Tonry, 36 Crime & Just at 6 (cited in note 381). See also Tapio Lappi-Seppälä, 
Penal Policy in Scandinavia, 36 Crime & Just 217, 283 (2007) (observing that, in contrast 
to the harsher American system, “[t]he Scandinavian and continental sentencing struc-
tures are better shielded against political and populist influences”); Cheryl Marie Webster 
and Anthony N. Doob, Punitive Trends and Stable Imprisonment Rates in Canada, 36 
Crime & Just 297, 337–47 (2007) (citing, inter alia, appointment of judges and influence 
of non-elected bureaucrats to explain why the incarceration rate is lower in Canada than 
the United States). “Consensus systems are typically characterized by numerous political 
parties, proportional representation, coalition governments, and policy continuity.” Id at 
19. See also Holger Spamann, The U.S. Crime Puzzle: A Comparative Perspective on U.S. 
Crime and Punishment, 18 Am L & Econ Rev 33, 54 (2016) (finding, through quantitative 
analysis, that one of the “variables that predict[s] an elevated U.S. incarceration rate” is 
“the absence of proportional democracy”). 
 384 Tonry, 36 Crime & Just at 15 (cited in note 381). 
 385 Id at 16. 
 386 Id at 40–41. 
 387 Nicola Lacey, The Prisoners’ Dilemma: Political Economy and Punishment in Con-
temporary Democracies 63 (Cambridge 2008). 
778 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:711 
 
proportional representation: “[T]he adoption and implementation 
of policy” in a proportional representation system must be nego-
tiated in a more “complex bargaining process . . . and will hence 
tend to be more insulated in their realisation from the dynamics 
of emotional campaigns than is typical in the majoritarian sys-
tems.”388 Lacey’s prescription for nations like the United States, 
which lack these political features and are unlikely to acquire 
them, is “the re-constitution of some respect for expertise in the 
field” and the “removal of criminal justice policy from party polit-
ical competition,” where it has fared so poorly.389 In related work, 
Lacey concludes that “the radically decentralised character of US 
democracy may have been a key, if indirect, cause of both rela-
tively high rates of crime . . . and punitiveness” in the late twen-
tieth century.390 
One prominent comparative account does seem to cut the 
other way. Criminologist Vanessa Barker argues that “increased 
democratization can support and sustain less coercive penal re-
gimes.”391  Barker constructs her claim through case studies of 
California, New York, and Washington. In California, Barker 
says, “political actors operate . . . with a high degree of democra-
tization but intensive social polarization.”392 In New York, by con-
trast, “political actors operate within a mode of elitist pragma-
tism.”393 And in Washington, “political actors operate within a 
more deliberative democracy, a mode of governance that empha-
sizes citizen participation, discussion, compromise, and self- 
governance.”394 Washington, it turns out, has the lowest impris-
onment rate of the three.395 This is no coincidence, Barker con-
cludes: states like Washington “have maintained relatively low 
imprisonment rates . . . not by insulating public policy from public 
 
 388 Id at 71. 
 389 Id at 191. 
 390 Nicola Lacey and David Soskice, Crime, Punishment and Segregation in the United 
States: The Paradox of Local Democracy, 17 Punishment & Socy 454, 459 (2015). See also 
generally Nicola Lacey and David Soskice, American Exceptionalism in Crime, Punish-
ment, and Disadvantage, in Kevin R. Reitz, ed, American Exceptionalism in Crime and 
Punishment 53 (Oxford 2018). 
 391 Barker, The Politics of Imprisonment at 12 (cited in note 139), cited in Simonson, 
119 Colum L Rev at 54 (cited in note 231). 
 392 Barker, The Politics of Imprisonment at 10 (cited in note 139). 
 393 Id at 11. 
 394 Id. 
 395 Id at 8, 15. 
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demands, but rather by engaging ordinary people in a more open 
and participatory democratic process.”396 
There are several reasons to be skeptical of the inference 
Barker draws. First, by international standards, as Barker con-
cedes, Washington is actually quite punitive.397 And (as Barker 
again concedes) Washington was hardly immune from punitive 
populism—Washington’s voters enacted the nation’s first three-
strikes law in 1993, which was followed closely by a series of 
additional punitive policies targeting guns, drugs, and juvenile 
offenders.398 
Second, there are countless factors other than deliberative 
democracy that have likely shaped Washington’s penal regime. 
(Barker’s analysis, economists would say, suffers from “omitted 
variable bias.”) These factors fall largely into two groups: ecolog-
ical and bureaucratic. As to the former, Washington is simply a 
different place from California and New York. Washington, for 
example, has the smallest black and Hispanic populations of the 
three states,399 the lowest rates of violent crime,400 and the lowest 
income inequality 401 —all of which predict lower incarceration 
rates.402 
 
 396 Vanessa Barker, Prison and the Public Sphere: Toward a Democratic Theory of 
Penal Order, in David Scott, ed, Why Prison? 125, 125 (Cambridge 2013), cited in  
Simonson, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1623 n 64 (cited in note 32). See also Barker, The Politics 
of Imprisonment at 89 (cited in note 139) (arguing that “the emergence of a more deliber-
ative democratic process in Washington State helped defuse growing social conflict and 
suppress reactionary moves toward repression”). 
 397 Barker, The Politics of Imprisonment at 88 (cited in note 139). See also Roxanne 
Lieb, Washington Prison Population Growth Out of Control, in Tonry and Hatlestad, eds, 
Sentencing Reform in Overcrowded Times 26, 26–27 (cited in note 284) (describing how 
Washington went from “renting excess prison beds in the late 1980s” to overcrowding in 
the 1990s); David Boerner, Sentencing Policy in Washington, 1992–1995, in Tonry and 
Hatlestad, eds, Sentencing Reform in Overcrowded Times 30, 31–35 (cited in note 284) 
(describing increasingly punitive measures enacted by the Washington legislature and 
voters in the early 1990s). 
 398 See Barker, The Politics of Imprisonment at 118–20 (cited in note 139). 
 399 US Census Bureau, American FactFinder (2010), archived at https://perma.cc/ 
YCA9-39XJ. 
 400 See Barker, The Politics of Imprisonment at 192 n 31 (cited in note 139). The “over-
all crime rate in Washington,” however, “has hovered well above the national average for 
over thirty years, at times higher than that in California or New York.” Id at 16. 
 401 New York is actually first in income inequality and California is fourth.  
Washington is thirty-second. See Emmie Martin, US States with the Highest Levels of In-
come Inequality (CNBC, Mar 12, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/5ZAU-T4C9. 
 402 On race and ethnicity, see David F. Greenberg and Valerie West, State Prison Pop-
ulations and Their Growth, 1971–1991, 39 Crimin 615, 633, 638 (2001); Xia Wang and 
Daniel P. Mears, Sentencing and State-Level Racial and Ethnic Contexts, 49 L & Socy Rev 
883, 899, 905–06 (2015). On crime rates, see Enns, Incarceration Nation at 141–42 (cited 
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As for bureaucratic factors, Washington touts some of the na-
tion’s most impressive expert-driven criminal justice institutions, 
which have exerted a moderating force. The Washington State  
Institute for Public Policy, a nonpartisan public research group 
founded in 1983, conducts rigorous criminal justice research, of-
ten exposing the enormous costs (and more questionable benefits) 
of punitive penal programs.403 And according to Professor Rachel 
Barkow’s analysis, the Washington Sentencing Commission has 
also played a “pivotal role” in promoting decarceral reforms by 
“provid[ing] the legislature with cost projections” for different pol-
icy alternatives.404 
Of course, Barker might argue that Washington’s unique 
democratic process is responsible for these progressive institu-
tions. But that argument suffers the same omitted variable bias 
as the principal one.405 So, too, does Barker’s argument that what 
really matters is not the punitive laws Washingtonians enacted 
in the early 1990s, but how the effects of those laws were damp-
ened relative to those of similar laws in California.406 In each case, 
the ecological differences among the states are just as plausible 
 
in note 276); Greenberg and West, 39 Crimin at 638 (cited in note 402). On economic ine-
quality, see David Jacobs and Ronald E. Helms, Toward a Political Model of Incarceration: 
A Time-Series Examination of Multiple Explanations for Prison Admission Rates, 102 Am 
J Soc 323, 349 (1996). See also Jacobs and Carmichael, 67 Am Sociological Rev at 128 
(cited in note 304) (finding that states with higher income inequality are more likely to 
retain the death penalty). Barker acknowledges the potential influence of crime rates and 
race but more or less brushes it aside. See Barker, The Politics of Imprisonment at 16–19 
(cited in note 139).  
 403 See, for example, Roxanne Lieb, Hal Scogin, and Gregory Weeks, Washington 
State Sex Offenders: Costs of Sentencing Options *1 (Washington State Institute for Public 
Policy, 1993), archived at https://perma.cc/5E98-LYUQ (reporting that a “typical sex of-
fender who is incarcerated costs state and local governments five times more than an of-
fender who successfully completes an alternative sentence”). 
 404 Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L Rev 715, 781 (2005). 
 405 For example, Barker explains how, starting in the 1960s, Washington embraced 
the “principle of parsimony”—a preference for the least restrictive sanction possible—
which informed the state’s first sentencing guidelines in 1983. Barker, The Politics of Im-
prisonment at 86–87 (cited in note 139). She does not, however, clearly explain why  
Washington chose parsimony in the first place. There is some suggestion, actually, that 
elites led the way. See id at 101 (“In Washington, political leaders, civic leaders, and crim-
inal justice officials rejected more conservative characterizations of crime and rejected a 
quick turn to more coercive forms of crime control.”); id at 103–04 (describing how, in 1978, 
a statistical researcher authored a set of proposals to regulate the prison population, which 
“eventually became institutionalized in the state’s penal policies”). 
 406 See id at 120–22. 
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an explanation as Washington’s deliberative democratic struc-
tures—or more so.407 
Tellingly, Barker herself recognizes the advantages of New 
York’s “pragmatic but elitist mode of governance” that “relies 
heavily on expert knowledge and scientific inquiry.”408 “By devel-
oping a rather calculated approach to penal sanctioning,” ex-
plains Barker, New York officials “depressed the raw emotion em-
bedded in retribution and undermined the morality of 
transformation linked to penal welfarism.”409  Barker contrasts 
New York’s approach with California’s highly democratized, “neo-
populist” process. “Initially created to undercut corrupt politicians 
and express distrust of state elites,” Barker writes, California’s oft-
used “initiative process has also been used to legislate intolerance 
toward minority racial and ethnic groups since its inception.”410 
And New York’s punishment rate (322 per 100,000), it turns out, 
is closer to Washington’s (273) than California’s (471).411 
2. Electoral incentives. 
A curious omission from the democratization agenda is any 
discussion of judicial and prosecutorial elections. There is the 
passing suggestion that insulated officials are worse than elec-
torally accountable ones,412 but, for the most part, the literature 
is silent on the issue. One would think the democratizers would 
be eager to abolish executive appointments in favor of elections. 
Indeed, the national shift from appointed to elected state-court 
judges occurred during another period of “democratization of 
American government”: the Jacksonian era.413 Lay participation 
may be the democratizers’ ultimate prize, but voting certainly 
counts for something—it’s a step away from bureaucracy and 
 
 407 See Lisa L. Miller, Book Review, The Politics of Imprisonment: How the Democratic 
Process Shapes the Way America Punishes Offenders, 21 L & Pol Book Rev 146, 149 (2011), 
which reviews demographic changes in California and Washington and posits that 
Barker’s account of a more deliberative and rational response to crime changes 
in Washington may be partly, if not largely, attributable to the fact that far fewer 
white Washingtonians considered crime to be essentially a problem of blacks and 
felt far less threatened by large populations of blacks entering the state’s cities. 
 408 Barker, The Politics of Imprisonment at 45 (cited in note 139). 
 409 Id at 126. 
 410 Id at 43. 
 411 Id at 15. 
 412 See Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at xxi (cited in note 12).  
 413 See Walker, Popular Justice at 72 (cited in note 172). 
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toward the participatory ideal. In fact, at times, the democra-
tizers seem to view voting as the bedrock form of participatory 
democracy.414 
The problem for the democratizers, as they surely know, is 
that judicial and prosecutorial electoral incentives lead to harsher 
outcomes. A “law and order” campaign is a strong one; “soft on 
crime” is weak. A strong body of rigorous empirical evidence finds 
that electoral incentives push both judges415 and prosecutors416 in 
a punitive direction. 
The democratizers might respond to this evidence, first, by 
suggesting that elected “law and order” judges—just like three-
strikes laws, perhaps—don’t truly reflect voters’ preferences. Yet 
 
 414 Kleinfeld, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1394 (cited in note 14). 
 415 See Daniel R. Pinello, The Impact of Judicial-Selection Method on State-Supreme-
Court Policy: Innovation, Reaction, and Atrophy 99 (Greenwood 1995) (summarizing a 
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and Noam Yuchtman, Crime, Punishment, and Politics: An Analysis of Political Cycles in 
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Appeals, and Case Selection: An Empirical Study, 72 S Cal L Rev 465, 470–75 (1999) (find-
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appeal); Paul Brace and Brent D. Boyea, State Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the 
Practice of Electing Judges, 52 Am J Pol Sci 360 (2008) (finding that public support for the 
death penalty makes elected, but not non-elected, judges more punitive); Sanford C.  
Gordon and Gregory A. Huber, The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent Be-
havior, 2 Q J Pol Sci 107 (2007) (finding that judges running in partisan contests are more 
punitive than those running in unopposed retention elections); Gregory A. Huber and San-
ford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 
Am J Pol Sci 247 (2004) (finding that elected trial judges become more punitive in sen-
tencing as elections near); David Jacobs and Aubrey L. Jackson, On the Politics of Impris-
onments: A Review of Systematic Findings, 6 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 129, 138 (2010) (finding, 
based on prior studies, “strong reasons to believe that political factors help determine sen-
tencing” in the expected direction); Kyung H. Park, The Impact of Judicial Elections in the 
Sentencing of Black Crime, 52 J Hum Res 998 (2017) (finding that incarceration rates for 
black, but not white, defendants rise at the end of the election cycle). 
 416 See Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay and Bryan C. McCannon, The Effects of the Elec-
tion of Prosecutors on Criminal Trials, 161 Pub Choice 141, 152 (2014) (finding that in 
election years the number of cases brought to trial by prosecutors’ offices increased by as 
much as 24 percent); Andrew Dyke, Electoral Cycles in the Administration of Criminal 
Justice, 133 Pub Choice 417, 435–36 (2007) (finding that, in election years, defendants are 
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710–11 (2013) (finding that the popular election of prosecutors results in inaccurate sen-
tences and wrongful convictions). 
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most of the evidence suggests that they do.417 Second, and relat-
edly, it is possible that, with better information, voters would 
choose more lenient judges. But “well-informed voters” are an elu-
sive group.418 And the prospects for improvement along this di-
mension seem exceedingly small.419  Finally, the democratizers 
might point to the recent election of “progressive prosecutors” in 
several major cities.420 This is, to my mind, a welcome but ulti-
mately modest development. Progressive prosecutors make up 
around 1 percent of district attorneys today,421 and it is far from 
clear how far this trend will spread.422 We are slowly learning, 
moreover, about the difficulties these officials are facing in imple-
menting their campaign promises. 423  In short, reform-minded 
prosecutors may be preferable to the prosecutors who got us to 
where we are today, but a system of appointed prosecutors may 
well be better still. 
3. Repeat play. 
An additional factor distinguishes criminal justice bureau-
crats—and judges in particular—from lay participants like ju-
 
 417 See Claire S.H. Lim, Preferences and Incentives of Appointed and Elected Public 
Officials: Evidence from State Trial Court Judges, 103 Am Econ Rev 1360, 1392–93 (2013) 
(finding that the sentencing harshness of elected judges correlates strongly to the political 
ideology of voters, while that of appointed judges does not); Joanna M. Shepherd, The In-
fluence of Retention Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38 J Legal Stud 169, 171 (2009) (finding 
that elected judges’ voting is strongly associated with retention politics). But see Stephen 
J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain 
Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J L Econ & Org 290, 
328 (2010) (finding that elected judges are not less independent than appointed ones). 
 418 See generally Arthur Lupia, Uninformed: Why People Know So Little About Poli-
tics and What We Can Do About It (Oxford 2016). See also Jeff Manza and Christopher Ug-
gen, Locked Out: Felon Disenfranchisement and American Democracy 115–16 (Oxford 2008). 
 419 Angus Campbell, et al, The American Voter 544 (Chicago 1960). See also Bryan 
Caplan, The Myth of the Rational Voter: When Democracies Choose Bad Policies 3  
(Princeton 2007). 
 420 See Lauren M. Ouziel, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Criminal Justice Reform, 61 
BC L Rev *1 (forthcoming 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/3VB3-K4DS. See also Pfaff, 
Locked In at 162 (cited in note 303). 
 421 See Ben Austen, On the Inside, NY Times Mag 44 (Nov 4, 2018) (reporting that 
“voters have elected 30 reform-minded prosecutors” out of 2,300 positions). 
 422 See Wright, Elected Prosecutors and Police Accountability at 241–49 (cited in note 
79) (providing data showing that prosecutorial elections “produce low turnover and few 
challenges” and expressing skepticism that recent elections portend a significantly 
broader trend). See also Pfaff, Locked In at 162 (cited in note 303) (observing that 
“[r]eforms at one level can be thwarted by parties at other levels”). 
 423 See, for example, Ouziel, 61 BC L Rev at *35–38 (cited in note 420) (describing line 
attorneys’ motivations to resist reform); Austen, On the Inside (cited in note 421) (similar). 
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rors: judges are repeat players and jurors are not. The democra-
tizers say the distinction favors jurors—recall the “jaded” and pu-
nitive bureaucrats Judge Bibas describes.424 Their argument is 
not implausible, but the evidence for it is thin. A recent empirical 
study suggests, in fact, that the opposite effect may prevail.425 
Professor Adi Leibovitch compares the sentencing practices 
of judges who, by chance, presided over criminal caseloads of dif-
fering average severities upon initially taking the bench.426 She 
finds that, going forward, the judges initially exposed to more se-
vere cases sentence more leniently than those initially exposed to 
less severe cases.427 “Legal judgments are affected by the relative 
comparison of a particular case with the other cases in the case-
load before the judge,” Leibovitch concludes.428 Transposed into 
the judge-juror context, Leibovitch’s evidence suggests that 
judges’ exposure to a steady flow of criminal cases may well inure 
them to the “shock value” most jurors will experience upon learn-
ing the details of a serious crime, leading the judges to view cases 
as relatively less severe than jurors. To be clear, Leibovitch does 
not directly compare judges and jurors, but her evidence does 
point in this direction. 
4. Mercy. 
There is likely truth to the democratizers’ argument that the 
“administrative ideal of equality across cases” has tended to in-
hibit the discretion necessary to dispense mercy in individual 
cases.429 After all, “[i]n criminal justice as elsewhere, discretion 
and discrimination travel together.”430 There is no question, for 
example, that progressive reformers concerned about official dis-
crimination supported determinate sentencing laws and the re-
striction of parole.431 To be clear, the democratizers make no per-
suasive argument that these antidiscrimination reforms were not 
 
 424 See notes 140–42 and accompanying text. 
 425 Judge Bibas acknowledges this alternative possibility—that judges grow “mel-
lower” over time—though it is unclear from context what normative valence he attaches 
to it. See Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at 32 (cited in note 12). 
 426 See Adi Leibovitch, Relative Judgments, 45 J Legal Stud 281, 293–95 (2016). 
 427 See id at 303–09. 
 428 Id at 320. 
 429 Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice at 24 (cited in note 12). 
 430 William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 Harv L Rev 
781, 822 (2006). 
 431 See Walker, Popular Justice at 217–21 (cited in note 172). 
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worth their costs, nor do they suggest how to balance the values 
of mercy and equal treatment. 
In any event, the democratizers offer a remarkably one-sided 
historical account that minimizes the role that populist forces, 
too, have played in closing doors to mercy. Indeterminate sentenc-
ing and parole, in particular, are critically expert-driven mecha-
nisms for the dispensation of mercy. The movements to rein them 
in were fueled by the same distrust of experts and elites that the 
democratizers espouse today, boosted by harsh popular views. 
Examples are legion. In the run-up to the enactment of the 
federal sentencing guidelines, “judges came under attack as too 
prone to individualize justice to suit the particular circumstances 
of defendants in ways that limited punishment and diminished 
deterrence.”432 “The history of the adoption of the guidelines,” Pro-
fessor Jonathan Simon observes, “suggests a quite deliberate in-
tent to reject judicial governance as such.”433 Similarly, in 1994, 
when California voters passed the state’s three-strikes law by a 
three-to-one margin, trust in government was low. “[C]itizens 
worr[ied] that judges will identify with offenders and treat them 
with inappropriate leniency.”434  “A bad judge in this view,” in 
other words, “is one prone to coddle criminals and thus act against 
the interests of the citizenry, and mandatory punishment is the 
way to ensure against such weakness.”435 
Garland argues more generally that the “politicization of 
crime control” led to “a sharp reversal of the historical process 
whereby the power to punish was largely delegated to profes-
sional experts and administrators.” 436  “One sees this reverse 
transfer of power,” Garland observes, “in a series of measures 
(fixed sentence law reforms, mandatory sentences, national 
standards, truth in sentencing, restrictions on early release, etc.) 
that have shifted detailed decision-making tasks back to the cen-
tre.”437 Likewise, Professor Sklansky agrees with those who “link 
the recent popularity of mandatory sentences and ‘zero-tolerance’ 
policies to disenchantment with the kind of ‘individualized jus-
tice’ previously dispensed by ‘expert judges, and supported by a 
 
 432 Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed 
American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear 127 (Oxford 2007). 
 433 Id at 128. 
 434 Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin, Punishment and Democracy at 231 (cited in note 40).  
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 436 Garland, The Culture of Control at 13 (cited in note 39). 
 437 Id. 
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panoply of normalizing professionals (psychologists, social work-
ers, probation officers, and so on).’”438 The point is simply that it’s 
unfair, and misleading, to count the demise of mercy as a demerit 
against bureaucracy alone when populism shares the blame. 
D. Equality 
One of the animating ideas behind democratization, following 
Stuntz, is that local democratic rule—that is, neighborhood con-
trol—will moderate punishment because the same people doling 
out sanctions will bear them. For similar reasons, the risk of bi-
ased punishment is also reduced. This is how it worked in the 
Gilded Age, Stuntz contends, when—outside the South—the 
criminal justice system was surprisingly egalitarian. This Section 
scrutinizes this important claim in the light of pertinent social 
scientific evidence. 
Two preliminary points are in order. First, unless it eradi-
cates all racial inequality in the criminal justice system, if democ-
ratization increases the severity of criminal punishment, it will 
disparately impact black men. Severity and equality considera-
tions are tightly intertwined. Second, and relatedly, Stuntz’s ar-
gument, in the abstract, sounds in severity as well as equality. It 
would seem to apply, for example, even in a racially homogeneous 
society. In practice, however, the argument is advanced most 
forcefully as a mechanism to alleviate racial inequality. Rather 
than let white suburbanites govern black urban defendants, the 
thinking goes, let black urban communities govern themselves. 
This will naturally moderate punishment and reduce the effects 
of any racial bias the white suburbanites might harbor. I respond 
to the argument in this register. 
To begin, a few observations about Stuntz’s touchstone, the 
Gilded Age North. I discussed above how Gilded Age communities 
were not as inclusive or tight-knit, and justice not as functional, 
as Stuntz makes it sound. But even granting Stuntz egalitarian 
justice in Northern cities during the Gilded Age, the nation has 
 
 438 Sklansky, Democracy and the Police at 92 (cited in note 13), quoting Jonathan 
Simon, Crime, Community, and Criminal Justice, 90 Cal L Rev 1415, 1418 (2002). See also 
Paula M. Ditton and Doris James Wilson, Truth in Sentencing in State Prisons *2 (US 
Department of Justice, Jan 1999), archived at https://perma.cc/JNZ3-RP5K (“Over the last 
two decades, sentencing requirements and release policies have become more restrictive, 
primarily in response to widespread ‘get tough on crime’ attitudes in the Nation.”);  
Roberts, et al, Penal Populism and Popular Opinion at 9 (cited in note 40) (attributing 
mandatory sentencing and the restriction of judicial discretion to “penal populism”). 
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evolved in ways that inhibit the system’s capacity to distribute 
punishment equally through mechanisms of local democracy. 
Crime is up, especially in urban centers. Urban populations are 
more mobile. Major cities have deindustrialized. Most important 
for present purposes, the Great Migration drastically changed ra-
cial demographics across the region. The Gilded Age North that 
Stuntz describes was largely white. Not so today. “In 1910,” 
Stuntz reports, “blacks made up 6 percent of Philadelphia’s pop-
ulation, 2 percent of Chicago’s and Cleveland’s, and a mere 1 per-
cent of Detroit’s.”439 By 1980, “those percentages were 38 percent, 
40 percent, 44 percent, and 63 percent, respectively.” 440  Stuntz 
contends that egalitarian justice among whites in the Gilded Age 
“spilled over” onto the small number of Northern blacks.441 Even 
assuming this is true, there is little reason to think, without more 
evidence, that a similar dynamic would hold today. Indeed, the 
failure of white egalitarian justice to “spill over” onto blacks is one 
of the principal reasons reformers bureaucratized the system in 
the first place.442 
It is helpful, in thinking through these issues, to situate them 
in two distinct, if highly stylized, demographic settings: first,  
majority-black neighborhoods, and second, racially heterogene-
ous neighborhoods in which blacks are a discrete minority. 
1. “Black neighborhoods.” 
Take first the stronger case for the democratizers: predomi-
nantly black neighborhoods in urban settings. To replace the dy-
namic Stuntz describes well—in which prosecutors and judges 
answerable to (whiter) countywide electorates prosecute and sen-
tence black defendants, and (whiter) juries selected from the 
county determine their guilt—the democratizers envision neigh-
borhood control. Police drawn from, and accountable to, the 
neighborhood would decide whom to arrest and refer to neighbor-
hood prosecutors; neighborhood juries would check the state at 
 
 439 Stuntz, Collapse of American Criminal Justice at 16 (cited in note 15). 
 440 Id. 
 441 Stuntz, 121 Harv L Rev at 2003 (cited in note 148). 
 442 See Samuel Walker, Origins of the Contemporary Criminal Justice Paradigm: The 
American Bar Foundation Survey, 1953–1969, 9 Just Q 47, 57–59 (1992). See also Michael 
J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 Mich L Rev 48, 93–94 
(2000) (describing the roots of modern US Supreme Court criminal procedure doctrine in 
concerns about mistreatment of black defendants in the South). 
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multiple junctures from bail through sentencing. Black defend-
ants would be punished by their own, rather than by detached 
and unsympathetic whites. Familiarity would temper severity. 
Maybe, but not necessarily. The problem is that the “neigh-
borhood effect” pushes in both directions simultaneously. Black 
voters and jurors may be more sympathetic than whites to black 
defendants from their neighborhood, to be sure. But they may be 
more fearful of those same defendants too. For suburban whites, 
crime is an abstraction; for blacks in some urban neighborhoods, 
it’s reality. Blacks are far more likely than whites to be victims of 
crime, including violent crime.443 Unsurprisingly, research sug-
gests that blacks are, on average, more fearful of crime than 
whites are,444 and that blacks for whom crime is more salient are 
more supportive of punitive measures that disproportionately 
burden black offenders. 445  The democratizers sometimes 
acknowledge these competing forces but never wrestle them to 
the ground. Nor do they present a compelling case that the forces 
of leniency will win out. Indeed, a good deal of evidence suggests 
that any such assumption is too facile.446 
Consider Professor James Forman Jr’s now-famous account 
of popular support for “tough on crime” policies in majority-black 
Washington, DC. Forman surveys black opposition to marijuana 
decriminalization and support for stricter gun laws and punitive 
 
 443 See Ghandnoosh, Race and Punishment at *10–11 (cited in note 6) (marshaling 
statistics). 
 444 See id at *11–12. See also Wesley G. Skogan, Crime and the Racial Fears of White 
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identified “crime, violence, and drugs” as the nation’s top problem in 2001. Lawrence D. 
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blacks support many punitive measures. See Ghandnoosh, Race and Punishment at *8–9 
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Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 NYU L Rev 21, 37 n 51 
(2012) (citing sources). 
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sentences in the 1970s and 1980s,447 both driven by an “overriding 
concern to protect black lives from the scourge of drugs and vio-
lence decimating their communities.”448 In 1986, DC launched Op-
eration Clean Sweep, a “military-inspired” police antidrug initia-
tive featuring battle-ready weaponry and aggressive new 
tactics.449 A decade later, then–US Attorney for the District of  
Columbia Eric Holder pioneered an operation of his own, Opera-
tion Ceasefire, which blessed pretextual traffic stops as a tool to 
get guns “out of the hands of young black men.”450 
Vanessa Barker and political scientist Michael Javen Fortner 
tell similar stories about support for the harsh Rockefeller drug 
laws among black New Yorkers.451 “Since the late 1960s,” Barker 
writes, “many black activists have pushed [New York] to take a 
tougher stand against lawlessness in their communities.”452 The 
major black newspaper in New York City advocated “mandatory 
life sentences for the ‘non-addict drug pusher of hard drugs,’” for 
example, and “the NAACP’s Citizens Mobilization Against Crime 
supported tougher penalties, proposing ‘lengthening minimum 
prison terms for muggers, pushers, 1st degree murders.’”453 Black 
support for punitive policies was not merely a localized phenom-
enon, however. Professor Randall Kennedy documents support by 
a majority of black members of Congress—those who, in his 
words, “concerned themselves most intently and consistently with 
elevating the fortunes of African-Americans”—for the federal 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,454 which created the now-notorious 
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(and defunct) 100-to-1 crack-power cocaine sentencing differen-
tial.455 Similarly, during his 1988 presidential campaign, Jesse 
Jackson castigated Ronald Reagan for his weakness in the War 
on Drugs.456 
In a lesser-known account, historian Fritz Umbach unearths 
the fascinating story of the New York City Housing Authority  
Police Department, which exclusively patrolled the city’s public 
housing projects as part of “America’s longest experiment in com-
munity policing.”457  “From the late 1950s until the end of the 
1970s,” Umbach explains, “tenants’ most urgent and insistent po-
litical goal was always the hiring of more housing police,”458 which 
took precedence over even community programs. 459  Prominent 
tenant groups implored authorities to enforce housing rules and 
evict troublemakers, bemoaning a 1971 consent decree that made 
eviction more difficult.460 In fact, tenants played a key role in un-
dermining the decree, pushing a reluctant US Attorney for the 
Southern District of New York, Rudolph Giuliani, to use federal 
civil asset forfeiture laws to evict individuals who were dealing 
drugs, a practice for which Giuliani would later take credit as it 
spread nationwide.461 
Finally, a recent empirical study attempts to quantify, on a 
national scale, some of the phenomena that Forman and others 
discuss. Using nationally representative survey data spanning 
1955 to 2014, the authors find that “black and not just white 
Americans became more punitive” during this period and that 
black respondents exhibited “relatively high levels of punitive-
ness” alongside “persistent anxiety about crime.”462 They further 
report, based on an analysis of voting patterns in the US House 
of Representatives between 1968 and 2015, that “an absolute ma-
jority of African-American legislators voted in favor of each of the 
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major federal crime bills” and “consistently supported bills that 
increased mandatory minimums,” and that, “amid rising crime in 
the 1980s and 1990s, there was a discernible rise in average sup-
port for punitive bills” among black congressmen.463 Perhaps most 
surprisingly, the authors find that increased black political rep-
resentation in state and federal legislatures had a punitive im-
pact on state-level imprisonment and policing rates.464 
All of these accounts are subtle, complex, and contestable.465 
Obviously not all members of the relevant constituencies shared 
these punitive views. (Recall, again, the Bronx jury.) And those 
who did operated under structural constraints that limited op-
tions for treating community ills. “In the era of mass incarcera-
tion,” observes Professor Michelle Alexander, “poor African  
Americans are not given the option of great schools, community 
investment, and job training. Instead, they are offered police and 
prisons. If the only choice that is offered blacks is rampant crime 
or more prisons, the predictable (and understandable) answer 
will be ‘more prisons.’”466 
Still, these stories all suggest that it is too simplistic to as-
sume that “black communities” will reflexively push toward 
greater leniency in criminal justice, especially when the same 
basic structural constraints still exist. The argument is not that 
blacks inherently desire punitive policies, which might, under 
some theories, justify those policies. The argument is simply that, 
under existing structural constraints, one should not too quickly 
predict that, if given greater control over criminal justice policy, 
black Americans will necessarily temper it.467 
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To be clear, it is entirely possible that “some level of punitive-
ness among blacks could result from—rather than disprove—the 
existence of racism.”468 Steeped in the same cultural influences as 
non-blacks, and naturally inclined (as we all are) to legitimate 
existing social hierarchies, many black Americans, research re-
ports, develop “out-group preferences.” 469  For example, black 
Americans, like whites, associate blackness with aggression and 
criminality.470 In recent surveys, “blacks were more likely to be-
lieve that the communities they lived in lacked moral values”471 
and four-fifths of black youth agreed that “too many young black 
Americans had the wrong morals about important things like 
work and sex.”472 Black Americans also divide along characteris-
tics such as age, class, or skin color, engaging in what political 
scientist Cathy Cohen describes as “secondary marginalization of 
those who are most vulnerable in oppressed communities.”473 
Separate from its likely effects on policy-level decisions, this 
complex psychology follows individuals into the jury box. And re-
search suggests that, when juries are fairly homogeneous—as the 
democratizers imagine neighborhood juries in black neighborhoods 
will be—group deliberation can amplify, rather than moderate, 
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individual biases. 474  Importantly, this can include a so-called 
black sheep effect, which manifests in severity toward one’s in-
group. This effect is especially likely, research shows, when evi-
dence of guilt is strong, as jurors psychologically distance them-
selves from the defendant and treat him harshly.475 
Likewise, we should not expect that hiring more black police 
officers—“recruiting officers with roots in or links to the commu-
nities they police,”476 in the democratizers’ parlance—will drasti-
cally change the nature of urban policing. Professors Devon  
Carbado and Song Richardson make this point forcefully in their 
review of Forman’s book.477 The “very factors . . . that explain why 
white police officers might systematically over-police and deploy 
violence against African Americans,” they show—including 
Fourth Amendment law, institutional incentives, and cognitive 
biases—“arguably implicate black police officers as well.”478 Black 
test subjects, for example—including black police officers—ex-
hibit “shooter bias” just as whites do, mistakenly “shooting” un-
armed blacks more often than unarmed whites.479 And “the pres-
sures black police officers likely experience to fit into their 
departments potentially compound the problem.”480  To become 
part of the community of “blue,” that is, “black police officers may 
 
 474 See, for example, Sunstein, Infotopia at 78–81 (cited in note 366); Norbert L. Kerr, 
Keith E. Niedermeier, and Martin F. Kaplan, Bias in Jurors vs Bias in Juries: New Evi-
dence from the SDS Perspective, 80 Org Behav & Hum Decision Processes 70 (1999);  
Geoffrey P. Kramer, Norbert L. Kerr, and John S. Carroll, Pretrial Publicity, Judicial 
Remedies, and Jury Bias, 14 L & Hum Behav 409 (1990); Lynch and Haney, Capital Jury 
Deliberation at 491 (cited in note 365); Robert J. MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury 
Decision-Making, 244 Science 1046, 1048 (1989); David G. Myers and George D. Bishop, 
Discussion Effects on Racial Attitudes, 169 Science 778 (1970). 
 475 See, for example, Derek Chadee, Race, Trial Evidence and Jury Decision Making, 
1 Caribbean J Crimin & Soc Psych 59, 75 (1996); José M. Marques, The Black-Sheep Effect: 
Out-Group Homogeneity in Social Comparison Settings, in Dominic Abrams and Michael 
A. Hogg, eds, Social Identity Theory: Constructive and Critical Advances 131 (Springer-
Verlag 1990); José M. Marques, Vincent Y. Yzerbyt, and Jacques-Philippe Leyens, The 
“Black Sheep Effect”: Extremity of Judgments Towards Ingroup Members as a Function of 
Group Identification, 18 Euro J Soc Psych 1, 12–14 (1988). 
 476 Kleinfeld, et al, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1699 (cited in note 29). 
 477 See generally Carbado and Richardson, Book Review, 131 Harv L Rev (cited in 
note 448). Forman himself discusses the black police in Forman, Locking Up Our Own at 
78–115 (cited in note 318). 
 478 Carbado and Richardson, Book Review, 131 Harv L Rev at 1981 (cited in note 448). 
 479 Id at 1993. See, for example, Joshua Correll, et al, Across the Thin Blue Line: Police 
Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J Personality & Soc Psych 1006, 1011 
& n 3 (2007); Kimberly Barsamian Kahn and Paul G. Davies, Differentially Dangerous? 
Phenotypic Racial Stereotypicality Increases Implicit Bias Among Ingroup and Outgroup 
Members, 14 Group Processes & Intergroup Rel 569, 575–77 (2011). 
 480 Carbado and Richardson, Book Review, 131 Harv L Rev at 1981 (cited in note 448). 
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have to marginalize the concerns of and disassociate themselves 
from the community of ‘black.’”481 
These forces produce surprising (and disturbing) real-world 
results: “[E]vidence shows that police departments with more 
black officers engage in more racial profiling than those with 
fewer black officers” and “black officers who stop a black man are 
more likely to arrest him than they are to arrest a stopped white 
suspect.”482 Professor Paul Butler cites evidence that “a black cop 
is more likely to shoot a black person than a white cop is.”483 And 
at the agency level, there is little evidence that agencies with 
more black officers use force—in general or against black civil-
ians—less often.484 In short, the “unquestioned assumption of ra-
cial solidarity between black citizens and black officers” stands on 
shaky empirical footing and suggests that a deeper, more insidi-
ous form of racism is afoot.485 The facts suggest that “the pursuit 
of diversity in the context of policing will not, without more, funda-
mentally change how African Americans experience the police.”486 
 
 481 Id at 1991. 
 482 Id at 1994 (citing studies). 
 483 Paul Butler, Chokehold: Policing Black Men 33 (New Press 2017). A partial expla-
nation may be that “black officers are deployed in areas where they have fewer interac-
tions with white suspects,” Butler notes. Id at 34. But he also reviews research that “raises 
serious concerns about police officers of color.” Id. See George Fachner and Steven Carter, 
Collaborative Reform Initiative: An Assessment of Deadly Force in the Philadelphia Police 
Department *3 (CNA Corporation 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/RA2G-M7VU (find-
ing that “threat perception failure” involving black suspects is higher among black than 
white officers). 
 484 Though not unanimous, the weight of earlier studies finds no significant correla-
tion between black representation in law enforcement and the use of force, deadly or oth-
erwise. Most of these studies, however, relied on deeply flawed measures of force-related 
incidents. Two more recent papers, which employ significantly better measures, reach sim-
ilar results with respect to killings of black civilians. See, for example, Joscha Legewie and 
Jeffrey Fagan, Group Threat, Police Officer Diversity and the Deadly Use of Police Force 
*33–36 (Columbia Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper 
No 14-512, Dec 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/XRJ2-SY5Y (finding that “minority 
representation in the police might not reduce the number of officer-involved killings” of 
black civilians, though it does mitigate the effects of group threat); Sean Nicholson-Crotty, 
Jill Nicholson-Crotty, and Sergio Fernandez, Will More Black Cops Matter? Officer Race 
and Police-Involved Homicides of Black Citizens, 77 Pub Admin Rev 206, 211–12 (2017) 
(finding no significant relationship, or even a positive association, between the proportion 
of black officers and police-involved killings of black civilians). 
 485 Forman, Locking Up Our Own at 107 (cited in note 318). 
 486 Carbado and Richardson, Book Review, 131 Harv L Rev at 1982 (cited in note 448). 
Indeed, many urban police forces are already quite diverse. See id at 1989–90.  
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2. Mixed neighborhoods. 
All that said, recall that only a shrinking minority of African 
Americans actually live in “black neighborhoods” today. What 
about the millions who live in locales that are predominantly 
white? Democratization shifts authority over the fate of black de-
fendants in these neighborhoods from judges and bureaucrats to 
the heterogeneous, though largely white, laity. I need not belabor 
the proposition that many Americans, especially whites, harbor 
antiblack bias, even if only implicitly.487 Specific to the criminal 
justice context, many studies have shown “that Americans, and 
whites in particular, strongly associate crime with racial minori-
ties, and racial minorities with crime.”488 Importantly, individuals 
(especially whites) who more strongly associate crime with racial 
minorities,489 as well as those (including blacks) who harbor racist 
attitudes more generally,490 are more likely to support punitive 
criminal justice policies. In fact, white test subjects in one study 
who were told that “most of the people who are executed are  
 
 487 On the gradual transition from “traditional” racism to contemporary, more  
“laissez-faire” racism, see Lawrence Bobo, James R. Kluegel, and Ryan A. Smith, Laissez-
Faire Racism: The Crystallization of a Kindler, Gentler, Antiblack Ideology, in Steven A. 
Tuch and Jack K. Martin, eds, Racial Attitudes in the 1990s: Continuity and Change 15, 
23–27 (Praeger 1997). On persistent, overtly racist attitudes about characteristics like 
work ethic and intelligence, see Lawrence D. Bobo, et al, The Real Record on Racial Atti-
tudes, in Peter V. Marsden, ed, Social Trends in American Life: Findings from the General 
Social Survey Since 1972 38 (Princeton 2012). On implicit bias, see Ghandnoosh, Race and 
Punishment at *14–17 (cited in note 6) (collecting studies). 
 488 Ghandnoosh, Race and Punishment at *13 (cited in note 6). See id at *13–17 (col-
lecting studies). See also Phillip Atiba Goff, et al, The Essence of Innocence: Consequences 
of Dehumanizing Black Children, 106 J Personality & Soc Psych 526, 532 (2014) (finding 
that black boys are seen as older and less innocent than white boys). 
 489 See, for example, Ted Chiricos, Kelly Welch, and Marc Gertz, Racial Typification 
of Crime and Support for Punitive Measures, 42 Crimin 358, 359 (2004); James D. Unnever 
and Francis T. Cullen, White Perceptions of Whether African Americans and Hispanics Are 
Prone to Violence and Support for the Death Penalty, 49 J Rsrch Crime & Delinq 519 
(2012); Kelly Welch, et al, The Typification of Hispanics as Criminals and Support for 
Punitive Crime Control Policies, 40 Soc Sci Rsrch 822 (2011). 
 490 See generally, for example, Steven E. Barkan and Steven F. Cohn, Racial Preju-
dice and Support for the Death Penalty by Whites, 31 J Rsrch Crime & Delinq 202 (1994); 
Bobo and Johnson, 1 Du Bois Rev at 164, 170 (cited in note 289); Elizabeth K. Brown and 
Kelly M. Socia, Twenty-First Century Punitiveness: Social Sources of Punitive American 
Views Reconsidered, 33 J Quant Crimin 935 (2017); Devon Johnson, Racial Prejudice, Per-
ceived Injustice, and the Black-White Gap in Punitive Attitudes, 36 J Crim Just 198 (2008); 
Joe Soss, Laura Langbein, and Alan R. Metelko, Why Do White Americans Support the Death 
Penalty?, 65 J Pol 397 (2003); James D. Unnever and Francis T. Cullen, The Social Sources 
of Americans’ Punitiveness: A Test of Three Competing Models, 48 Crimin 99 (2010). 
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African-Americans” were more likely to favor capital punish-
ment than those not given this information.491 In short, blacks 
who live in majority-white neighborhoods may not be seen by 
whites as in-group members, and thus may not receive the neigh-
borly, in-group treatment the democratizers imagine when they 
advocate for local lay control. 
Substantial evidence shows that these biases, too, seep into 
the jury box. The process of jury selection is supposed to root this 
out but few believe it does.492 In fact, it may exacerbate the prob-
lem, as blacks and Latinos are excluded from juries at dispropor-
tionate rates. 493  For this reason, when recommending an in-
creased role for local juries, Stuntz presents a package of jury 
reforms he says are crucial to reducing jury bias.494  I support 
these proposals. Yet, at least until they occur, I question the wis-
dom of entrusting more authority to lay juries in predominantly 
white communities. As noted earlier, group deliberation can ex-
acerbate rather than mitigate individual biases, including racial 
bias, especially in close cases.495 There is evidence that capital ju-
ries discriminate against black defendants, especially those 
 
 491 See Mark Peffley and Jon Hurwitz, Justice in America: The Separate Realities of 
Blacks and Whites 156–57 (Cambridge 2010). 
 492 Among other things, potential jurors are not always honest during voir dire. See, 
for example, Linda L. Marshall and Althea Smith, The Effects of Demand Characteristics, 
Evaluation Anxiety, and Expectancy on Juror Honesty During Voir Dire, 120 J Psych 205, 
213 (1986); Richard Seltzer, Mark A. Venuti, and Grace M. Lopes, Juror Honesty During 
the Voir Dire, 19 J Crim Just 451 (1991). 
 493 See, for example, Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries 
Through Community Representation, 52 Vand L Rev 353, 373–76 (1999); Ronald F. 
Wright, Kami Chavis, and Gregory S. Parks, The Jury Sunshine Project: Jury Selection 
Data as a Political Issue, 2018 U Ill L Rev 1407, 1425–26. Blacks, Latinos, and noncitizens 
are also underrepresented in jury pools. See Mary R. Rose, Raul S. Casarez, and Carmen 
M. Gutierrez, Jury Pool Underrepresentation in the Modern Era: Evidence from Federal 
Courts, 15 J Empirical Legal Stud 378, 383, 389 (2018). See also James B. Jacobs, The 
Eternal Criminal Record 252 (Harvard 2015) (“Most states and the federal government 
permanently ban convicted felons from jury service.”). Convicted felons include 13 percent 
of all adult males and approximately one-third of all black adult males. Christopher  
Uggen, Jeff Manza, and Melissa Thompson, Citizenship, Democracy, and the Civic Reinte-
gration of Criminal Offenders, 605 Annals Am Acad Pol & Soc Sci 281, 304 (2006). 
 494 See Stuntz, 121 Harv L Rev at 2035 (cited in note 148) (advocating fewer peremp-
tory challenges and more localized jury selection). 
 495 See sources cited in note 474. But see Iontcheva, 89 Va L Rev at 364 n 276 (cited 
in note 92) (collecting studies finding that group deliberation mitigates individual bias). 
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whose victims are white.496 Research from the noncapital context 
similarly finds racial disparity in jury conviction rates.497 
The precise effects of neighborhood diversity on jury decision-
making are indeterminate. On the one hand, there is evidence that 
even a single African American in the jury pool eliminates the ra-
cial gap in conviction rates.498 While not the only explanation for 
this striking result, the authors observe that “[m]ost obviously and 
directly, having at least one black member in the jury pool makes 
it feasible to have a black member on the seated jury.”499 “Black 
representation on the seated jury might affect trial outcomes,” in 
turn, “not only through the jury deliberation and decision pro-
cess”—if black jurors bring different perspectives, for example, or 
prompt white jurors to confront their biases500—“but also by affect-
ing how the case is presented and argued by the prosecution and 
 
 496 See, for example, David C. Baldus, et al, Racial Discrimination and the Death Pen-
alty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings 
from Philadelphia, 83 Cornell L Rev 1638, 1688–90 & tbl 6 (1998); David C. Baldus and 
George Woodworth, Race Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: An 
Overview of the Empirical Evidence with Special Emphasis on the Post-1990 Research, 39 
Crim L Bull 194, 210 (2003) (augmenting the 1998 Philadelphia study); Katherine Beckett 
and Heather Evans, Race, Death, and Justice: Capital Sentencing in Washington State, 
1981–2014, 6 Colum J Race & L 77, 103–04 (2016); Thomas J. Keil and Gennaro F. Vito, 
Race and the Death Penalty in Kentucky Murder Trials: An Analysis of Post-Gregg Out-
comes, 7 Just Q 189, 203 (1990). Dark-skinned black defendants fare particularly poorly. 
See, for example, Jennifer L. Eberhardt, et al, Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypi-
cality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 Psych Sci 383 (2006). 
But see Baldus and Woodworth, 39 Crim L Bull at 214 (cited in note 496) (asserting that 
“white-victim disparities are principally the result of prosecutorial charging decisions ra-
ther than jury or judicial sentencing decisions”). For evidence from mock jury studies, see 
Lynch and Haney, Mapping the Racial Bias at 85, 91–95 (cited in note 365); Lynch and 
Haney, Capital Jury Deliberation at 489, 492–94 (cited in note 365). 
 497 See, for example, Shamena Anwar, Patrick Bayer, and Randi Hjalmarsson, The 
Impact of Jury Race in Criminal Trials, 127 Q J Econ 1017, 1048 (2012); Francis X.  
Flanagan, Race, Gender, and Juries: Evidence from North Carolina, 61 J L & Econ 189, 
192 (2018). See also Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 Mich L 
Rev 1611, 1616–51 (1985); Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: 
Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 Mich L Rev 63, 75–100 (1993). 
Mock jury studies likewise find small but statistically significant effects of race on guilt 
and sentencing. For reviews, see Tara L. Mitchell, et al, Racial Bias in Mock Juror Deci-
sion-Making: A Meta-Analytic Review of Defendant Treatment, 29 L & Hum Behav 621, 
629 (2005); Samuel R. Sommers, Race and the Decision Making of Juries, 12 Legal & Crim 
Psych 171, 172–74 (2007). 
 498 See Anwar, Bayer, and Hjalmarsson, 127 Q J Econ at 1019 (cited in note 497). 
 499 Id at 1020. 
 500 On the effects of black representation on jury deliberation, see Samuel R. Sommers, 
On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial 
Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J Personality & Soc Psych 597, 606–09 (2006). 
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defense attorneys.”501 Likewise, other studies have found that ju-
ries with higher proportions of white jurors are more punitive.502 
Yet research into the dynamics of group deliberation suggests 
that, among heterogeneous jurors, white males of high socioeco-
nomic status tend to become foremen and dominate discussion.503 
And paradoxically, while a larger black presence in the neighbor-
hood should increase black representation on juries—which may im-
prove outcomes for black defendants—it may simultaneously 
heighten punitive attitudes among white residents, potentially in-
creasing punishment for all offenders, which, in turn, disparately 
impacts blacks. This latter, well-documented effect is known as “ra-
cial threat.”504 In fact, blacks, too, are more likely to overestimate 
 
 501 Anwar, Bayer, and Hjalmarsson, 127 Q J Econ at 1020 (cited in note 497). See also 
Sommers, 90 J Personality & Soc Psych at 603–04 (cited in note 500) (finding that, even 
before deliberation, white members of diverse mock juries were more lenient toward black 
defendants than white members of all-white juries). 
 502 See, for example, David C. Baldus, et al, The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Cap-
ital Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U Pa J Const L 3, 86 fig 7 (2001); 
William J. Bowers, Benjamin D. Steiner, and Marla Sandys, Death Sentencing in Black 
and White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Composition, 
3 U Pa J Const L 171, 259 (2001). 
 503 See, for example, Hans and Vidmar, Judging the Jury at 101, 108 (cited in 
note 221). See also Devine, Jury Decision Making at 155–56 (cited in note 221) (collecting 
additional studies). 
 504 See, for example, Greenberg and West, 39 Crimin at 640 (cited in note 402); 
Maureen A. Craig and Jennifer A. Richeson, More Diverse Yet Less Tolerant? How the 
Increasingly Diverse Racial Landscape Affects White Americans’ Racial Attitudes, 40 Per-
sonality & Soc Psych Bull 750, 758–59 (2014); David Jacobs and Jason T. Carmichael, The 
Politics of Punishment Across Time and Space: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis of Impris-
onment Rates, 80 Soc Forces 61, 66, 81–82 (2001); David Jacobs and Richard Kleban, Po-
litical Institutions, Minorities, and Punishment: A Pooled Cross-National Analysis of Im-
prisonment Rates, 82 Soc Forces 725, 746–48 (2003); Benjamin Feigenberg and Conrad 
Miller, Racial Divisions and Criminal Justice: Evidence from Southern State Courts *5–6 
(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 24726, June 2018), archived 
at https://perma.cc/4LU4-6PSW. Relatedly, whites in more racially diverse neighborhoods 
overestimate their personal risk of victimization. See generally, for example, Justin T. 
Pickett, et al, Reconsidering the Relationship Between Perceived Neighborhood Racial 
Composition and Whites’ Perceptions of Victimization Risk: Do Racial Stereotypes Matter?, 
50 Crimin 145 (2012); Lincoln Quillian and Devah Pager, Estimating Risk: Stereotype Am-
plification and the Perceived Risk of Criminal Victimization, 73 Soc Psych Q 79 (2010); 
Rebecca Wickes, et al, “Seeing” Minorities and Perceptions of Disorder: Explicating the 
Mediating and Moderating Mechanisms of Social Cohesion, 51 Crimin 519 (2013). Overall, 
the implications of demographic diversity are something of a paradox: on the one hand, 
whites are threatened by racial demographic change, which can increase intergroup bias; 
on the other hand, positive contact with nonwhite neighbors may temper these effects to 
some degree. See Maureen A. Craig, Julian M. Rucker, and Jennifer A. Richeson, The 
Pitfalls and Promise of Increasing Racial Diversity: Threat, Contact, and Race Relations 
in the 21st Century, 27 Current Directions Psychological Sci 188, 191 (2018). 
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their neighborhood’s crime rates when more racial minorities live 
nearby.505 
3. Judges vs. juries. 
There is cause for concern that ordinary individuals—both 
black and white—will treat black defendants poorly. But if the 
alternative is more judicial authority, we must also ask how 
judges are likely to fare in comparison. Judges, of course, are only 
human, subject to the same prejudices that afflict us all.506 Racial 
disparities in sentencing are well established, even with judges 
rather than juries at the helm.507 It would be tempting to infer 
from this observation that judicial decisions are no more egalitar-
ian than lay ones would be. Such an inference, however, would 
miss an important wrinkle: judges do not entirely determine 
criminal sentences. It’s not even clear that they’re the most im-
portant players.508 Sentences, rather, are the product of a chain of 
decisions by police officers, prosecutors, defense lawyers, proba-
tion officers, and, only then, judges. Racial disparity can creep in 
at any or all of these stages. 
Indeed, recent empirical work questions the extent to which 
racial disparities in sentencing are attributable to judges at all, 
at least in jurisdictions with sentencing guidelines.509 These stud-
ies variously conclude that prosecutorial decisions to seek man-
datory minimum sentences explain over half, and possibly all, of 
 
 505 See Lincoln Quillian and Devah Pager, Black Neighbors, Higher Crime? The Role 
of Racial Stereotypes in Evaluations of Neighborhood Crime, 107 Am J Soc 717, 738 (2001); 
Robert J. Sampson and Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma 
and the Social Construction of “Broken Windows”, 67 Soc Psych Q 319, 334–37 (2004). 
 506 See, for example, Andrea L. Miller, Expertise Fails to Attenuate Gendered Biases 
in Judicial Decision-Making, 10 Soc Psychological & Personality Sci 227, 230–33 (2019); 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, et al, Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 Notre 
Dame L Rev 1195, 1211–26 (2009). 
 507 See, for example, David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in 
Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J L & Econ 285, 296 (2001); Cassia 
C. Spohn, Thirty Years of Sentencing Reform: The Quest for a Racially Neutral Sentencing 
Process, 3 Crim Just 427, 474 (2000). 
 508 See, for example, William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disap-
pearing Shadow, 117 Harv L Rev 2548, 2559–62 (2004) (describing prosecutorial control 
over sentences in both guidelines and discretionary sentencing jurisdictions). 
 509 In addition, a number of earlier studies find little evidence of judicial discrimina-
tion at sentencing. See, for example, Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of U.S. 
Prison Populations Revisited, 64 U Colo L Rev 743, 749, 754 (1993); Stephen Klein, Joan 
Petersilia, and Susan Turner, Race and Imprisonment Decisions in California, 247 Science 
812, 815–16 (1990). See also Michael Tonry, Malign Neglect: Race, Crime, and Punishment 
in America 65–70 (Oxford 1995). 
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the federal racial sentencing disparity;510  that United States v 
Booker,511 which expanded judicial sentencing discretion, did not 
increase racial disparities;512 and that, to the extent that Booker 
did affect black defendants adversely, the effects were due to 
changes in prosecutorial charging behavior, while judges used 
their discretion to mitigate disparity.513 
I do not mean to suggest that these findings, all of which are 
based on federal sentencing data, are conclusive. Other recent 
studies are more reluctant to write off the judicial contribution to 
sentencing disparities. 514  Nevertheless, the weight of evidence 
suggests that police and prosecutors, rather than judges, are re-
sponsible for at least some, and possibly much (or even all), of the 
observable racial disparity in ultimate outcomes. Judges, in other 
words, likely deserve less blame for disparities than they com-
monly receive. And there is plenty of room, so to speak, for jury 
sentencing to be worse. 
Perhaps this shouldn’t surprise. Judges are, after all, trained 
and expected to be impartial. And while they don’t escape all psy-
chological irrationality,515 there is some evidence that they fare 
 
 510 See M. Marit Rehavi and Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal 
Sentences, 122 J Pol Econ 1320, 1323–24, 1343 (2014). See also Byungbae Kim, Cassia 
Spohn, and E.C. Hedberg, Federal Sentencing as a Complex Collaborative Process: Judges, 
Prosecutors, Judge-Prosecutor Dyads, and Disparity in Sentencing, 53 Crimin 597, 615–
18 (2015) (finding that disparity attributable to prosecutors is larger than disparity from 
judges). 
 511 543 US 220 (2005). 
 512 See Sonja B. Starr and M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Dis-
parity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 Yale L J 2, 9 (2013). 
 513 See id; Joshua B. Fischman and Max M. Schanzenbach, Racial Disparities Under 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Role of Judicial Discretion and Mandatory Mini-
mums, 9 J Empirical Legal Stud 729, 730, 761 (2012). Taking a broader, twenty-year per-
spective, Professors Fischman and Schanzenbach also find that “racial disparities were 
generally lower during periods when judges had wider discretion, suggesting that judges 
exercise discretion in a manner that mitigates disparity.” Id at 730. See also Emily Owens, 
Erin M. Kerrison, and Bernardo Santos Da Silveira, Examining Racial Disparities in 
Criminal Case Outcomes Among Indigent Defendants in San Francisco *2–3 (Penn Law, 
2017), archived at https://perma.cc/UY59-XPU9 (finding that racial disparities in criminal 
case outcomes are attributable to nonjudicial factors). 
 514 See, for example, Crystal S. Yang, Free at Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial 
Disparities in Federal Sentencing, 44 J Legal Stud 75, 77, 105 (2015) (finding that Booker 
increased “judicially induced disparities”); Alma Cohen and Crystal S. Yang, Judicial Pol-
itics and Sentencing Decisions, 11 Am Econ J: Econ Pol 160, 184–85 (2019) (concluding 
that observed disparities “are not solely driven by prosecutorial discretion” and that 
“judges play an important role in explaining disparities in sentencing”). 
 515 See, for example, Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and Andrew J. Wistrich, 
Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 Cornell L Rev 777, 817–18 (2001); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,  
Andrew J. Wistrich, and Chris Guthrie, Can Judges Make Reliable Numeric Judgments? 
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better than laypeople in combatting certain biases.516 On race, 
specifically, one recent study finds that, although judges (like eve-
ryone else) harbor implicit racial bias, these biases only some-
times influence actual judgment, possibly because judges attempt 
to compensate to avoid making biased judgments.517 Moreover, 
there is evidence that judges’ racial bias decreases with experi-
ence,518 an important maturation process that is impossible for 
one-shot jurors. 
E. Compliance 
The final premise of democratization is that, by allowing the 
people to participate in criminal justice, and by aligning the law 
with community values, democratization will bolster the system’s 
legitimacy and moral credibility, respectively, leading to im-
proved compliance and cooperation and engagement with author-
ities. Despite their thematic similarities, the literatures on “pro-
cedural justice” and “empirical desert”—both of which claim the 
ability to improve compliance—have developed separately, based 
on distinct bodies of empirical research. I address them sepa-
rately here. I also discuss some of the potentially pernicious effects 
of embracing these theories of community-empowering justice. 
1. Procedural justice. 
In a literature widely known within criminal justice circles—
and endorsed by the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Po-
licing—Professors Tom Tyler, Tracey Meares, and others main-
tain that individuals are more likely to obey the law when they 
 
Distorted Damages and Skewed Sentences, 90 Ind L J 695, 696–97, 717, 731 (2015); 
Wistrich, Guthrie, and Rachlinski, 153 U Pa L Rev at 1259 (cited in note 362). 
 516 See, for example, Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich, 86 Cornell L Rev at 817 (cited 
in note 515) (finding that judges are less susceptible than jurors to two widespread cogni-
tive biases); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie, and Andrew J. Wistrich, Probable Cause, 
Probability, and Hindsight, 8 J Empirical Legal Stud 72, 93 (2011) (finding that judges’ 
probable cause determinations are not clouded by hindsight); Susanne M. Schmittat and 
Birte Englich, If You Judge, Investigate! Responsibility Reduces Confirmatory Information 
Processing in Legal Experts, 22 Psych Pub Pol & L 386, 395 (2016) (finding that criminal-
law experts, including judges, exhibited less confirmatory information processing than 
laypeople); Wistrich, Guthrie, and Rachlinski, 153 U Pa L Rev at 1321 (cited in note 362) 
(finding that judges can ignore evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s right to 
counsel). 
 517 See Rachlinski, et al, 84 Notre Dame L Rev at 1221–23 (cited in note 506). 
 518 See, for example, David Arnold, Will Dobbie, and Crystal S. Yang, Racial Bias in 
Bail Decisions, 133 Q J Econ 1885, 1890, 1929 (2018); Cohen and Yang, 11 Am Econ J: 
Econ Pol at 178 (cited in note 514). 
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view legal authorities as legitimate. Perceptions of legitimacy, in 
turn, depend on whether the authorities govern in a procedurally 
just fashion—which itself hinges significantly on whether the cit-
izenry is given voice in matters of the state.519 In the democrati-
zation agenda, procedural justice operates on two planes: on the 
wholesale level, “the public wants to be listened to when policies 
are being created”; on the retail level, people want “an oppor-
tunity to state their case when dealing with individual police of-
ficers.”520 As discussed above, the former lies closer to democrati-
zation’s core and the latter, its periphery. 
On the wholesale level, one empirical criticism observes that 
“most of the evidence for the positive effects of voice has been gen-
erated in studies of legal arrangements or other situations in 
which the decision maker has no vested material interest in a 
particular outcome.”521 “[A]s soon as the setting is shifted to one 
in which the decision maker . . . might receive differentiated pay-
offs depending upon the decision rendered,” in contrast, “any sa-
lubrious effects of voice vanish and are replaced by ‘frustration’ 
effects.”522 This latter scenario might describe legislators working 
with citizen advisory boards to refine the criminal code, who are 
posturing for reelection, or prosecutors or police at community 
justice meetings, who are managing their workloads. Or, at least, 
participating citizens may view these officials this way. Some of 
Tyler’s own research tends to confirm this result. Tyler finds, for ex-
ample, that the perceived ability to make arguments to or influence 
 
 519 See Tyler, Rasinski, and McGraw, 15 J Applied Soc Psych at 715–21 (cited in 
note 162).  
 520 Meares, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1531 (cited in note 32). 
 521 Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy at 197 (cited in note 234) (citation 
omitted). See also Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged 
Sword of Procedural Fairness, 1 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 171, 192 (2005) (“[M]any of the most 
robust procedural fairness effects have involved civil disputes between pairs of ordinary 
citizens, where outcomes are equivocal with respect to their implications for the system.”). 
 522 Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy at 197 (cited in note 234), citing 
Ronald L. Cohen, Procedural Justice and Participation, 38 Hum Rel 643 (1985) and Robert 
Folger, Distributive and Procedural Justice: Combined Impact of Voice and Improvement 
on Experienced Inequity, 35 J Personality & Soc Psych 108 (1977). For other evidence of 
deliberative frustration, see Amy Gangl, Procedural Justice Theory and Evaluations of the 
Lawmaking Process, 25 Pol Behav 119, 136 (2003); Michael E. Morrell, Citizens’ Evalua-
tions of Participatory Democratic Procedures: Normative Theory Meets Empirical Science, 
52 Pol Rsrch Q 293, 300, 315 (1999); Randall S. Peterson, Can You Have Too Much of a 
Good Thing? The Limits of Voice for Improving Satisfaction with Leaders, 25 Personality 
& Soc Psych Bull 313, 322 (1999). 
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the decisions of a political body does not lead subjects to be more 
favorable toward that body, and sometimes just the opposite.523 
A separate critique counsels caution in our optimism about 
procedural justice at the retail level, in everyday interactions be-
tween officers and civilians. To be clear, there is considerable ev-
idence that procedurally just treatment induces cooperation in 
certain other settings, such as the workplace.524 The research on 
policing, however, is largely associational; a “credible case for cau-
sality has not been made.”525 What is more, the evidence of com-
pliance effects we do have focuses “only on compliance with an 
officer’s on-scene directive, not on longer-term compliance with 
the law and future police orders.”526 
Criminologists Robert Worden and Sarah McLean report sev-
eral pertinent findings in their recent book. First, the actual, ob-
served procedural justice with which officers act explains a little 
more than one-tenth of the variation in individuals’ subjective per-
ceptions of procedural justice.527 Procedural injustice shapes per-
ceptions more potently. 528  Relatedly, “citizens’ assessments of 
whether the outcome they received was the outcome they  
deserved . . . are not a reflection of officers’ procedural justice.”529 
Far more important are general attitudes about the police that 
citizens carry into encounters.530 
 
 523 See Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Models of the Justice Motive: Antecedents of Dis-
tributive and Procedural Justice, 67 J Personality & Soc Psych 850, 858 (1994). 
 524 See National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Proactive Polic-
ing: Effects on Crime and Communities 232–36 (National Academies 2018). 
 525 Daniel S. Nagin and Cody W. Telep, Procedural Justice and Legal Compliance, 13 
Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 5, 7 (2017). 
 526 Id at 14. Consider M. Alper Sozer, Crime and Community Policing 144 (LFB Schol-
arly 2009) (“This book did not find any evidence to justify the crime reduction effect of 
community policing.”). 
 527 Worden and McLean, Mirage of Police Reform at 136 (cited in note 252). See also 
Nagin and Telep, 13 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci at 11 (cited in note 525). 
 528 See Worden and McLean, Mirage of Police Reform at 179 (cited in note 252). See 
also Edward R. Maguire, Belén V. Lowrey, and Devon Johnson, Evaluating the Relative 
Impact of Positive and Negative Encounters with Police: A Randomized Experiment, 13 J 
Experimental Crimin 367, 385–86 (2017); Wesley G. Skogan, Asymmetry in the Impact of 
Encounters with Police, 16 Policing & Socy 99, 118–19 (2006). 
 529 Worden and McLean, Mirage of Police Reform at 143 (cited in note 252). 
 530 Id at 185 (“What citizens take away from their encounters with the police in the 
form of their attitudes toward the police is shaped by what they brought to their encoun-
ters much more than by what police do.”). See Jacinta M. Gau, Procedural Justice and 
Police Legitimacy: A Test of Measurement and Structure, 39 Am J Crim Just 187, 202–04 
(2014). See also Belén V. Lowrey, Edward R. Maguire, and Richard R. Bennett, Testing 
the Effects of Procedural Justice and Overaccommodation in Traffic Stops: A Randomized 
Experiment, 43 Crim Just & Behav 1430, 1445 (2016); Nagin and Telep, 13 Ann Rev L & 
Soc Sci at 15–17 (cited in note 525) (reviewing additional studies). 
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Second, “[t]he use of police authority” such as searches or 
physical force “has a bearing on subjective experience”—including 
perceived procedural justice—“independent of the procedural jus-
tice with which authority is exercised.” 531  Put differently, 
“[w]hether officers used their authority—by using physical force 
or conducting searches—proved to be much more important than 
how officers used their authority—their procedural (in)justice—
in shaping citizens’ assessments of procedural justice.”532 
Third, introducing, at monthly departmental meetings, re-
ports on citizens’ subjective experiences with the police “did not 
generally result in detectable improvements over time.”533 “Super-
imposed on existing structures,” Worden and McLean conclude, 
“the procedural justice model is likely to be [ ] loosely coupled with 
police practice” on the ground.534 This echoes a large body of evi-
dence on community policing, a related and partially overlapping 
policing model. After all, contemporary policing is community po-
licing.535 Yet the community-oriented aspects of the community-
policing approach, scholars have consistently found, “rarely in-
trude[ ] much on the operational autonomy of the police.”536 
Interestingly, Tyler himself largely agrees with all of this: 
“The case for the effectiveness of [the procedural justice] model in 
the arena of policing has not been made,” he writes.537 According 
to Tyler, “it is not social science researchers who have been push-
ing the rapid . . . application of these ideas to policing”; rather, “it 
 
 531 Worden and McLean, Mirage of Police Reform at 148 (cited in note 252). 
 532 Id at 12. See also Charles R. Epp, Steven Maynard-Moody, and Donald Haider-
Markel, Pulled Over: How Police Stops Define Race and Citizenship 133 (Chicago 2014) 
(“It is simply not true that if officers remain professionally respectful they can carry out 
as many investigatory stops as they wish without causing harm.”). 
 533 Worden and McLean, Mirage of Police Reform at 165 (cited in note 252). 
 534 Id at 183. But see Jonathan Jackson and Ben Bradford, Book Review, Mirage of 
Police Reform, for Special Issue of Police Practice and Research, 19 Police Prac & Rsrch: 
Intl J 204, 206 (2018) (agreeing that cultural change within organizations is hard but con-
tending that Worden and McLean did not allow enough time). 
 535 See, for example, Sklansky, Democracy and the Police at 2 (cited in note 13) (call-
ing community policing “a new orthodoxy” ascendant over the past four decades); Stuntz, 
Collapse of American Criminal Justice at 293 (cited in note 15) (similar). 
 536 Sklansky, Democracy and the Police at 97 (cited in note 13). See also, for example, 
Worden and McLean, Mirage of Police Reform at 24–25 (cited in note 252). See also gen-
erally Tony Cheng, Input Without Influence: The Silence and Scripts of Police and Com-
munity Relations, 67 Soc Probs 171 (2020); William Terrill and Stephen D. Mastrofski, 
Working the Street: Does Community Policing Matter?, in Skogan, ed, Community Policing 
109 (cited in note 231) (finding no systematic relationship between community policing 
assignments, officer training, and attitudes and the extent to which officers used coercion). 
 537 Tom Tyler, Procedural Justice and Policing: A Rush to Judgment?, 13 Ann Rev L 
& Soc Sci 29, 32 (2017). 
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is legal and governmental authorities seeking insights for dealing 
with a pressing national problem: public distrust in the police.”538 
Without the luxury of time to wait for further research, and given 
that “considerable evidence available in other arenas” supports 
the “potential value” of the procedural justice model “in address-
ing issues of police legitimacy,” Tyler concludes, “the widespread 
reliance upon this work by authorities seem[s] reasonable.”539 
I am more concerned than Tyler about the wisdom of ground-
ing policy in this unsettled body of research. If the procedural jus-
tice model does not improve policing the way its proponents hope, 
it’s a distraction from the pressing imperative to find something 
that will. (With respect, my own reading of the literature on pro-
cedural justice in policing suggests considerably more faith in the 
empirics among social scientists—or at least legal scholars—than 
Tyler professes.) In fact, given the way procedural justice is her-
alded as a “community-based approach,”540 it may be worse than 
a distraction. It may actually expand police discretion by stamp-
ing it with the “community’s” imprimatur.541 
Consider two examples. First, the Supreme Court has sanc-
tioned police activity carried out in the name of “the community” 
that the Fourth Amendment might otherwise condemn. It has 
adopted a broad “community caretaking” exception to the proba-
ble cause requirement, which licenses great intrusions—includ-
ing entry into the home—when police have an “objectively reason-
able basis” to believe their assistance is needed.542 It has also 
upheld suspicionless searches of parolees as a means of “reducing 
recidivism and thereby promoting reintegration and positive citi-
zenship”543 and suspicionless stops of “responsible citizens” to look 
for witnesses to a crime, promoting “public safety.”544 As Sklan-
sky observes, “The Court’s rhetoric in both of these [latter] 
cases resonated strongly with a view of the police as an arm of 
‘the community.’”545 
 
 538 Id at 31. 
 539 Id at 32. 
 540 See National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Proactive Polic-
ing at 211 (cited in note 524). 
 541 For an extended argument with similar themes—that efforts to implement direct, 
participatory democracy give rise to institutions that end up expanding the scope and au-
thority of the state, see generally James A. Morone, The Democratic Wish: Popular Par-
ticipation and the Limits of American Government (Yale rev ed 1998). 
 542 See Brigham City, Utah v Stuart, 547 US 398, 400 (2006). 
 543 Samson v California, 547 US 843, 853 (2006). 
 544 Illinois v Lidster, 540 US 419, 425 (2004). 
 545 Sklansky, Democracy and the Police at 43 (cited in note 13). 
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Second, the Court has pointed to the presence of civilian re-
view as justifying relaxing the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary 
rule. Doctrine requires the police to “knock and announce” before 
entering a home to execute a warrant. In Hudson v Michigan,546 
the Court considered the remedy for a violation of this rule. In 
holding that exclusion of evidence was unnecessary, the Court 
identified legal and institutional developments that had occurred 
since it had applied the exclusionary rule to the states in 1961. 
Among these was “the increasing use of various forms of citizen 
review [that] can enhance police accountability.”547 The Court did 
not actually cite any evidence for this point, and the empirical 
research to date is mixed, at best. Indeed, just three years before 
the Court decided Hudson, Judge Debra Livingston, who served 
nearly a decade on New York City’s Civilian Complaint Review 
Board, penned an article tellingly titled The Unfulfilled Promise 
of Citizen Review.548 In fact, some think that common types of ci-
vilian review may undermine accountability by diffusing respon-
sibility and muddling the chain of command.549 
2. Empirical desert. 
Professors Josh Bowers and Paul Robinson echo these cri-
tiques. They contrast procedural justice with a model of “empiri-
cal desert” in which laws that are “morally credible,” because they 
are substantively just, induce greater compliance.550 For this rea-
son, Bowers and Robinson argue, as between procedural legiti-
macy and moral credibility, “moral credibility ought to be the 
principal objective in uncommon circumstances in which a system 
may effectively pursue only one.”551 
The problem is that the evidence for these “compliance ef-
fects” is shaky, as Robinson has occasionally admitted.552 In nearly 
all of the prior work Robinson cites, researchers investigated 
whether a law’s moral credibility affects the stated likelihood of 
 
 546 547 US 586 (2006). 
 547 Id at 599. 
 548 Livingston, 1 Ohio St J Crim L 653 (cited in note 82). See also Worden and McLean, 
Mirage of Police Reform at 27 (cited in note 252) (“[T]here is no evidence that citizen over-
sight alters patterns of police behavior or performance.”). 
 549 See George E. Berkley, The Democratic Policeman 146–47 (Beacon 1969). 
 550 See Bowers and Robinson, 47 Wake Forest L Rev at 216, 259, 282 (cited in note 201). 
 551 Id at 213. 
 552 See, for example, Paul H. Robinson, Reply, in Robinson, Garvey, and Ferzan, eds, 
Criminal Law Conversations 61, 63 (cited in note 200) (agreeing “that our current 
knowledge regarding [empirical desert’s crime-control] effects is limited”). 
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compliance with that law, not with the law more generally.553 Rob-
inson’s own studies present lay participants with vignettes in-
volving criminal sentences that, by conjecture, are grossly dispro-
portionate to anticipated views of just desert.554 Learning of these 
sentences, Robinson finds, reduces participants’ expressed will-
ingness to comply and cooperate with the law.555 Yet Robinson de-
tects only slight anticipated compliance effects from massively 
unjust sentences, such as a fifty-year sentence for a nineteen-
year-old who reasonably believed the minor with whom he had 
consensual sex was an adult.556 Professors Christopher Slobogin 
and Lauren Brinkley-Rubenstein, in their own original research, 
“find little evidence that divergence from societal views about 
punishment . . . significantly increases willingness to break the 
law or diminishes respect for it, especially once the passage of 
time makes the divergence less salient.”557 
There is an additional concern with the moral credibility ar-
gument: existing research does not distinguish between the cred-
ibility of outcomes in individual cases and that of the system as a 
whole. In other words, the data do not show whether people re-
gard a system as morally credible when outcomes in individual 
cases are perceived as just but the systemic effects are not. After 
all, sentences are not the only systemic input that matters—budg-
ets, police and prosecutorial discretion, and a host of other factors 
unrelated to sentencing go far toward determining how much 
punishment the system doles out and to whom. 
F. The Collision Course 
If there’s anything to the arguments I’ve just made, the “large 
tent” of democratization may, in due time, devolve into civil war. 
As a group, the democratizers pledge allegiance both to principles 
 
 553 See Slobogin and Brinkley-Rubenstein, 65 Stan L Rev at 97 (cited in note 198). 
One exception is Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 Tex L Rev 1399 (2005). Professor 
Nadler finds some evidence that exposure to unfair legal outcomes increases subjects’ will-
ingness to contemplate noncompliance with other laws. Id at 1415–16. Altogether, how-
ever, her evidence is mixed, and she concludes that “[i]t is undoubtedly false that perceived 
injustice in the legal system leads to greater willingness to break the law for all people, in 
all circumstances, at all times.” Id at 1440. See also Slobogin and Brinkley-Rubenstein, 65 
Stan L Rev at 102 (cited in note 198) (conjecturing that “any survey measure of perceptions 
about the likelihood one will violate the law has minimal external validity”). 
 554 See Robinson, Goodwin, and Reisig, 85 NYU L Rev at 1965 (cited in note 125). 
 555 See id at 2002–07. 
 556 See id. 
 557 See Slobogin and Brinkley-Rubenstein, 65 Stan L Rev at 100 & n 102 (cited in 
note 198). 
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and policies, on the one hand, and to particular purposes they say 
those principles and policies will promote, on the other. The latter 
are the democratizers’ ends; the former, means conjectured to 
achieve those ends. What I have gone to great pains to demonstrate 
is that the democratizers’ means may very well fail to achieve 
their ends—and may even undermine them. The democratizers’ 
dual commitments—to both means and ends—are likely on a col-
lision course. 
What happens if I am right? This broad coalition, I expect, 
will fracture. One camp will contain those principally committed 
to the ends of dismantling our system of racialized mass incarcer-
ation. To them, democratization is a tool that can be discarded 
when it proves itself useless. Their belief in democratization is 
shallow and contingent; they wish to effectuate community values 
only when those values promote their own reform prescriptions. 
Meares, for example, characterizes herself as “largely sympa-
thetic” to the democratization agenda, at least as it concerns po-
licing, but argues that “citizen engagement . . . should be struc-
tured and rationalized toward a particular end.” 558  But who 
chooses the “particular end”? Experts, I assume. On this view, the 
people matter only insofar as they provide strategic cover for—
and legitimation of—what is ultimately an expert-driven agenda. 
The other camp will encompass those who will follow the peo-
ple virtually wherever they lead. Their principal commitment is 
to a methodology of governance. Such a conviction is defensible 
on various grounds. But it does not grant one membership in the 
resistance. Decarceration, if it occurs, would be a happy side effect 
of democratization for these scholars. Robinson, for example, does 
not flinch when his studies find that, outside the context of “crime 
control” doctrines, laypeople prefer sentences higher than those 
the law regularly doles out.559 
The democratization coalition, then, is a preciously fragile 
one. It is sometimes said that the vague and capacious concept of 
“democracy” makes strange bedfellows. 560  The same is true, I 
mean to suggest, of democratization. There is, one might argue, 
nothing wrong with that as long as both sides keep the bed warm. 
What troubles me, though, is that any victories the democratizers 
 
 558 Meares, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1526 (cited in note 32). 
 559 See notes 326–27 and accompanying text. 
 560 See Morone, The Democratic Wish at 9, 11 (cited in note 541). 
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score for the decarceral agenda will be fleeting.561 History sug-
gests that, at some point, crime rates will spike or a sensational 
murder will capture the public imagination. Attitudes will grow 
more punitive; racial tensions may flare.562  The democratizers 
committed to principles of lay rule and empirical desert will urge 
us to follow the rising tide, to let the people lead. Those committed 
to decarceration will be deserted. 
III.  CONCLUSION: ALTERNATIVE VISIONS OF  
“DEMOCRATIC” CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
America does indeed seem to be in the midst of a criminal 
justice “moment.”563 The critical question is what to do with the 
opportunities this moment creates. The democratizers wave us 
away from experts and bureaucracy and toward a model of thor-
oughgoing lay participation in the criminal justice process and its 
institutions. For all the reasons given, their agenda leaves me 
cold. But where to turn instead? 
The literature does not lack for alternative models, all of 
which might justifiably claim the mantle of “democracy,” vari-
ously understood. These models are not mutually exclusive, ei-
ther conceptually or pragmatically. Scholars on the radical left, 
building upon vibrant social movements, advocate bold reforms 
ranging from community control to abolition to the “Black Peo-
ple’s Grand Jury,” ideas designed to empower and liberate mar-
ginalized members of the polity to act within existing legal struc-
tures, to transform those structures, or to create their own.564 
Others advance a public-health conception of criminal justice, in 
which legal institutions aim to rehabilitate, or treat, the individuals 
 
 561 Consider Derrick Bell, Silent Covenants: Brown v. Board of Education and the Un-
fulfilled Hopes for Racial Reform 151 (Oxford 2004). 
 562 See note 321 and accompanying text. 
 563 See, for example, First Step Act of 2018, Pub L No 115-391, 132 Stat 5194. 
 564 See, for example, Danielle Sered, Until We Reckon: Violence, Mass Incarceration, 
and a Road to Repair (New Press 2019); Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination 
of Law, 93 NYU L Rev 405 (2018); Monica C. Bell, The Community in Criminal Justice: 
Subordination, Consumption, Resistance, and Transformation, Du Bois Rev *12–14 (forth-
coming), archived at https://perma.cc/N2FC-KMXV. See also generally, for example, Brie 
McLemore, Procedural Justice, Legal Estrangement, and the Black People’s Grand Jury, 
105 Va L Rev 371 (2019); Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 
UCLA L Rev 1156 (2015); Roberts, 111 Nw U L Rev 1597 (cited in note 32); Simonson, 111 
Nw U L Rev 1609 (cited in note 32). 
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brought before them and return them to full democratic partici-
pation.565 A third camp, to which I am—perhaps unsurprisingly—
sympathetic, emphasizes an evidence-based approach to criminal 
justice problem-solving focused on achieving outcomes consistent 
with democratic values. 
The basic idea that criminal justice policy ought to be 
grounded in evidence is not new. In 1967, the President’s Com-
mission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice con-
cluded that the “greatest need” of “law enforcement and the ad-
ministration of [ ] justice” was “the need to know.” 566  The 
Commission recommended an ambitious national research strat-
egy, including an independent body like the National Science 
Foundation, to support a rational approach to crime control.567 
Subsequent scientific advances, however, long went ignored.568 
Things may finally be starting to change. “Lawmakers and poli-
cymakers are beginning to rely more on evidence-informed meth-
ods not only to achieve public safety and reduce incarceration,” 
scholars have documented, “but also to improve the quality of ev-
idence used in courtrooms, to improve policing through technol-
ogy, and to gather better data on criminal justice operations.”569 
Indeed, a number of the democratizers’ own proposals betray 
some allegiance to these principles. Consider, for example, the  
democratizers’ suggestions to reduce the use of imprisonment, 
 
 565 See, for example, Amy J. Cohen, Trauma and the Welfare State: A Genealogy of 
Prostitution Courts in New York City, 95 Tex L Rev 915, 955 (2017) (describing modern 
“problem-solving courts” that reflect “ideas of self-empowerment, self-sufficiency, and in-
dividual participation and responsibility”). 
 566 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The 
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 273 (GPO 1967). 
 567 See id at 274–77. 
 568 “The creation of governmental institutions that sponsor and fund research, the 
development of university departments in criminal justice and criminology, and the accu-
mulation of large sophisticated scientific literatures,” Michael Tonry lamented in 2013, 
“have not resulted in the development of evidence-based policies as a norm in American 
criminal justice systems.” Michael Tonry, Evidence, Ideology, and Politics in the Making 
of American Criminal Justice Policy, 42 Crime & Just: Rev Rsrch 1, 11–12 (2013). 
 569 Brandon L. Garrett, Evidence-Informed Criminal Justice, 86 Geo Wash L Rev 
1490, 1493 (2018). See generally, for example, Francis T. Cullen, Andrew J. Myer, and 
Edward J. Latessa, Eight Lessons from Moneyball: The High Cost of Ignoring Evidence-
Based Corrections, 4 Victims & Offenders 197 (2009); Brandon L. Garrett and John  
Monahan, Judging Risk, 108 Cal L Rev (forthcoming 2020), archived at https:// 
perma.cc/7VCG-EKMZ; Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Cor-
rections, 91 Notre Dame L Rev 537 (2016); Jennifer E. Laurin, Gideon by the Numbers: 
The Emergence of Evidence-Based Practice in Indigent Defense, 12 Ohio St J Crim L 325 
(2015); Lawrence W. Sherman, The Rise of Evidence-Based Policing: Targeting, Testing, 
and Tracking, 42 Crime & Just: Rev Rsrch 377 (2013). 
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moderate prison conditions, and force the entities that prosecute 
and sentence to internalize the costs of prosecution and incarcer-
ation. The democratizers do not propose to consult the public on 
these general topics. Nor do they claim widespread public support 
for, say, cost internalization. There is no obvious role here for lay 
participation and there’s no reason to think laypeople are neces-
sary—or even helpful—in achieving these outcomes. These pro-
posals are the stuff of experts and bureaucrats. And they are best 
justified using social science evidence.570 The same might be said 
of procedural justice. 
Committing to foreground “evidence” is only a first step. 
What remains are difficult questions about what sorts of evidence 
we need and who—laypeople or experts (and what kind of ex-
perts)—will supply that evidence. Also key are questions of insti-
tutional design. For ease of exposition, I have so far accepted the 
democratizers’ notion that the world divides into expert and lay 
perspectives and institutions. In reality, most “democratic” insti-
tutions combine expertise and popular input in different ways 
and measures. 
Professor Rachel Barkow, for example, advocates an  
administrative-law model that “looks more like the way we make 
policy in other regulatory areas where expertise plays a more 
significant role.”571 The premise—with which I tend to agree—
 
 570 On decarceration, see David Roodman, The Impacts of Incarceration on Crime *7 
(Open Philanthropy Project, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/AW9T-MG75 (concluding, 
in a thorough review of the literature, that “the best estimate of the impact of additional 
incarceration on crime in the United States today is zero” and that “there is as much rea-
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ted). On prison conditions, see M. Keith Chen and Jesse M. Shapiro, Do Harsher Prison 
Conditions Reduce Recidivism? A Discontinuity-Based Approach, 9 Am L & Econ Rev 1, 
21 (2007); Francesco Drago, Roberto Galbiati, and Pietro Vertova, Prison Conditions and 
Recidivism, 13 Am L & Econ Rev 103, 122 (2011); Gerald G. Gaes and Scott D. Camp, 
Unintended Consequences: Experimental Evidence for the Criminogenic Effect of Prison 
Security Level Placement on Post-Release Recidivism, 5 J Experimental Crimin 139, 153 
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nalization, see Itai Ater, Yehonatan Givati, and Oren Rigbi, Organizational Structure, Po-
lice Activity and Crime, 115 J Pub Econ 62, 66–67 (2014) (finding that cost internalization 
in Israel reduced incarceration); Aurélie Ouss, Incentive Structures and Criminal Justice 
*17–18 (unpublished manuscript, Dec 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/QP5S-28NU 
(similar in California). 
 571 Barkow, Prisoners of Politics at 3 (cited in note 41). For additional recent takes on 
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review, to escape the pork-barrel and logrolling politics that prevent politicians from clos-
ing prisons); Barry Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 NYU L 
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is that “empirically valuable information on criminal law can 
lead to better decisions,” meaning “decisions that improve public 
safety and human lives at a lower cost.”572 “The average American 
citizen,” Barkow continues, “is not on equal footing with an expert 
who studies the data in achieving these goals”; “when it comes to 
public safety and maximizing limited resources,” in other words, 
“there is such a thing as expertise that can improve decision- 
making.”573 At the same time, administrative law recognizes in 
various ways that ordinary people may know things the experts 
do not, and that lay contributions and feedback are crucial to well-
informed regulation.574 
An evidence-based approach, to be clear, is not necessarily 
antagonistic toward lay participation or community-based solu-
tions. Its posture is contingent and skeptical, in a scientific sense. 
If reliable evidence shows these solutions to work, great—run 
with them. 575  The skepticism that pervades Part II pertains 
largely to whether reliable evidence does exist to support the de-
mocratizers’ proposals. Nor does an evidence-based approach ob-
viate the need to engage in difficult value judgments. What does 
it mean, after all, for a criminal justice reform to “work”? Does a 
procedural justice model “work” if it enhances the legitimacy of the 
police, and increases citizen compliance, without improving sub-
stantive or distributive justice? Some say not,576 but reasonable 
 
 572 Barkow, Prisoners of Politics at 167 (cited in note 41). Barkow gives a simple ex-
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could achieve the same public safety results at a lower cost and without unnecessary con-
finement, that treatment program should be used.” Id at 166. 
 573 Id at 168. 
 574 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit Revolution 79–99 (MIT 2018). 
 575 Consider Trevor George Gardner, Right at Home: Modeling Sub-Federal Re-
sistance as Criminal Justice Reform, 46 Fla St U L Rev 527, 534 (2019) (advocating “in-
strumental” rather than “ideological” sub-federal resistance to state and federal criminal 
justice policy). 
 576 Various scholars argue that, even if the procedural justice model does work, there 
are serious normative concerns with legitimating, through procedural justice techniques, 
a system that is substantively unjust. The basic concern “is that authorities can use the 
appearance of fair procedure . . . as an inexpensive way to coopt citizens and distract them 
from outcomes that by normative criteria might be considered substantively unfair or bi-
ased.” MacCoun, 1 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci at 189 (cited in note 521). “Any procedural justice 
reforms,” Paul Butler urges, “need to be accompanied by substantive reforms if they are 
to have an impact beyond public relations.” Butler, Chokehold at 198 (cited in note 483). 
Indeed, “[d]eploying legitimacy theory and procedural justice as a diagnosis and solution 
to the current policing crisis,” Professor Monica Bell cautions, “might even imply . . . that 
the problem of policing is better understood as a result of African American criminality 
than as a badge and incident of race- and class-based subjugation.” Bell, 126 Yale L J at 
2061 (cited in note 11). Or as Professor Dorothy Roberts puts it, more acerbically: “It is 
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people could disagree, depending upon their ranking of competing 
societal values. What evidence contributes is a realistic under-
standing of which values are served and disserved, and to what 
extent. 
In all events, the choice between more and less “democracy” 
is a false one. The critical questions are what values we want our 
criminal justice system to serve and what kind of democracy is 
likeliest to realize them. The latter question, in turn, requires us 
to contemplate how best to blend accountability to the public with 
various kinds of criminal justice expertise. These are difficult 
questions that I put off for another day. But they are ones we 
should be asking. 
 
nonsensical to believe an anti-democratic system can be fixed by ensuring greater obedi-
ence from the very people it is designed to subordinate.” Roberts, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1604 
(cited in note 32). 
